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On coalition course - The Telegraph

Murari Mohan Mukherjee ()
23 April 1997

Title : On coalition course
Author : Murari Mohan Mukherjee
Publication : The Telegraph
Date : April 23, 1997

Four decades of rule by the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty influenced the growth of the
Indian polity in three distinct ways. First, it provided the country the
political stability which enabled democracy to strike roots in Indian soil.
Second, owing to their personal charisma and personalized style of working, no
member of the dynasty felt the need to rely on the Congress to strengthen his or
her political base. This led to the progressive weakening of the party
organization and its ultimate atrophy. Third, the dynastic rule delayed the
emergence of a robust, multi-party democracy and the growth of regional parties.

As a result, the decline of the Congress did not lead to its displacement by
another national party. Instead, one witnessed the rise of a plethora of regional
and sub-national parties. The ensuing confusion led to the country entering
coalition politics without having evolved a culture of collective leadership and
cooperative endeavour. This has given an unsavoury air to coalition governments
in general and has resulted in the public looking upon them as shortlived
marriages of convenience.

In 1977, the Janata Party cabinet led by Morarji Desai was the first coalition
government in India. The Jana Sangh joined this coalition with reservations. The
Desai government was put to severe test during Its 28 month tenure. The Jana
Sangh utilized this government to induct its own cadres in the government
controlled media and other organizations. It refused to snap its umbilical
relation with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. This ultimately led to the Jana
Sangh's withdrawal from the Janata Party and the latter's consequent collapse.

The second, coalition government was formed in 1989 with external support from the
Bharatiya Janata Party. It suffered from the same ideological incompatibility.
When the BJP pulled out over the Mandal-Ayodhya issue, the prime minister, V.P.
Singh, resigned, and Chandra Shekhar stepped in with the Congress supporting him
from outside. But the motives of the Congress were mala fide from the very start.
Rajiv Gandhi soon pulled the rug from under Chandra Shekhar's feet thus
precipitating the 1991 general elections.

The third coalition government led by H.D. Deve Gowda till a few days ago fared
better. One can even be confident that the government now headed by I.K. Gujral
will not revert to earlier examples of coalition governance.

The United Front government has a distinct advantage over its predecessors in its
being composed of more or less like minded parties. In spite of rumblings in the
Congress about the nature of the leadership and by the left about the validity of
the government's economic policies, there is no serious mismatch of perceptions.

Another reason the present coalition has better prospects than those before it is
that for the first time, none of the 190 members of the United Front joined the
alliance with any ulterior motive of sabotaging it from within.

Despite these strengths of the Gujral government, its weaknesses are more
significant and numerous. The United Front faced hiccups from the beginning.

The formation and composition of the cabinet - in which the regional satraps
played a decisive role - clearly held the seeds of future turmoil. The
Ramakrishna Hegde episode, followed by Maneka Gandhi's expulsion previewed the
shape of dissensions - the Congress's no confidence against Deve Gowda's prime
ministership being the most important manifestation - to come. The controversies
surrounding Mohammad Taslimuddin and Kanti Singh indicated the problems that Deve
Gowda faced for not having a free hand in selecting his team. Moreover,
freewheeling statements by some ministers had put the United Front government to
test.

The greatest weakness of the United Front was its total dependence of the Congress
for survival. The internecine feuds in the Congress made things worse. The
Congress moreover was too addicted to power to resist the temptation of doing to
the front what Indira Gandhi did to Charan Singh or Rajiv Gandhi did to Chandra
Shekhar.

The Congress's withdrawal of support should, however, be seen as a temporary
setback. The party had to destabilize the front for its own survival. For the
past 10 months it had waited for the front to collapse from its own
contradictions. When this did not happen, it had to precipitate a crisis.

The unsettling days of chaos might also be viewed positively. It has often been
argued that parliamentary democracy in India is entering its "middle age", which
makes certain systemic changes necessary. Atal Behari Vajpayee, leader of the
opposition, had observed in November 1996 that the one failure to achieve
democratic empowerment of the majority and ensure them the fruits of economic
progress itself merited a change in governance. He also pointed to the subversion
of the electoral system by money and muscle power. Criminalization and corruption
had coarsened the polity and systemic flaws had permitted opportunism to flourish.

The plight of the two major national parties, the Congress and the BJP, in fact
mirrors the problems that confront this democratic experiment in the country. In
its present state, the Congress seems ill equipped to deal with the constant flux
and is bereft of ideas and proper leadership. It is unable to detect the new
faultlines in Indian politics which are related to caste and regional tendencies.
Despite drawing its support mostly from the urban middle class, it can no longer
be termed as a progressive party.

The BJP is not better placed either. Its "flip flop" strategy is indicative of
the bankruptcy of its programme. Occasionally diluting its ideology and at other
times displaying a puritanical streak about its commitment to Hindutva, the party
seems confused about its priorities.

For instance, take its attempt at coalition politics. Its alliances with the
Samata Party in Bihar, the Haryana Vikas Party in Haryana, the Akali Dal in Punjab
and the Bahujan Samaj Party in Uttar Pradesh have decidedly borne fruit. But the
strategy of forming a "national democratic front" with a common minimum programme
is definitely a borrowed idea which is bound to be at conflict with its
centralizing goals. The party is yet to evolve a policy of decentralization and
devolution of power to the states.

The BJP nevertheless, serves as the biggest unifying force in Indian politics
today. The United Front had not made it a secret that anti-BJPism was what had
brought the 13 parties together. Yet anti-BJPism alone cannot prove to be the
strongest adhesive for the United Front. In the past, United Front parties have,
singly or collectively, cooperated with the BJP or its predecessor, the Jana
Sangh. The plank had been anti-Congressism then. But now the United Front without
remorse clones the Congress manifesto in its common minimum programme. The budget
made its tilt towards the Congress more than apparent.

Despite the resolution of the leadership crisis in the United Front, the political
situation remains precarious. Unable to form a government on their own, the
Congress, the BJP and the United Front will always be cause for instability. Had
they been ideologically distinct, they could have carved out their separate
electorates. But the Congress and Janata Dal share too much common space to make
this possible. Their manifestos confuse the people, their confrontation defeat
their common objective of keeping the BJP out of power.

Political parties, be it within a coalition or without, should keep in mind that
outside their bailiwick there is a larger public whose interests have to be
catered to. And this public is far from being homogeneous or uniformly
prosperous.

This problem has to be addressed through realistic development programmes. It is
also through developmental alternatives that sections of the population are to
judge what is best for them. Attempts to win a larger consensus through these
programmes will keep the ideologies in circulation and the notion of the public
alive. Without this democracy in India will be a Benthamite world where each
section will selfishly aspire towards its own aggrandizement.

Winston Churchill had said, "national interests must always supervene the
individual or party interests". Indian politicians would do well to remember the
statement. Now is the time for repair and people with probity have to take
charge.


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