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HVK Archives: Broadcast policy, Making the 'autonomous' body truly autonomous

Broadcast policy, Making the 'autonomous' body truly autonomous - The Times of India

Ashish Mullick ()
10 May 1997

Title : Broadcast policy, Making the 'autonomous' body truly autonomous
Author : Ashish Mullick
Publication : The Times of India
Date : May 10, 1997

Perhaps the most important area in the proposed broadcast law is the structure of
the Broadcast Authority of India (BAI). The general feeling is that the provisions
in the broadcast bill draft are at sharp variance with the intended objectives of
the planned legislation since they contradict the very foundation of the entire
exercise-the need to deregulate.

The draft provides that the BAI will consist of one whole-time chairman, four
whole-time members, six part-time members, four ex-officio members including
secretary, information and broadcasting (I&B), secretary, department of
telecommunication (DoT), secretary, department of space and the secretary-general.

The chairman, whole-time members and part-time members will be appointed by the
President on the recommendation of a selection committee consisting of the
chairman of the Council of States who will be chairman of the committee, the
chairman of the Press Council of India and a nominee of the President of India.

The very first point that strikes a media observer is: If the intended objective
of the Supreme Court judgment is to ensure that the BAI is an autonomous body, why
let as many as four secretaries in the government sit on the BAI? While there can
be no doubt about the competence of these gentlemen in their respective fields,
their very status as secretaries will raise serious questions about the actual
independence of the BAI.

If the intention is, indeed, to have government officials on the board, the
directors general of DD and AIR could be asked to discharge this function as
ex-officio members, being the operational heads of government-run media. In
addition, the chairman of the Press Council of India could be a third ex-officio
member of the board, which would report to a chairman appointed by the President.

The Government could, additionally, consider appointing a six-man parallel team of
full-time members comprising experts from various specialised fields. These could
include an expert from the legal profession, an expert from the finance market, an
expert on broadcast technology, a public affairs professional (who will advise the
board on various issues on the basis of his constant interaction with various
media houses, non-governmental agencies, etc), a person from the consumer goods
industry, and an advertising professional.

They can all be selected by the chairman of the board for a term of five years and
must have a minimum of 15 years' experience in their respective fields.

The most crucial issue for the proposed BAI, is funding. It is imperative that it
should be made self-sustaining in terms of finances and a little reliant as
possible on the Government so as to ensure objectively genuine autonomy. The
source of funds can predominantly be operating permit fees imposed for various
categories of services, though care should be taken to ensure that the objective
of the BAI does not shift to making profits. The permit fees can be revised from
time to time, depending on inflationary trends.

The BAI should, nevertheless, be in a position to compensate the chairman and
full-time members as per market standards, so that the very best talent in the
country does not dither to be a part of the authority.

A typical package for the chairman could comprise an annual remuneration ranging
between Rs 50 lakhs and Rs 60 lakhs (inclusive of all perks), whereas each of the
full-time members could be compensated in the range of Rs 30 lakhs-Rs 36 lakhs
annually (inclusive of all perks).

The second contentious issue in the broadcast bill draft pertains to part-time
members. In an area such as broadcasting, which demands more than whole-time
attention, the very term 'part-time' appears to be a misnomer, more so when seen
in the context of the vibrant Indian marketplace, since this implies
responsibility without authority.

The third point of contention in the broadcast bill draft is that of collective
responsibility of all members of the BAI. In an area of specialisation and
particularly at a time when various divergent areas such as satellite, cable, DTH,
MMDS, etc are involved, the emphasis should really have been on separate teams of
specialists with clearly demarcated areas of function as provided in the American
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

A glaring example of the need to have specialists is the widespread criticism of
non-Test playing selectors on the Board of Control for Cricket (BCCI) selection
committee. Similarly, the absence of experts on the BAI panel would deprive it of
all-important credibility.

It may be mentioned here that the American model is better suited for India since
the FCC is truly autonomous as it reports to the Congress (in the U.K., the
regulatory body reports to the Queen). Besides, the vastly developed media
marketplace of the U.S. can serve as a role model and test case for India, as
against the U.K. model of the BBC (since the BBC is not advertising-led, like DD,
its example does not wholly apply to India).

This issue assumes considerable significance since Indian governments have, in the
past, been accused of almost blindly following British models.

The Government would have done well to draw from FCC's structure. FCC comprises
five members who are appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the
Senate. Normally, one commissioner is appointed or re-appointed each year for a
term of five years. From among these five commissioners, the President appoints
the chairman of the commission.

The managing director of the FCC is appointed by the commission chairman and is
the commission's chief operating and executive official. He has overall control
over administrative and managerial matters, while the commission retains control
over policy-making and legislation matters. The managing director can, however,
recommend changes in policy.

And then come the all-important specialists. The office of the Inspector General
plays the role of an active supervisor to the activities and conduct of the
commission. Moreover, it also reviews existing and proposed policies and their
effect on the economy at large.

The office of Public Affairs is responsible for conveying commission activities
and policies to various public institutions, media houses, other industries,
consumers, etc.

It also advises the commission on various subjects based on feedback received
through the information dissemination organ of the office.

The office of Legislative Affairs serves as a contact between the Congress and
various government bodies and the commission and its members.

The office of plans and policy is responsible for policy analyses with respect to
national, international policy changes and economic, legal and sociological
considerations.

The office of Engineering and Technology is mainly concerned with technical
matters. It is responsible for type approvals and the monitoring of technical
stipulations for licenses. It also monitors technological changes worldwide and
reports on the possibility of its application. It renders service and advice with
respect to rule making matters and proceedings affecting more than one department.

The office of General Counsel advises and represents the commission for all legal
matters such as those involving international agreements, litigation covering
licenses, type approvals, etc.

In addition, it also co-ordinates staff work and renders service with respect to
rule-making matters and proceedings affecting more than one bureau.

The office of international communications, on the other hand, coordinates with
governments of other countries, analyses international policy decisions and
co-ordinates international conferences.

The office of administrative law judges is responsible for conducting and hearing
all adjudicatory cases except those reserved exclusively for the commission to
hear.

The Review Board reviews decisions and other hearing matters referred to it by the
commission.

One of the most critical issues that the government needs to take into account is
segregation of the BAI's role with respect to radio and television. Meaning that
there may be two separate regulatory bodies for the two media (as is the case with
the U.K. regulatory authority). This will make the task of the authority less
complicated and more focused on each area.

The above points can, of course, be amended once market experts, media
industrialists and other people of eminence are consulted by the Parliamentary
committee while modifying the draft. Hopefully, it will thereafter be more
transparent and autonomous in the true sense.


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