archive: 'The method followed at Siachen is irrelevant in Kargil'
'The method followed at Siachen is irrelevant in Kargil'
Major General Ashok K Mehta
Rediff on Net
August 18, 1999
Title: 'The method followed at Siachen is irrelevant in Kargil'
Author: Major General Ashok K Mehta
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: August 18, 1999
Kargil has revived two dormant issues: counterinsurgency, CIS and defending LoC in
Kargil. The first feeds on the second. The diversion of troops from the valley to
Kargil disturbed the CIS grid carefully set up over the last ten years though the
Rashtriya Rifles, RR have filled some of the voids. Pakistan used Kargil as a
diversion to pump in large number of Taliban into J&K.
The daring three in a row attacks in two days in Kupwara sector last week are the
fallout of the thinning out of troops from the valley for Kargil. These attacks are
unprecedented. For the first time militants have dared to attack a regular army (RR
post), a brigade headquarter and ambushed a commanding officer's column killing him
and his subedar major.
It is also the first time after three to four years that militants have confronted
the army instead of going for soft targets. Previously militants had targeted army
camps in Rajouri forcing the deployment of an additional division there last year.
The militants have reorganised themselves with the majority of fighters being Afghan
Taliban supported by local militants. They have revised their tactics: confrontations
short of assault on isolated posts instead of hit and run operations.
The message is clear. Pakistan will not allow the Kargil momentum to peter out,
rather insurgency dormant in the valley for a couple of years, will be rekindled and
brought to full steam. Pakistan has to focus international attention on the freedom
fighters and the potential nuclear flashpoint of J&K.
This time around, Pakistan will engineer serious and spectacular incidents involving
in local population which will deter the holding of elections in the state. The
attacks on security forces on J&K in conjunction with the ISI-sponsored arson and
insurgency in the Northeast is likely to put the spotlight on deficiencies in
internal security at the time of elections.
The victory in Kargil snatched from the jaws of defeat is both remarkable and a
blessing in disguise. It has shown up operational deficiencies and preparedness of
the armed forces, the fragility of the LoC, the failure of early warning and the true
face of Pakistan. It has equally vividly demonstrated the need for a war-like
response including the use of air power to the new face of insurgency. It is also
clear that constructive steps have to be concurrently taken in the political and
diplomatic areas.
The immediate priorities are a vigorous CIS campaign and a sound plan for manning the
liberated areas of Kargil. It would appear that RR along with BSF, CRPF and state
police will be used to defeat the insurgency now that the army may be freed from this
role. Whatever the composition of the force, a unified intelligence and operational
command is a must for its success. Eventually RR should take over the responsibility
of internal security tasks in J&K. A similar framework pivoted on Assam Rifles for
the Northeast is necessary. This is part of the old plan where DGs of Rashtriya and
Assam Rifles would take over CIS duties from the army. The bulk of the insurgency in
the valley must be eliminated this winter without carrying over its traces into the
new millennium.
The second problem is defending the LoC in Kargil. This task had been exaggerated to
levels of fantasy by an uninformed media. Many breathtaking models have been
suggested for defending Kargil. Pakistan is being credited with having Siachenised
the entire mountain wasteland between Zojila and Turtuk tying down at least two, even
three, divisions! These judgements betray incomplete knowledge of terrain, manning
norms and Siachen.
To start with, the politico-military connotation of Siachen on Kargil is misleading.
Kargil lies within the territorial limits of the LoC whereas Siachen falls in its
undemarcated zone. Three battalions deployed on the glacier along with the Saltoro
watershed contest the disputed Pakistani interpretation of the extension of the LoC.
The glaciated posts east of Shyok river are altitudes ranging from 18 to 20000 feet,
permanently snowbound.
In Kargil each sector is different from the other. Mashkoh valley, Drass, Kaksar,
Chhainikund. Shingo, Batalik, Chorbatla and now the new Hanif (after Lt Hanifuddin)
sub sectors stretch across 140 km averaging 14 to 16000 feet. Before the Kargil war,
four army and one BSE battalions occupied posts throughout the year but with wide
gaps between brigades as well as between battalions. During summer, snow will thaw in
most of these areas.
For example, the gaps between the Siachen Brigade and Kargil (Batalik) and Kargil and
Gurez brigades (Mashkoh) were as large as 30 km. The inter-brigade boundaries are
invariably the most vulnerable where encroachments and conflict usually start. These
gaps have existed since 1972 because largescale movement of troops in a war situation
was not envisaged.
Further these areas in Ladakh were regarded as unsuitable for infiltration due to the
Shia and Buddhist profile of population enroute, though some intruders were
intercepted in Mashkoh in 1993. Most of the gaps which have to be plugged are as
different from Siachen as Mount Kilimanjaro is from Kanchjanga.
Besides the objectionable statement on Siachenisation, the other illusion is about
more Kargils. There is no scope for a Kargil elsewhere on the LoC. Templates
suggested for intensified deployment to prevent recurrence of intrusions of Kargil
are bizarre. They range from a post every 200 yards to 200 posts held by 20 men to a
1 to 3 model which implies three soldiers are required at the base of support one on
the peak. This method followed at Siachen is irrelevant in Kargil. These absurd
models have unnecessarily committed two to three divisions in Kargil replicating the
three battalions on Siachen whereas the actual requirements is far less -- no more
than one brigade.
Surveillance and manning of the LoC is dictated by terrain, weather conditions and
domination of LoC and routes across it. The new gridlock astride the LoC will not be
encroachment-proof. The most reliable early warning and surveillance systems are
aerial and ground reconnaissance complemented by forward and sideways-looking radars,
sensors but monitored by a man and a dog. Technology has to be tested on this terrain
before induction.
Pakistan held the four pockets of intrusions with 1000 soldiers. They have brought in
another brigade to hold posts opposite the area of intrusions. At the very most, the
Indian Army will require an additional 4000 troops (one brigade) to plug the violated
gaps. The existing brigade sector will turn into an expanded two-brigade divisional
area, certainly not into a three-division Corps zone, however much Pakistan would
want this to happen. At present Siachen, Turtuk and Leh form part of the Leh
division. Batalik and Chorbatla could be added to this as one additional brigade
sector.
The cost of additional deployment by India will also have to be borne by Pakistan. It
has already said it would man peaks on LoC from where it can dominate Kargil and has
therefore inducted fresh troops for this. We need to raise additional battalions of
J&K Light Infantry and Ladakh Scouts, which have fought gallantly in Kargil and
Turtuk. Their soldiers are locals, well acclimatised and superbly motivated. The cost
of defending Kargil has been erroneously estimated as Rs 4 crore a day. This has been
compounded by mis-assessing the cost of Kargil as three times Siachen.
Sealing the LoC in high mountains is just not feasible. What is feasible is raising
the cost for Pakistan breaching the LoC by strong and swift anti-infiltration and CIS
operations. Also by making Pakistan pay diplomatic penalty. But the shelling in
Kargil and Drass will go on. The tradeoff lies in the Neelam valley in the Kupwara
sector where Indian guns keep doing a Kargil. That may be one reason why Kupwara has
been chosen to launch the present phase of insurgency.
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