Title: End the menace
of terrorism!
Author: Major General
Ashok K Mehta (retd)
Publication: Rediff
on Net
Date: April 7, 2000
We have the will and
the means to end this menace, was the warning given to Pakistan by Prime
Minister Vajpayee at the joint press conference with President Bill Clinton
following the Sikh massacre. This belated declaration of intent and capability
rings hollow against the background of the decade-long proxy war which
has thrived because it has gone unpunished. The will and ways to end the
menace of terrorism were forfeited when the Indian State failed to strike
at the source and roots of insurgency across the LoC in the early 90s.
Any show of grit and
determination now when India has internationally sanctified the LoC is
sheer rhetoric. Missing altogether is the deterrent of denial and retribution
which has encouraged terrorism and militancy.
Last month was easily
the worst 30 days of the ten-year-old proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir where
Pakistan has kept alive the LoC for more than 50 years. The main reason
for the violent intensification of terrorism was the Clinton visit attended
by a battalion of international media, though the tempo of violence has
been building up since Kargil and the military takeover of Pakistan.
There has been a qualitative
change in the nature and intensity of terrorist attacks. Previously only
soft targets were chosen and confrontation with security forces avoided.
It was typical hit-and-run operations, but very effective. By 1994, the
situation took a turn for the worse with even the army coming under extreme
stress and strain. There were a number of stress-related incidents like
mutinous conduct and shootouts among security forces.
Around mid-1994, then
army chief General B C Joshi had strongly advocated hot pursuit and targeting
of the source of insurgency. But the idea was dropped even though Pakistan
did not then possess a nuclear shield. Renewed counterinsurgency operations
and political dialogue with Pakistan were able to contain militancy. By
1998, after a peaceful election, Srinagar was restored as a tourist destination
and economic activity revived. Jammu and Kashmir had attained normalcy.
But then Kargil happened and shattered the peace.
The first three months
of the new century have been the worst ever for the security forces. The
induction of foreign mercenaries and suicide squads of fedayeen have brought
all manner of targets within the reach of terrorists. They now dare to
attack posts. Ambush patrols lay improvised explosive devices and infiltrate
high security camps like the BSF, Corps and Rashtriya Rifles headquarters
and shoot soldiers with silenced pistols at point blank range. These are
acts of defiance and high motivation. The casualties inflicted on security
forces are the highest in the last ten years.
Besides the surprises
and shock effect of these spectacular assaults on premier military sites,
they also undermine the morale of the soldier constrained by the emphasis
on use of minimum force and by human rights concerns. Political interference
and administrative enquiries have forced troops into a no-risk defensive
mentality. Just two terrorists holed up in a camp have put hundreds of
elite troops in a spin. No concept of surgical strikes has been devised
to flush them out.
The intensification of
the proxy war has affected the morale of the troops fighting it. They are
tired, overstretched and extremely stressed. Commanders are testy and on
edge. They question the one-sided respect of the LoC and are visibly relieved
when they cross the Banihal tunnel for rest and recuperation. Thank god
we are out of the hell hole, is what they say.
There is calibrated escalation
by both sides of the proxy war. Pakistan first upped the ante by introducing
suicide squads, heavy weapons and Taleban-hardened foreign mercenaries
after Kargil. Despite the ritual declaration of a new, proactive strategy,
no practical steps have been taken to end the menace. The authorities believe
that pumping in more troops is the answer, whereas what is required is
actionable intelligence and unity of command. The much venerated unified
command is a joke. Post-Kargil, when the army tried to pull out from the
proxy war, the state and central governments raised a hue and cry. The
army is meant to fight wars, not insurgencies.
Late last month, India
also raised the ante by incorporating the attack helicopter in counter-insurgency
operations. For the first time, gunships are being used to track and attack
terrorists in their hideouts. In the past, helicopters have been used only
for casualty-evacuation.
A book on a future two-front
war between India-Pakistan and India-China, written by a western military
expert to be released soon, begins with the scenario which has already
been enacted in the past by the introduction of the helicopter. In the
fictionalised account, the Taleban use a Stinger missile to bring down
a helicopter carrying the Indian home minister and the northern army commander.
The rest is all out war, the favourite hobby horse of Western military
theorists.
It is not inconceivable
that shoulder-held missiles may soon be acquired by terrorists. The LTTE
is one source for these. In the past, Tamil Tigers have not been averse
to merchandising military expertise like the improved IED. The real danger
is of the fedayeen turning into Dhanu, the human bomber which has become
the scourge of Sri Lanka.
Civilised democracies
respect human dignity and life. Kargil, Kathmandu and Kandahar happened
because India is getting accustomed to turning the other cheek. One wins
wars by inflicting casualties on the enemy, not inviting them on one's
own forces.
The fatalistic approach
to accepting insult and injury is bad for the national psyche and morale.
Equally, it is no good sulking over the straitjacket India has put itself
into by sanctifying the LoC.
Last week, at their biannual
meeting at Delhi, army commanders were addressing future conflict whereas
they should have been concentrating on the present in Jammu and Kashmir.
Markaz al Dawa, near Lahore, is the fount of jehad in Jammu and Kashmir.
If America could attack Osama Bin Laden in Kandahar, why can't India target
Markaz al Dawa?
Let India demonstrate
the will and means to end the menace of terrorism.
