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Clinton's message to Pakistan

Clinton's message to Pakistan

M.B. Naqvi
Dawn, Karachi
April 9, 2000
Title: Clinton's message to Pakistan
Author: M.B. Naqvi
Publication: Dawn, Karachi
Date: April 9, 2000

THE people of Pakistan had better concentrate on what Bill Clinton said and how he said it on TV. What he may have told in private to Gen. Musharraf is less relevant. The US president chose to speak to the people of Pakistan directly and whatever his personal motivation, he came off as an earnest well-wisher of Pakistan.

What he said, cliche or not, deserves to be pondered over and acted upon either in clear defiance of what he wished them to do or in accordance with it what he advised. There is no way of fudging the issue or muddling through it; a clear choice has to be made one way or another.

That Pakistan is between the devil and the deep sea goes without saying. But it is not due to anything the Americans did; we ourselves are largely responsible for what afflicts us today. Which Pakistanis is one accusing? There was the bureaucratic-military coterie of about half a dozen people in the early 1950s who subverted democracy and prevented its free functioning. It took over the country in 1958 under martial law, in the early part of which the military established its supremacy over the civilians. The martial law may have lasted only four years but the Ayub regime went on for much longer. It nurtured the East Pakistan crisis.

The denouement of the doings of that ruling coterie could be seen in the shape of the 1971 tragedy. Indeed, many would say that the coterie was also responsible for the eleven years of Gen. Ziaul Haq's regime that created all manner of troubles as also for the destabilization of democracy that was restored in 1988 right down to another military takeover on October 12 last year.

Supporters of the military-bureaucratic coterie think that all politicians in Pakistan are corrupt as well as incompetent, and that common Pakistanis are not fit to govern themselves efficiently and require guidance. This philosophy has guided all the dictators and most Pakistanis now prefer to call the elite groups the 'establishment.' Indeed, a better term would be 'political class.' It includes all incumbent and would-be MNAs, MPAs, Senators and senior bureaucrats and top echelons of business, finance, trade and a few successful professionals. This has been the view of authoritarian rulers and their supporters and those who believe in it have been the denigrators of democracy. There are many such people in important spheres of life and some in and around the current military regime.

There is a relatively small segment of rational, humanistic and democratic opinion which disputes this and holds the political class as a whole to be responsible for the mess Pakistan is in. They are fiercely opposed by the politically splintered but ideologically convergent right-wing orthodox religious parties and groups, which on the whole remain closely allied with, and are supporters of, authoritarian rulers. Some of them conditionally support the Musharraf regime - if it enforces Shariat. These include Maulana Fazalur Rehman's JUI, the patron-saint of the Taliban. This is the political geography of Pakistan.

What is unmistakable is the fact that Pakistan has been ruled by the same political class - whether in a nominal democracy or under military-bureaucratic regimes. Under them a culture of dependence has grown. Pakistan has developed on the basis of foreign aid and when foreign assistance became relatively small compared to the government's needs, its development has suffered. The result has been that its non-productive expenditures, mainly debt servicing and defence, have gone on increasing while social sectors have been neglected. The fact of the matter now is that this sort of thing cannot go on. This has got to change.

President Bill Clinton has assured us of all the American support provided we fulfil the four conditions he has laid down. These are: restoration of democracy; restraint in the manufacture, development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles; respect for the Line of Control in Kashmir; and resumption of dialogue with India.

Before one goes into the details of these, it has to be clarified that situated as Pakistan's political class is, it has no option but to accept all the four conditions if it does want American goodwill of the kind that would help Pakistan politically and economically in the present crisis situation. There may be other options but they are not available to the present establishment that rules the roost. So, why talk about them?

The question is if the economy cannot remain viable and goes into default either during 2000-01 or in fiscal year 2001-02, it will create conditions in which the survival of the state may become a problem. The choice is Islamabad government's. It is a Hobson's choice and perhaps the last chance to continue along the familiar path.

Restoration of democracy implies a lot of difficult things. Mr Clinton seems to have ignored the difficulties of a general in control of the state's governing apparatus. He has to find for himself a safe way out of this involvement. In particular, he needs to have all the acts of his government, including the takeover of power - clearly an extra constitutional act - duly indemnified. How can anyone expect the military in Pakistan - which is the true ruler rather than just one general - to relinquish power and go back to barracks leaving everything in a mess?

Even the holding of polls to the national and provincial assemblies is not possible until the generals are sure who will emerge from these polls and whether the ones likely to come to power will grant the required indemnity - for all the military and civil officers who are now conducting the business of governance. This is a challenge that the political class has to meet for enabling the generals to pull out - a manoeuvre that generals have always found hard to execute successfully.

Nuclear restraint is urged by the Americans and most other people of the world. But the ruling classes of India and Pakistan are both united in opposing it. Both are committed to maintain a nuclear deterrent that is nominally minimal but has also to be credible and effective - a prescription for a continuing nuclear arms race.

Respect for the LoC and resumption of dialogue can be grouped together and treated as one subject dealing with 'terrorism.' Indians remain firm that they will not start talking to Pakistan until it stops across-the-border Jihad. Respect the for LoC means stoppage of all manner of Jihad and also depends on Pakistan opting for normal relations with India and negotiating with it a settlement of all bilateral problems in an ambience of peace, economic cooperation and free trade.

The Americans also include under the rubric of terrorism Pakistan using its influence with the Taliban in a way that may discourage their extremism and of their friends in Afghanistan. In addition, it should result in securing the custody of Osama bin Laden and some others wanted by Americans for trial.

The fact of the matter is that the Americans take exactly the same view on the general question of terrorism as does the BJP-led government in New Deli. That Americans are no longer honest brokers but are largely partisan in the view of a large section of Pakistani establishment is something that has to be reckoned with. Given our dependence syndrome - we need a large amount of cash from the IMF or at least its promise of $ 500 million before June 30 next and a new agreement with the IMF offering a larger amount under the nominal title of anti-poverty agreement.

It is to be clearly understood that Pakistan will have to rely mainly on the peaceful efforts of the Kashmiris to project and secure support for their grievances and on the reaction of international opinion, both of which will have to make an impact on the Indian politics and government.

The jihad since then has brought India and Pakistan face to face with the prospect of a 'limited war' that can scarcely remain as limited as implied or wished for and in which the nuclear dimension is likely to be occasioned. That would be an unwinnable situation for both India and Pakistan. Both are required to walk back from the precipice. But would they? At any rate, they do not know how. Track III diplomacy of Pakistan-India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy and Pakistan Peace Coalition (PPC) could perhaps show the way if only the governments in New Delhi and Islamabad will heed.
 



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