Author: Daniel Pipes
Publication: The Los
Angeles Times
Date: October 6, 2000
In all likelihood, the
violence that began in Jerusalem on Sept. 28 marks a major turning
point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. And how Israelis respond has
direct implications for Americans.
From its creation in
1948 until roughly 1993, Israel consistently pursued a policy of deterrence--signaling
to its enemies not to make trouble or they would pay dearly. Though
expensive and often painful to pursue, not to speak of unpopular internationally,
this tough approach worked; grudgingly and slowly, the opponents of the
Jewish state did come to accept its existence.
Yitzhak Rabin's famous
handshake on the White House lawn with Yasser Arafat in 1993 inaugurated
a very different policy--a softer, more generous and internationally more
acceptable one. Since 1993, Israelis have offered substantial benefits
to their enemies (Palestinian autonomy, southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights)
and make almost no demands in return.
For example, although
Israeli diplomats protest the jihad rhetoric in Arafat's speeches and the
anti-Semitic cartoons in Palestinian newspapers, these are empty complaints;
after lodging an objection, the Israelis go right back to negotiations
and make further concessions. Palestinian acts of terrorism lead
to only momentary breaks in diplomacy, followed by a quick return to the
dubiously named peace process.
Israelis are generous
in the expectation that goodwill will prompt a reciprocal feeling across
the battle line. Forbearance, they hope, will disentangle them from
an old and unwanted conflict.
Sad to say, just the
opposite has occurred, for Israel's policy of goodwill has baffled Palestinians
and other Arabs. Sometimes it conveys weakness; the Syrian president
called Israel's decision to evacuate southern Lebanon "an Israeli defeat,
the first since the creation of the state." Sometimes goodwill appears
as a frightening deception; Shimon Peres' lovely vision of a benign "new
Middle East" translated into Arabic as a terrible Israeli ambition for
economic hegemony.
In either case, Israel's
soft policy results in a diminished willingness by its enemies to compromise.
Rather than seek partial gains through negotiations, Palestinians are increasingly
resolved to win all through force. This dynamic accounts for their
near-total lack of interest in Ehud Barak's jaw-droppingly generous proposals
in July. He offered them 90% of the West Bank, 150,000 Palestinians
let into Israel, and shared sovereignty over the Temple Mount. But
these terms held minimal appeal to a population now demanding 100% of the
territory, millions of Palestinians into Israel and full sovereignty.
Although the Palestinians
have for years demonstrated a growing impatience with diplomacy, their
Israeli (and American) interlocutors seemingly have been blind to this
mood, imagining that another piece of paper will assuage them. But
Palestinian confidence and aggressiveness now has reached a point at which
further Israeli concessions are meaningless. The season for force
has arrived.
And so a campaign of
violence has began. Judging by current sentiments, it may well last
for a long time: "This is a war between religions," Khalid Abu Araysh,
a 25-year-old in Hebron told the Associated Press, "and I'm participating
because I'm Muslim."
The current bloodshed
confronts Israel with a choice: Continue on with the seductive post-1993
policy of unilateral withdrawal, hoping against hope that one more concession
will induce Palestinian goodwill. Or revert to the less pleasant
but far more effective policy of deterrence, putting the Palestinians on
notice that Israel will not just protect itself from violence but will
reverse Palestinian gains made since 1993; only when the Palestinians show
a change of heart--meaning a true renunciation of violence--would negotiations
recommence.
The signs are not good.
Barak has announced that a "cessation of violence is a precondition for
any continuation of the negotiations," implying his readiness to return
to the bargaining table as though nothing much has happened. This
signals the Palestinians that their violence has no diplomatic cost, and
so ultimately is acceptable to Israel.
Such Israeli weakness
has potentially worrisome repercussions for Americans because, as the ultimate
guarantor of Israel's security, the United States has a stake in that country's
safety and welfare. Therefore, rather than encourage Israelis to
take steps that further erode its security, as the Clinton administration
so enthusiastically does, we should warn them away from the dangerous course
they are pursuing.
