Author: Editorial
Publication: Dawn, Karachi
Date: February 3, 2001
The Indian government's decision
to withdraw some of its troops and heavy equipment from the Line of Control
in Kashmir is encouraging. The lowering of the militarization level in
a conflict-ridden region always proves beneficial for peace. This process
had already begun along the LoC in Kashmir when Pakistan withdrew some
of its forces in December in response to India's Ramazan ceasefire. It
is, therefore, a positive development that the thrust of the two parties
is towards defusing tension. This should promote a climate conducive to
a peace dialogue, which should be the end goal of all these strategic measures.
Of course, any move which has a direct impact on reducing the incidence
of violence in Kashmir is welcome. At least, it leads to a lowering of
the casualty figures.
In this happy scenario, one would
have to add a note of disquiet though. A section of the Kashmiri militants
who have links with some Pakistan-based jihadi organizations have rejected
India's peace moves and stepped up their offensive. As a result, the number
of casualties, which have dropped considerably following the ceasefire,
are still quite high. What is worrisome is that these militant groups have
not spelled out their political aims with degree of clarity. If they are
thinking in terms of a military victory, they are only deluding themselves.
It is time they realized that they are not in a position to drive out India
with all its military might from Occupied Kashmir. Afghanistan is a good
example of the failure of guerrilla fighters to clinch their initial military
successes with a political process aimed at a broad-based settlement with
their rivals at the negotiating table. The Vietnamese were more shrewd.
They forced the Americans to quit Vietnam by negotiating peace on their
own terms at the Paris conference. It is time the Kashmiri freedom fighters
also pondered the implications of their jihad for the future of Kashmir.
If the conflict in Kashmir is to
be resolved and a permanent solution found to the dispute, India will also
be required to address the compulsions of a dialogue as well. The ceasefire
in the valley and the two extensions of the truce plus the present move
to withdraw some troops will not provide a permanent solution to the problem
unless it is sought through a process of negotiations. Logically, the opening
of a dialogue on Kashmir with the Kashmiris and Pakistan should be the
immediate next step. But India has been prevaricating on this. All the
members of the APHC delegation who were to visit Pakistan have not been
issued passports yet. Neither has the APHC leadership been invited for
talks to New Delhi. This has created an atmosphere of uncertainty about
the prospects ahead. If this state of affairs continues it would strengthen
the hands of the militants and cause frustration in the ranks of the moderates,
which would ultimately undermine the ceasefire. It is therefore important
that New Delhi should now make haste with the initiation of the actual
process of contact and talks among the three principal parties. Once the
peace process begins, the preachers and purveyors of violence will find
themselves gradually marginalized.
