Author: Kuldip Nayar
Publication: Afternoon Despatch
& Courier
Date: July 5, 2001
I have covered all the summits
between India and Pakistan from the one held at Tashkent in 1966 to that
at Lahore in 1999. All of them, around six, failed because both sides were
seeking different things. New Delhi wanted Islamabad to eschew violence
in settling Indo-Pakistan differences while Islamabad demanded a solution
of its liking on Kashmir before, responding to appeals for peace.
At every summit, the Indian Prime
Minister made it clear that Kashmir was not negotiable. And every time
Pakistan did not implement the agreement reached because it had made no
headway with Kashmir.
Take the Tashkent conference. Prime
Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri kept on emphasising on Pakistan President
General Mohammad Ayub Khan to give an undertaking on renunciation of force.
But Ayub went on linking it with the settlement on Kashmir. The talks practically
failed. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, the conciliator, brought them together
for a 'final' session.
Kashmir dispute
At that meeting Ayub brought a four-line
draft which he hoped would satisfy Shastri on the question of renunciation
of force. The draft contained only a general statement on the efficacy
of finding a solution to Indo-Pakistan problems through peace. Shastri
was not satisfied and suggested an amendment which Ayub accepted. And in
his own hand the Pakistan President made the necessary changes, including
the phrase "Without resort to arms."
But when India asked for an official
confirmation of the amended draft, Pakistan said that there was never any
draft. Zulfikat Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan's Foreign Minister, apparently
had his way because he was against giving any assurance on peace without
having something on Kashmir. He threatened to go back to Pakistan and "take
the nation into confidence" on what had happened. Ayub gave in because
he could not take any chances. He had emerged weaker from the 1965 conflict
with India.
It was not Ayub but Bhutto who rang
up Shastri's dacha to explain that Ayub had agreed to put in the phrase,
"without resort to arms" on the promise of Indian "concessions" on Kashmir.
An innocuous kind of statement, saying that further efforts would be made
to solve India-Pakistan differences, was prepared.
It was Kosygin who saved the situation.
He used all his persuasion - as well as pressure - to make Shastri not
to insist on a specific reference to renunciation of force in the proposed
peace agreement. On his part, the Soviet leader gave an assurance that
his country would support India if ever Pakistan tried to take Kashmir
by force. Kosygin also worked on Ayub to agree to the pledge of renunciation
of force indirectly by reaffirming in the proposed agreement that under
the UN charter the parties concerned were obliged to adopt peaceful means
to settle differences.
Bhutto told me later: "Shastri took
Ayub for a ride. I don't know whether you saw the way he disarmed (Ayub)-
'I am a poor man, a parliamentarian, I don't have your courage, I don't
have your strength, your stature," and the man started twirling his mustaches
and Shastri at that time streaked off."
Ultimately, Shastri and Ayub signed
a declaration to settle disputes through peaceful means and to consider
steps to restore economic, trade and cultural relations as well as communications.
However, Shastri made it clear to Kosygin that Kashmir's accession to India
was irrevocable.
The exercise at Shimla was not much
different. India submitted its draft, captioned "Agreement on Bilateral
Relations between India and Pakistan." It said: "The Government of Pakistan
are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation
that have hitherto married their relations and work for the promotion of
a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable
peace in the subcontinent so that both countries may henceforth devote
the resources and energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare
of the people."
The draft emphasised the need for
adoption of a policy of ensuring peace, friendship and cooperation and
settlement of disputes by peaceful means. It was laid down that the two
countries "shall always respect each other's national unity, territorial
integrity, political independence, sovereignty and equality."
But Pakistan brought in Kashmir
and said that the problem had to be solved in accordance with the UN resolution
on the subject. P.N. Haksar, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's principal secretary,
then leading the talks, said that what India understood from these resolutions
was different from what Pakistan did. In fact, the entire Kashmir was India's,
including the portion under Pakistan's occupation. Aziz Ahmad, leader of
the Pakistan delegation, argued that the people in Pakistan were very suspicious,
"even if we were to discuss its (the Kashmir question) preliminaries,"
the impression would go around that there was a "sellout" at Shimla.
The same point was made by Bhutto
by then Pakistan's prime minister - to Indira Gandhi when officials on
both sides reported failure of their efforts. He said that he was not in
a position to discuss Kashmir because the whole peace agreement would be
suspect in the eyes of Pakistanis who would imagine some "secret clause"
on Kashmir. "My back is to the wall; I can't make any more concessions,"
Bhutto said. He suggested that the discussion on Kashmir be postponed to
some other time. "Why hurry on these matters? I think haste sometimes ruins
these problems. Then why should it be incumbent on us to solve all problems?"
Bhutto might have made a promise
to get back the territory which India had won in West Pakistan during the
Bangladesh wan He might have even tried to sell the proposal on return
to Pakistan from Shimla. But he could not have pursued it because the mood
in Pakistan at that time was nasty. After Pakistan's losing the Bangladesh
war, Bhutto's promise would have been taken by the Pakistanis as the Versailles
Treaty which the Allies had imposed on Germany after its defeat in the
First World War.
Still Bhutto agreed to respect "the
line of control resulting from the ceasefire of 17 December 1971." However,
after the meeting, he wrote in his own hand in the draft agreement "without
prejudice to the recognised position of either side." India agreed to that.
At Male, Nawaz Sharif, the then
Pakistan prime minister, admitted before Inder Gujral, the then Indian
prime minister, that he was now convinced that India was not willing part
with its side of Kashmir and that Pakistan had to recognise it. In a recent
article in a Pakistani daily, Mushahid Hussain, Sharif's Information Minister,
has said that Gujral conceded Kashmir was a "dispute". Checking with Gujral,
I find it is not true. He says: "How could I agree to our territory being
a disputed one?"
Getting closer
Mushahid, who was a minister-in-waiting
when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore, has also said
in one of his articles that the timeframe fixed for the solution on Kashmir
was 15 months. I have not checked this with Vajpayee. But there is no doubt
that the two sides were getting closer to some solution because the Kargil
operation, conceived by General Musharraf, was meant to sabotage whatever
was taking shape. Vajpayee has also reportedly said: "We were nearing the
solution."
Musharraf, now the Pakistan President,
might have to give the Lahore Declaration the name of Agra Declaration.
He might have to pick up the thread from where the deposed prime minister
Nawaz Sharif let, off. It will be an irony. But it will also be the way
towards a solution, which is a must to bring normalcy in the region.
