Author:
Publication: Jane's Intelligence
Digest
Date: September 20, 2001
As the United States plans its military
response to last week's terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the
role of Pakistan - and the position of the country's unelected military
leader, General Pervez Musharraf - have become key questions. JID investigates
and warns that, should the general fall as a result of offering overt support
to the USA in its campaign against the Taliban, the consequences - both
for the US-led alliance and the entire region - could be potentially catastrophic.
There are many reasons why the present
crisis will prove deeply troubling for Pakistan's self-appointed president.
Having started the year with the prospect of building a new and more positive
relationship with the incoming administration of US President George W.
Bush, pressure is now mounting on Musharraf as embarrassing evidence of
Islamabad's active support for the Taliban regime in neighbouring Afghanistan
comes under intense scrutiny.
One of the more difficult issues
which the general may have to explain is the close links between two Islamic
militant groups involved in the Kashmir region and the world's most wanted
terrorist, Osama Bin Laden. The two groups in question, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
and Lashkar-e Tayyiba, were specifically singled-out in the US State Department's
Report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism for 2000. Although, the Pakistani
government has repeated denied that it has any involvement with these two
groups, credible intelligence community sources point to close ties between
senior members of Pakistan's military and security services and both organisations.
Other awkward questions will focus
on allegations that Pakistan has hosted training camps for militant Islamic
groups and provided them with financial assistance - charges which Musharraf's
officials have repeatedly denied - and that Pakistan has been used as the
regular transit route via which Bin Laden's Al-Qa'eda group has travelled.
In particular, there are serious allegations that Pakistan's Inter-Service
Intelligence organisation has active links with both the Taliban regime's
intelligence service and Bin Laden himself.
According to local intelligence
sources, the Pakistani authorities have provided medical facilities for
the ailing Bin Laden, including renal dialysis, at a military hospital
in Peshawar. None of this will be unfamiliar to US intelligence operatives
who have been compiling extensive reports on these alleged activities.
However, it is becoming clear that both the Taliban and Al-Qa'eda would
have found it difficult to have continued functioning - including the latter
group's terrorist activities - without substantial aid and support from
Islamabad. This would, logically, place Pakistan in the category of "states
which support terrorism", according to the US government's definition.
President Bush's pointed warnings to Bin Laden's backers will have put
Musharraf on the spot.
The key question is not whether
Pakistan will support the US anti-Taliban coalition, but only how far the
general will dare to go in his desperate efforts to make amends for past
activities that have been very well documented by US intelligence. Above
all, Musharraf will realise that having come to power in 1999 by means
of a military coup d'etat, he will have to rely on the continued support
of Pakistan's army and security services - both of which are alleged to
have close links with the US's principal targets.
In broad terms, the US administration
has three main options for military action against the Taliban and its
notorious 'guest':
1. Launch a general air-campaign
against Taliban targets (government offices, strategic facilities, military
forces etc)
2. Undertake selective targeting
of Bin Laden's bases and associated locations
3. Attempt a very specific 'smash
and grab' raid, probably by helicopter and involving special forces, to
seize or kill Bin Laden.
Having launched an ill-fated Cruise
missile strike against Bin Laden in 1998, the US cannot risk a repeat mission
that fails to hit its main target yet again. Therefore, highly detailed
information about his movements will be essential and Pakistan's intelligence
service is very well placed to provide this, not least because of its alleged
links to the man and his Al-Qa'eda organisation.
For Musharraf, the risks are enormous
whichever course he ultimately adopts. Failure to co-operate fully with
the US will leave Pakistan isolated and perhaps lead to even tighter and
more damaging international sanctions. On the other hand, he is under intense
domestic pressure, not least from within his own armed forces. There is
also the issue of the militant Islamic groups in Kashmir to consider.
What makes the situation even more
critical is that Pakistan is one of the world's nuclear powers. Although
as JID has previously pointed out, there are serious limitations on the
country's nuclear delivery systems, Islamabad may have around 25 nuclear
missiles at its immediate disposal (see JID 9 June 2000). While it is highly
unlikely that the present Pakistani government would actually resort to
the use of such weapons unless in response to an overwhelming military
attack, there is no guarantee that a pro-Taliban regime in Islamabad would
act with similar restraint.
General Musharraf came to power
with the support of Pakistan's military. He is extremely vulnerable if
the army, or at least a significant element of it, turns against him. If
he were to be ousted during an anti-Western, pro-Taliban uprising organised
by an alliance between Kashmiri militants and nationalist military officers,
then the prospect of a full-scale regional conflagration might become very
real.
