Author: Mohammed Ayoob
Publication: The Washington Times
Date: November 8, 2001
The Indian prime minister's visit
to Washington this week provides an opportunity for President George Bush
and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to exchange views on a whole host
of issues that are likely to include coordinated responses to terrorism,
but must go beyond that subject.
India has been a victim of intense
cross-border terrorism, especially during the past decade. It has become
increasingly clear that the sources of material support and training for
terrorists infiltrated into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir are the
same that brought the Taliban to power in Afghanistan and patronized the
activities of the Osama bin Laden network. Evidence from both the 1998
American bombings of terrorist bases and from current campaigns against
the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan have clearly revealed the presence
of recruits from Pakistani-sponsored groups that are routinely trained
for infiltration into Kashmir.
In the context of the war against
the Taliban, one may understand the compulsions that led Washington to
enter into a marriage of convenience with Pakistan. However, one cannot
justify America's current wooing of Pakistan as anything but a very short-term
strategy. The role of the Pakistani military in bringing the Taliban to
power and using terrorist camps in both Pakistan and Afghanistan to train,
arm and infiltrate elements into Kashmir ought to serve as a severe warning
to those in Washington who contemplate a long-term relationship with Islamabad.
By contrast, American interests
and objectives coincide with those of India both in South Asia and in the
wider Asian region. America's stake in regional stability and in the promotion
of liberal democracy cannot be achieved without Washington and New Delhi
working closely together. As the pre-eminent regional power, India is the
linchpin of a stable regional order in South Asia. India is also the beacon
light as far as the democratic experiment in the Third World is concerned.
It has been able over the past half-century not merely to preserve the
formal trappings of democratic governance, but also infused it with genuine
liberal and secular content.
India's secularism and liberalism
is threatened today by the rise of Hindu nationalists who would like to
give India's democracy a majoritarian twist that fundamentally contradicts
the original intention of the republic's founding fathers. So far, this
extremist agenda has been kept at bay because of the liberalism and secularism
enshrined in the Indian constitution and the politics of coalition-building
and compromise needed to govern such a diverse country.
Kashmir, as the only Muslim-majority
state in India, becomes very important in this regard. Any change in the
territorial status quo in Kashmir on the basis of religion is likely to
play into the hands of Hindu extremists whose attempt to brand all Indian
Muslims as fifth-columnists will carry greater credibility among the more
gullible sections of the Indian public. This is the principal reason why
India cannot accept a division of Kashmir on religious lines. There are
140 million Muslim citizens of India (only three percent of whom happen
to live in Kashmir) whose security and well-being cannot be jepoardized
for the sake of redrawing lines in a remote corner of the subcontinent
to suit antediluvian religio-political agendas.
Washington must realize that Kashmir
is not merely a territorial dispute, but goes to the heart of the inclusive
definition of India's national identity and, therefore, to the core of
stability in the South Asian region. Mr. Vajpayee must be assured, preferably
in public, that the United States has no desire to meddle in this issue
in any way that may give the impression of even the slightest support to
redrawing the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.
However, the most important reason
for the United States and India to remain on the same strategic wavelength
is the increasing convergence of their interests and objectives regarding
China. Beijing's intentions about curbing Indian capacities to act beyond
the subcontinent, or even within it, have been clear for the past four
decades. Its relationship with Pakistan was fashioned with this end in
view. Chinese policies of transferring nuclear design, nuclear material
and missile components and technology to Pakistan were a part of this strategy.
Repeated American protestations on this issue have gone unheeded by Beijing,
and every "commitment" made by China has been observed in the breach.
At the same time it is becoming
clear that China is truly America's strategic competitor in Asia and beyond.
China's self-perception of its role in the international system assumes
the revival of bipolarity (Beijing uses the term "multipolarity" as the
code word for bipolarity), in which China would constitute the second pole
of power. More specifically, Chinese and American visions of the regional
order in Asia diverge dramatically. For China, East and Southeast Asia
form its historical sphere of influence. However, East Asia is vital to
American security and the United States cannot afford to have any other
power dominate this region. This can be expected to bring the United States
into clash with China in the not too distant future.
It is worth noting in this regard
that Japan and Russia are also increasingly apprehensive of Chinese designs.
However, their capacity to act is hobbled for psychological reasons in
the case of Japan and economic ones in the case of Russia. India is not
so constrained. Therefore, a clear recognition of the potential threat
posed by China to both the United States and India can open up major possibilities
for strategic coordination. Mr. Bush and Mr. Vajpayee will be well-advised
to investigate the likelihood of such a threat and explore the possibility
to meet it jointly, even if they do so only behind closed doors.
Mohammed Ayoob is a professor of
International Relations at James Madison College, Michigan State University.