Author: Sanjay Suri
Publication: Outlook
Date: January 10, 2002
Introduction: "The key question
is whether the US backs off from its overcommitment to Pakistan. If the
US were to back off from this...lionising of Musharraf, it will (greatly)
affect the psychology in New Delhi."
Selig Harrison is Director of the
National Security Project at the Centre for International Policy in Washington.
Considered extremely influential among the think-tanks, his views on South
Asia are closely followed. Here he talks to Sanjay Suri. Excerpts:
Q.: How convincing do you find Pakistan
President Pervez Musharraf's crackdown on terrorists?
A.: If we're talking of the crackdown
on Islamic extremist groups within Pakistan, then it is a very positive
development. However, if we're talking of stopping cross-border terrorism
in Kashmir, that's different. He attempted to finesse that issue with some
beautiful words that stop short of a clear commitment to stopping cross-border
terrorism. If he is serious, we will see a stop in the infiltration of
the Pakistanis and the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad and Kashmiri
militants who have been trained in Azad Kashmir. Because they can only
do that in most cases if they have fire cover and logistical support from
the Pakistani army.
Q.: Is Musharraf likely to stop
this infiltration?
A.: I am very sceptical, I think
he has attempted to put up a smokescreen of action with respect to Kashmir
by talking of crackdown on indigenous groups within Pakistan.
Q.: You're making a distinction
between the two, but aren't the two one?
A.: I don't think so. I don't think
it is enough for Musharraf, in order to stop cross-border terrorism in
Kashmir, to arrest a thousand Islamic extremists in Pakistan and change
the character of the madrassas. What that requires is orders to the armed
forces to stop facilitating infiltration of terrorist groups across the
Line of Control. Of course, the two are connected. If he really cripples
the Lashkar-e-Toiba, then of course it's connected to what happens in the
Valley. But it seems to me that what has happened is that most of the military
operations of the Lashkar-e-Toiba have been moved within Pakistan to Azad
Kashmir and from there they have been moved over the last few weeks under
the cover of all this talk across into the Valley. If that's the case,
then what Musharraf is really doing is disabling Islamic extremist groups
that were conducting sectarian activities within Pakistan like Sunni versus
Shia, which has been very destabilising for Pakistan.
Q.: Is Washington recognising this
distinction?
A.: The problem is that Washington
has not, at least publicly, made the distinction that I just made.
Q.: So, is Musharraf himself successfully
blurring that distinction?
A.: It is possible that Musharraf
has attempted to distinguish these two things because most of his generals
are concerned that these groups remain available for use in Kashmir.
Q.: Indian leaders say they want
action and not words leading to an end to cross-border terrorism. How long
can India wait, and for what?
A.: I would think that certainly
for two or three weeks it should be possible to watch what happens to this
infiltration. I don't think a firm deadline should be given because I don't
like to see an atmosphere of war hysteria. If there is no change at all,
then India has to tell that to the world and then it has to decide how
much longer it has to wait to see action. It's difficult to roll back operations
of this kind but it doesn't take long to issue orders to your armed forces
not to provide cover to infiltrators. I certainly hope that over the next
month there is a wait-and-see period.
Q.: What will it take to have peace
between India and Pakistan?
A.: It doesn't look very encouraging
at the moment. I think the key question is whether the US backs off from
its over-commitment to Pakistan. We have gone to bed with Pakistan since
September 11 to an extent that's encouraged and emboldened elements within
Pakistan who wish to increase pressure on India.This is the root of the
problem.
Q.: So where is this leading to?
A.: I think the idea of providing
so much economic aid without strings attached, without making it conditional
on the real stoppage of infiltration into the Valley was a mistake, and
if that continues, if we allow Musharraf to con us, if the US does not
tell Pakistan that you are a destabilising force, if we go ahead with this
quasi-military relationship with Pakistan that the Pentagon is increasingly
talking about, if in effect the US once again makes Pakistan a military
ally, then I think it's going to feed a growing impatience in India and
then the situation will be very gloomy. I think if the US were to back
off from this embracing and lionising of Musharraf, it will affect the
psychology in Delhi to a great extent. Certainly Pakistan would be less
likely to take chances.
