Author: Dr. Abdullah Al Madani
Publication: Gulf News
Date: January 4, 2004
URL: http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/Opinion.asp?ArticleID=107081
Since the creation of their state,
Pakistani politicians have maintained that Kashmir is a national issue,
far more important than any other issue, and that the legitimacy of their
entity would not be complete without having full sovereignty over the entire
Kashmir territory. Additionally, it has been repeatedly said that any Pakistani
leader giving up on this issue would be doomed to death.
Current debates on Pakistani websites,
however, show that such ideas no longer have supporters other than extremist
religious groups.
Young and educated Pakistanis seem
to be more concerned about peace in the subcontinent, as a prelude to development,
prosperity and better standards of living, than the fate of Kashmir. It
was not surprising, therefore, that the recent assassination attempts against
General Pervez Musharraf were solely organised by fundamentalist groups.
After years of unsuccessful policies
aimed at forcing India to end its sovereignty over Kashmir, Pakistan seems
to be yielding to the voice of reason and realism by clearly acknowledging
that it is impossible to find a solution to the Kashmir issue through the
outdated UN resolutions of 1948 and 1949.
It should be noted that Pakistan,
not India, created obstacles in the path of the implementation of these
resolutions. India was the party which took the case to the UN first, hoping
justice would be done.
Despite its displeasure with the
UN resolutions, India agreed to implement them and hastened to hold several
meetings with Pakistan in the early 1950s for this purpose. But Pakistan's
reluctance to withdraw its invading troops from Kashmir prior to holding
a plebiscite, as stated in the resolutions, complicated the whole situation.
Should Musharraf stick to his recent
public declaration that he has left aside the concept of a plebiscite to
end the Kashmir dispute in favour of other realistic mechanisms, and should
he translate this into action before being assassinated or overthrown by
fanatic forces, he would be remembered in history as the first Pakistani
leader to turn the chapter of the most serious cause of hostility and instability
in South Asia.
What forced Musharraf to give up
a long-held taboo? The simple answer is that Pakistan is currently facing
unprecedented internal and external situations, in which its own survival
is threatened. Hence, Musharraf probably thought it better for his nation
to pursue a more realistic policy towards Kashmir than seizing upon a dream
that would never come true in a changing world governed by new strategic
equations and norms.
In this context, one can point to
the following developments:
First: There is now a growing tendency
towards the notion of independence among Kashmiris rather than a UN plebiscite
that only gives them the option to become either a part of India or Pakistan.
Should this get deeper, Pakistan
could be obliged to abandon the Kashmiri territories under its control
since 1947. This, in turn, could encourage separatist sentiments among
Pakistan's different ethnic groups.
On the other hand, anti-independence
Kashmiris increasingly realise that Pakistan is not an attractive state
to be annexed to, hence they prefer to remain part of a technologically
and economically rising India but under new terms that give them a wider
margin of sovereignty.
Second: During the last two years,
India succeeded in holding fruitful, direct negotiations with many Kashmiri
political leaders who until recently were fully pro- Pakistan and refused
to talk to the Indians. As a result, Pakistan became isolated with only
one or two Kashmiri factions.
Third: Pakistan undertook an international
campaign against India's security measures in Kashmir to win sympathy from
human rights organisations.
But these organisations came to
the conclusion that crimes committed against non- Muslim Kashmiris by the
Pakistan-sponsored Jihadi movements were no different from those allegedly
committed by the Indian forces.
Thus, Islamabad was deprived of
one of its weapons, as far as the Kashmir issue is concerned.
Fourth: In recent years, India has
successfully forged stronger relations with a number of influential regional
powers such as Iran, Turkey and Malaysia. This led to these countries adopting
a more neutral stance on the Kashmir. This even included China, Pakistan's
long-standing strategic ally. As a result, Pakistan's Kashmir policy came
to be only advocated by a number of ineffective international players.
Fifth: After the fall of the Taliban,
Islamabad lost its influence in Afghanistan. More important was the loss
of its northern backyard, which had been used for recruiting, training,
and arming Kashmiri and non-Kashmiri fighters prior to their infiltration
into Indian Kashmir.
Sixth: The military balance in the
Indian subcontinent is tipped unfavourably against Pakistan following the
security and military agreements between India and Israel and India's success
in building up a strategic relationship with Washington, acquiring military
bases in Central Asia, developing its naval forces, and winning Moscow's
approval to jointly manufacture Russian fighters and tanks. Against such
developments, it has become costly for Pakistan to continue its policies
of harassing India.
Seventh: While India is emerging
as one of the world's largest economies, Pakistan's economy is declining
and becoming heavily dependent on foreign aid. With such an unhealthy economic
position, it had become impossible for Pakistan to continue its old Kashmir
policy.
Abdullah Al Madani is a Bahrain-based
Gulf researcher and writer on Asian affairs. He can be contacted at aelmadani@gulfnews.com
