Author: M.K. Narayan
Publication: The Asian Age
Date: April 12, 2004
Trading militancy for peace appeared
to be the dominant sentiment in Islamabad in January this year. The Islamabad
Declaration and the joint statement of Prime Minister Vajpayee and President
Musharraf seemed to signal a new esprit de corps in South Asia. Fears were
expressed even then that this might prove to be another futile attempt,
but a glimmer of hope was provided by certain utterances of President Musharraf,
wherein he seemed to make significant departures from Pakistan's "ritualistic
positions" on Kashmir. The impression of a "peace wind" prevailing over
the "fog of war" was also strengthened after Musharraf made a pledge not
to permit "any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support
terrorism."
Experts have constantly drawn attention
to the high cost of the India-Pakistan conflict. In the Siachen sector,
for instance, they have always argued that the cost for both sides was
unacceptable, both in financial and human terms - estimates are that if
the conflict were to last for another five years, it would set back both
countries by as much as $1.5 billion apart from the loss in lives. The
hidden costs of the conflict are still higher. There, hence, seemed reason
enough for both countries to reach a modus vivendi.
Commencement of a dialogue was always
seen as the first step towards reconciliation. A successful dialogue, however,
depended on the creation of a suitable atmosphere, specially in Kashmir.
The bonhomie on display in Islamabad between the Prime Ministers of India
and Pakistan and President Musharraf, held out hope that a political framework
for a dialogue had become possible, and formal negotiations on a range
of bilateral issues would now commence. The road map sketched by the foreign
secretaries seemed to confirm this.
The "Islamabad spirit" is, however,
proving to be highly evanescent. Within a short time the feel-good atmosphere
seems to have evaporated. Certain aspects viz. a comprehensive ceasefire
agreement along the Line of Control, the international border and the agreed
ground position line in Siachen, have endured, but the India-Pakistan discourse
has all of a sudden become very strident. Sceptics who voiced apprehensions
that the political thaw would not last and cynics who pointed out that
talks between India and Pakistan always stalled on the issue of Kashmir
appear prophetic.
The shift has become even more palpable
of late. There was an unstated premise that neither side would discomfit
the other by raising controversial issues. India had avoided blaming Pakistan
for the "jihadi" violence in J&K and did not demand that Pakistan dismantle
the "jihadi" training camps on its soil. It also maintained a discreet
silence on the "A.Q. Khan episode." Pakistan no longer seemed to insist
on a hyphenated relationship between Kashmir and the resolution of other
India-Pakistan issues.
This display of restraint - at least
on Pakistan's part - is no longer in evidence. An early manifestation of
this was President Musharraf's address (in mid-March and via satellite)
to the India Today Conclave in New Delhi. In his address, Musharraf did
not pull any punches, insisted that Kashmir was the central issue, that
it lay at the heart of the India-Pakistan confrontation, and that it was
the source of disunity in South Asia. Stressing upon the centrality of
Kashmir in Indo-Pak relations, he observed that confidence building measures
"could not outstrip the dialogue process on substantive issues including
Kashmir." No leader in Pakistan, he said, could afford to sideline or ignore
the Kashmir dispute - a statement that he repeated later on Pakistan Television.
On the latter occasion, he also stated that if there was no forward movement
on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute when the two foreign ministers
meet in August, he would not be a party to the peace process.
Some of the other views expressed
by Musharraf in the course of his address also appear controversial. He
seemed to imply that it was context that determined whether someone was
a terrorist or a "freedom fighter." He appeared to justify the violence
unleashed by radical Islamist forces, claiming that Muslim countries were
at the receiving end today and Muslims were suffering from a sense of deprivation
and powerlessness. He wanted Muslim concerns to be assuaged instead of
insisting on their ending violence.
Passing a verdict on where Musharraf
stands today, may appear unnecessarily judgmental at this stage. Yet, he
does seem to have gone back on the commitments made in Islamabad, and also
undermined the "Islamabad spirit." Musharraf's unilateral interpretation
of the Vajpayee-Musharraf joint statement appears totally at variance with
what the two leaders had agreed upon in Islamabad. Moreover, the shading
given to it now by Musharraf is a far from happy one. He appears to make
clear that Pakistan would not concede ground on Kashmir. Also that, violence
is necessary to leverage benefits for Pakistan in order to attain its goals
in Kashmir.
Pakistan's intentions become clearer
when linked to certain other events. At the meeting of the UN Commission
on Human Rights in Geneva, Pakistan went out of its way to rake up allegations
of human rights violations against India, quoting extensively from the
deliberations of the Organisation of Islamic Countries - an organisation
known to be inimically disposed towards India. The official-level talks
between India and Pakistan, scheduled for April 8 and 9, have also been
indefinitely postponed - whether this is on account of Pakistan's unwillingness
to open the LoC to transit traffic and trade, or due to "technicalities"
not having been sorted out, is unclear.
Questions are, hence, beginning
to be raised about the reasons for Pakistan's shift. Is it a safety valve
to reduce domestic pressures from Islamist radicals and deflect criticism
from Pakistan's "kowtowing" to US dictates, or is it pandering to the Pakistani
and Kashmiri expatriate lobby in the West? These latter have strong vested
constituencies and powerful western backers. Their solution for Kashmir
is to depart from the paradigm of "indivisibility" of J&K, and constitute
new entities from the former "princely state of J&K." These entities
would have their own democratic Constitutions, as well as their own citizenship,
flags and legislatures, with the defence of Kashmir being the joint responsibility
of India and Pakistan. Either way, the path to peace and progress in Kashmir
appears to have hit a road block.
Within J&K, the situation remains
relatively unchanged. Violence has not abated. Whether it is events such
as militants storming the high profile Press Information Bureau building
in Srinagar during March or grenade attacks on political rallies and security
forces during April, patterns of violence show little change. The Centre-Hurriyat
talks are in danger of stalling. Two rounds of discussions between Deputy
Prime Minister L.K. Advani and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (Ansari
faction) during January and March are yet to produce results, despite a
promise to review cases of detainees and institute a mechanism for ensuring
zero-level human rights violations. Instead, the boycott call by all the
secessionist groups - of the forthcoming Lok Sabha polls in J&K - threatens
to rob the current initiative of all meaning.
Detente to near-crisis in a short
space of a few weeks does not augur well for the peace process. It is difficult
to envisage what kind of forward movement will occur on Kashmir between
now and August. If even existing confidence building measures are being
dispensed with, the future holds out little hope.
M.K. Narayan has served as chief
of the Intelligence Bureau
