Author: Wilson John
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: February 16, 2005
Like a bad dream, the Dr AQ Khan
episode has returned to haunt the world. There are a number of reasons
why it will do so in the coming days. First, it is one of the most serious
crimes committed against humanity. The repercussions of state-sponsored
networks of smugglers, nuclear scientists, military officials and businessmen
freely trading in nuclear technology and materials will be felt for generations.
There are credible reports of smuggling networks, especially in east Europe,
which have sufficient quantity of nuclear materials to develop several
radioactive-capable explosive devices.
There is equally strong evidence
that Pakistani nuclear scientists have had close links with the Taliban
and Al Qaeda leaders in the past. Once these two facts are placed along
with the strong desire expressed by various terrorist groups, especially
those aligned with the Al Qaeda, to possess nuclear or radioactive weapons,
it is not very difficult to assess the transnational threat created by
the AQ Khan network that poses a danger to the world.
For this reason alone, the network
should not only be destroyed, but also the people who operated it across
the world should be identified, hunted down and trialled for committing
crime against humanity. This would, of course, depend, solely on the willingness
of the Bush Administration. President George W Bush, in his second term,
should set an example for the world to follow by setting up a special tribunal
to prosecute those accused of aiding and abetting the Khan network. The
tribunal should seek the assistance of international organisations like
the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency besides intelligence
and security agencies from an international coalition. This coalition should
comprise members of law enforcement, customs, intelligence and military
officials from Pakistan, US, India, Malaysia, Germany, UK, France, South
Africa and Russia.
The first task of the tribunal should
be to identify the accused and call for their interrogation by a neutral
team of intelligence and security officials and nuclear experts. Identifying
the accused in the Khan episode is not really difficult. The names are
available in public domain. More specifically, the Royal Malaysian Police
had issued a press statement in 2004 listing out names of those associated
with Dr Khan. There are quite a few others who have not been identified
and there are many more who will not be identified. The most feasible way
to find out is to interrogate those who are known and available.
Since the Pakistan government has
made it an issue of national honour not to let Dr Khan to be questioned
by any intelligence agencies, four others in Pakistan could be easily called
for questioning. One is Dr Muhammad Farooq, a close associate and confidante
of Dr Khan. He acted as a conduit between Dr Khan, Pakistan army and Iran.
There is evidence that Dr Farooq, a centrifuge expert, travelled to Iran
and Libya on behalf of Dr Khan, and was the key source of information against
the Khan Network when the US and Pakistan intelligence officials debriefed
him in November 2003. One of the startling disclosures made by Dr Farooq
was about Dr Khan's financial skullduggery.
The Tehran deal, in fact, marked
the beginning of Khan's clandestine nuclear sales. Investigations have
revealed that the scientists, including Dr Farooq, maintained secret bank
accounts in Dubai where millions of dollars were deposited. Mr Kamran Khan,
an investigative journalist, wrote in a prominent Pakistani newspaper that
"foreign accounts used to deposit the proceeds from the transfer of some
nuclear technology to Iran have been traced back to at least two senior
nuclear scientists." He further wrote that Iranian authorities had confirmed
the information about the bank accounts. One of the scientists was Dr Farooq.
Dr Farooq's interrogation, by independent
agencies, will reveal the most important key to the entire network, the
role of Pakistan Army. He could reveal the officers who were dealing with
him on a regular basis. It is quite clear that an operation like the one
run by Dr Khan cannot be possible without the active support of a large
organisation like the Pakistan Army. It is not conceivable that the Army
that runs a three-tier security cordon around Khan Research Laboratory
at Kahuta was unaware of the transfer of materials and equipment to foreign
destinations. And, an operation of this magnitude cannot be carried out
without the existence of a specific department or task force - most likely
clandestine - within the Army.
Similarly, Humayun Khan, a trader
in electric equipment and computer hardware in Islamabad, can reveal the
military's nuclear smuggling network. Although there is no evidence in
public domain linking Humayun with Dr Khan, there is substantial proof
that he had links with the Pakistan Army and was involved in smuggling
nuclear materials. Humayun's involvement in the nuclear trade was exposed
with the arrest of an Israeli businessman settled in South Africa, Asher
Karni. Karni, an ex-soldier in the Israeli Army, was arrested at Denver
International Airport in January 2004 following an investigation by the
US Department of Commerce into the sale of 66 spark gaps (a dual use equipment
used in breaking kidney stones as well as triggering nuclear weapons) to
Pakistan.
E-mail records recovered from Karni's
computers revealed the existence of Humayun and his attempts to buy sophisticated
oscilloscopes, magnetometers, telemetry systems, and airplane guidance
systems from US companies during 2002 and 2003. Humayun also sought Sidewinder
missiles and infra-red sensors for the missiles from Lockheed Martin Naval
Systems, a clear evidence of his links with the Pakistani military establishment.
More than one year after these disclosures, Humayun has neither been arrested
nor questioned. He could reveal the identity of Pak military officials
who dealt with him and the channels through which he smuggled dual-use
equipment from different parts of the world. In fact, Humayun could lead
investigators to other networks, much like Dr Khan's, which continue to
flourish and expand.
The third person who can be questioned
in detail is former Army Chief General Aslam Beg. He was deeply involved
in the nuclear trade with Iran. General Beg was also involved in other
clandestine nuclear deals. He has publicly maintained that Pakistan should
trade in nuclear technology and equipment. General Beg, according to former
Pakistan Cabinet Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan had negotiated with Iran
for a nuclear deal. Former US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley has
also referred to a conversation with General Beg during which the latter
had said he was discussing nuclear cooperation with Iran's Revolutionary
Guards.
Gseneral Beg had such stronghold
over the nuclear programme that he even refused Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto a briefing on Pakistan's nuclear development programme when she
had visited the Joint Staff Headquarters a few months after taking over
as Prime Minister in 1989. General Beg could prove to be a goldmine of
information.
The fourth man who should be interrogated
is Aizaz Jaffri, a prominent businessman based in Islamabad. He owns Hot
Shots, a bowling alley in Islamabad, and a mall complex besides scores
of business establishments which, reports say, are actually owned by Dr
Khan. Jaffri used to work for Pakistan's National Development Corporation
before he joined Khan's network and began acting as a front man for dozens
of businesses established by Dr Khan. Between November and December 2003
when Dr Khan was being questioned and his associates detained, Jaffri made
three trips to Dubai, possibly (as investigators suspect) to shut down
the financial structure which he ran for Dr Khan.
