Author: Uttam Sengupta
Publication: The Telegraph
Date: November 30, 2005
URL: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1051130/asp/opinion/story_5541171.asp
The lack of a coherent response from the government
has made the Maoist threat in Bihar more menacing,
Maoists continue to mock the Indian state.
After demonstrating the ease with which they can break into jails and loot
armouries at Jehanabad and Giridih, they seem to have gone on a recruitment
spree. Pamphlets have reportedly been distributed in the Bihar and Jharkhand
countryside, possibly elsewhere as well, inviting young people to join the
'revolution'. What is interesting is the promise they have made to pay a monthly
stipend, which reportedly is Rs 2,000 per head, and also a compensation, worth
Rs 2 lakh, in case of 'death in action'. That they are flush with funds is
also borne out by the fact that several doctors in Patna admitted last week
that they can identify the Maoists by their willingness to pay for expensive
tests and medicine.
In large parts of Bihar and Jharkhand, the
Maoists no longer allow government agencies to function. Contractors cannot
lay roads or canals unless they pay up and work under Maoist supervision.
Nobody dare go to the police. A senior police officer claimed that every time
a Maoist leader is arrested, local policemen invariably ask for forgiveness
after claiming that the 'operation' was prompted and guided by 'New Delhi'
and added that even the judiciary is no longer immune to the Maoist threat.
A villager in Jehanabad summed up the situation
rather well. Government agencies first started acting like the mafia in Bihar
by arresting, harassing and convicting the innocent for their vested interests.
They have now been replaced by the Maoists, he added. People are left with
no other choice but to live under a reign of terror let loose by both sides.
The response from the establishment has been
confused, and is unlikely to have instilled much confidence. After the jailbreak
in Jehanabad, the Union home ministry first shrugged its shoulders and claimed
that law and order was a state subject though Bihar had been under president's
rule for over six months. It soon realized the absurdity of its stand and
offered to send commandos after the Maoists. The commandos did land in Bihar
and scouted the countryside for several days, hounds in tow, before the government
sheepishly withdrew them.
The state government blamed the Election Commission
for diverting a large number of policemen to election duty and claimed that
it was the valour of the handful of cops present that prevented Maoists from
looting the armoury at the Police Lines. The same day, the Union home ministry
was heard quoting the state's director-general of police, who said that a
sufficient number of policemen were stationed at Jehanabad. Amidst all this
confusion, the Maoists made it clear that they had no intention of looting
the armoury and that it was a holding operation at the Police Lines and elsewhere
to ensure that the jailbreak was accomplished without interference from the
police.
The Jehanabad administration stood virtually
paralysed on that day. Although technology made it possible for even national
television channels to start flashing the news of the Maoist strike barely
an hour after the incident, security agencies failed to cut off the escape
routes of Maoist rebels. Indeed, the first contingent of the paramilitary
forces, or the special task force, remained immobile at the Jehanabad Zero
Mile even three hours after the Maoists escaped, allowing a car carrying newsmen
to move into town. So scared were the security forces of landmines that they
eventually arrived at the jail half-an-hour after the newsmen. A solitary
civilian official, possibly the sub-divisional officer, and his pistol- bearing
bodyguard, both in a state of shock, were the only ones in the jail where
a few inmates remained huddled in the darkness. The administration had the
rest of the night to put its act together but till noon next day, it was a
free-for-all inside the jail with prisoners, ordinary people and the newsmen
moving freely in and out of the premises. It is not the jailbreak the administration
should be ashamed of. It is their conduct after the jailbreak that was shameful
and caused concern.
Jehanabad, disconcertingly, was not the first
such display of Maoist power. In February last year, Maoists had carried out
a similar operation at Koraput in Orissa, where hundreds of armed insurgents
attacked the police station, treasury, banks, jail and the collectorate and
then retreated. This year, in June, the Maoists once again attacked several
targets simultaneously at Madhuban on the Bihar-Nepal border.
In November itself, barely a few days before
Jehanabad, they struck at Giridih and looted the armoury at the homeguards
training school. At all these places, they are said to have conducted operations
with clockwork precision, used sophisticated communication equipment like
walkie-talkies, cell phones and the wireless, vehicles and, of course, awesome
firepower that included the use of assault rifles.
What is more worrying is that Maoists seem
to have infiltrated the police and the government and built up a communication
system that the latter are unable to crack. Even when telephones are tapped
and information received that a senior Maoist leader would arrive on a particular
day at a particular station, police are never sure if he would travel on the
same day or a week thereafter; or whether the leader would get down four stations
after the specified point or before. The codes get increasingly sophisticated
and complicated and is continually changed to throw the police off-track.
Policemen following Maoists are also frustrated by the almost complete lack
of cooperation from people in the countryside. A majority of them live in
the fear of Maoists or are secretly pleased that the brutal police force have
finally met their match.
The Maoists, say the sleuths, have learnt
to use 'external' hard discs on their computer so that even the occasional
recovery of computers used by Maoists provide them no information at all.
Chance recovery of cell phones too reveal little because the names and addresses
are usually fake and the mobile sets are discarded at regular intervals at
both ends. The wireless and the walkie-talkies are used for a short period
of time and only during 'operations'. The rest of the time, these devices
remain 'dead', thus frustrating efforts to track the frequencies used. Mobility,
familiarity with the terrain and flexibility are the advantages that the Maoists
seem to enjoy. They can walk through the difficult terrain at night while
policemen wait for vehicles and the daybreak. The Maoists seem to be learning
new techniques and adapting to new situations all the time while policemen
sit chewing their nails.
The situation has got more complicated by
the fact that many people within the government are sympathetic towards the
Maoist struggle against oppression. A large number of professionals and intellectuals
are convinced that the rebels are idealists fired by revolutionary zeal and
that they have sacrificed a more secure life for a better tomorrow. There
are also the hardliners who compare the Maoists with the mafia and advocate
a heavy-handed approach towards them. It is this confusion that the Maoists
have taken full advantage of to pose a serious challenge to the government.
But the state continues to underplay the threat and appears clueless. Unless
it works out a coherent response, incidents like Jehanabad will get repeated
elsewhere.
