Author:
Publication: Rediff.com
Date: April 21, 2006
URL: http://in.rediff.com/news/2006/apr/21inter.htm
Ajit Doval is one of the most decorated officers
of the Indian Police Service. He is the first police officer to get the Kirti
Chakra, the second highest gallantry award after the Param Vir Chakra.
He belongs to the 1968 batch of the Kerala
cadre and retired as chief of the Intelligence Bureau in January 2005.
Doval, who belongs to Garhwal, has outstanding
credentials as an operations man. He made his name as a field operative in
the Mizoram insurgency where he broke rebel leader Ladenga's hold over his
private army. In 1989, he lead an IB team along with the Punjab police and
National Security Guards in Operation Black Thunder to evacuate terrorists
from the Golden Temple in Amritsar.
For many years he led many important teams
within IB which included the important operations against Islamic terrorism
in India. He also led the team set up to capture underworld gangster Dawood
Ibrahim after the Mumbai bomb blasts in 1993.
He has also served in Pakistan when J N Dixit
was India's high commissioner.
He was also one the three negotiators along
with diplomat Vivek Katju and C D Sahay, intelligence officer of the Research
and Analysis Wing, to negotiate the release the passengers of IC 184 flight
that was hijacked to Khandhar.
Few men in the IPS know India's internal security
problems as well as Doval.
In an exclusive interview with rediff.com's
Managing Editor Sheela Bhatt, he speaks his mind.
Q.: What are the challenges before India on
matters related to internal security?
A.: In the last decade a series of studies have been carried out in India
and abroad to figure out what exactly are India's security vulnerabilities.
All studies agree on one point -- that India's internal vulnerabilities are
much higher than its external vulnerabilities. You read the report of the
Group of Ministers Task force, the report of the National Security Advisory
Board or the US State Department's assessments -- all say internal security
vulnerability is at 75 to 80 percent.
In the global context, after World War II
very few countries have lost their territory, their constitution, their economy
because of external factors. East Timor, Bangladesh and the breaking up of
the Soviet Union was because of internal factors that lead to civil war or
breakdown of law. India is an old civilization which is converting into a
new nation state. This is highly exothermic. This heat is necessary because
this leads to amalgamation.
But the process makes fault lines fluid. India
has got all the fault lines -- ethnic, religious, cultural, linguistic and
caste. The synthesis is on but there has yet to be amalgamation. The transition
is a difficult phase. I expect that in 2050, due to education, the economy
and development the fault lines will vanish. India's internal vulnerability
is also because of political factors.
Political leaders' fortunes lie in exploiting
these fault lines. While all political leaders want to strengthen national
unity, their future lies in exploiting the fault lines. Here lie the contradictions.
To get the vote of a particular community I'll need to accentuate their favours.
If the minority or majority are not afraid of each other then there is no
vote-bank. So politicians have to give voters an imaginary or real perception
of fear. The genius of politics lies in exploitation of fears and invention
of new ones.
But there are very positive, competent and
determined people inside and outside government who will bridge these fault
lines.
Q.: This is the broader picture but can you
tell us how you see the micro issues? Which is the most prominent issue threatening
India's internal security?
A.: I consider infiltration of Bangladeshis the biggest internal security
problem. It's the biggest because the government feels that it can do nothing
about it. There is no military response, diplomatic responses have failed,
border management is not effective and the legal response is not doable because
two crore illegal people's adjudication will take 200 years. Even then, you
can take those adjudicated outsiders to the border, Bangladesh may not accept
them. And even when they are accepted they come back after 15 days to a new
destination in India. When an Indian court convicts somebody as a Bangladeshi
his government escort buys him a ticket, gives him food and takes him to the
border. But in a large number of cases the Bangladesh Rifles refuse to accept
India's evidence. Bangladeshis enjoy a paid holiday in this country!
Even if he is accepted, by paying touts around
Rs 3,000 in Dhaka he can get back on a border-bound bus.
India's problem is how to fight subversion
or sabotage if you have a support base of two crore people who are from outside.
It is difficult to infiltrate five terrorists or 50 saboteurs or 200 persons
who indulge in communal violence. Pakistan will be never able to send in 200
people at a time at the border. From Bangladesh 2,000 persons can get in if
you pay Rs 3,000 per head. It is just not possible to stop them.
I'll tell you an interesting incident of a
person arrested in Guwahati. His name was Salim Kari, who was born blind.
He belonged to Muzzaffarnagar in Uttar Pradesh. He ran militant operations
for nine years while living in Kupwara, Kashmir. He was the mastermind behind
many terrorist operations. When we zeroed on him he slipped into Pakistan.
There was no trace of him, thereafter. He was a member of a body which is
into the 'bleed India' activities. Salim surfaced in Guwahati with five other
terrorists and fortunately he was arrested. You should read his revelations
that were made public by the then chief minister of Assam in the state assembly.
He spoke about the number of Indian Muslims
taken to Bangladesh and Pakistan. He talked about modules they are building
in different places in India. He revealed how Bangladeshis in different parts
of India are targeted by them to do their job. Lots of Bangladeshis are actively
involved in espionage work. Lashkar-e-Tayiba's modules also use illegal Bangladeshis
in India to do their dirty job.
For India, the eye-opener was in 2001during
the Tabligh e Jamat congregation in Dhaka. It was the biggest congregation
after the Haj in Mecca. More than 40 lakh Muslims gathered there. An amazing
number of people went from India. We had never heard so many anti-India speeches
before at any such congregation. These speeches were made at the event attended
by the prime minister, chief justice and many other top leaders of Bangladesh.
The entire environment being created there is that India is the enemy country.
The Jamat Islami hates India the most. The influx is giving a fillip to Pakistan's
Inter Services Intelligence. It is also a route for weapons smuggling and
helps north-eastern insurgency. Bangladesh supports the demographic invasion
of India. The complexion of a large number of constituencies are changing
due to this.
Later on, political compulsions will restrict
politicians from taking decisions in India's best interests.
Q.: In this scenario what are India's options?
A.: Somebody has to be given the task. Find the man and assign the task to
him. Ask his team to deliver. Monitor how many Bangladeshis return. Even if
20 to 30 percent return it will make an impact. You must remember that all
over India more than 200 constituencies are such that politicians will be
tempted to take decisions favouring immigrants and compromise national security.
Bangladesh infiltration will lead to politics of communalism.
Q.: India's intelligence infrastructure should
have done the job of sending illegal migrants back.
A.: Intelligence infrastructure is a part of the larger system. No such part
can overtake the larger system. Nuts and bolts can't overtake the engine that
is driving the system!
Q.: Why were the effective measures not taken
during the National Democratic Alliance rule to control Bangladeshis influx?
A.: You are presuming that I don't know evils of smoking so I am smoking.
But may be I know evils but still smoke. Knowledge per se is no guarantee
of action.
Q.: But when you were in IB, in various senior
positions, what did you do?
A.: A series of steps were taken during the NDA rule which were then not pursued
with vigour. The identity card system was introduced. A pilot project was
completed; a large amount of money was spent on the system that would have
helped in strengthening national security. If you go to a hotel, if you fly,
if you buy a home - almost anything you do you would need that I-card. It
was a response to a national threat.
Then, for the first time a Task Force on Internal
Security was created and a multiple-agency centre was created. For the first
time an integrated national security understanding was developed.
Q.: But why were you not effective on the
issue of Bangladeshi infiltration?
A.: I was part of the team that had 11 players in the field. You have to play
from a particular position. On such issues the team captain decides. The policy
execution is always a subordinate function to the government's policy formulation.
Q.: Which are the other issues adversely affecting
India's internal security?
A.: Border management is a grave problem area. The management of Indian borders,
both in the north and even the coastal borders, deserves more attention. It's
being given attention but we need more vigil. India has more than 15,000 km
of land border and some 7,500 km of coastal border. Remember, if the border
with Pakistan was secure there would not have been any insurgency in Punjab.
The Kashmir problem would have been much less if the huge amounts of arms
and ammunition would not have come in via the border. We know for sure that
54,000 AK series rifles have been seized so we know that most of these arms
come in via the Indo-Pak border. More than 1,000 kg of RDX seized by India
means that more than 100 truckloads of goods have come in without detection.
Imagine, if these arms and RDX have come in,
then how many people have infiltrated through Pakistan carrying this stuff?
More than 15,000 people have gone to Pakistan for training and returned with
arms.
Also, 200 km out to sea we have exclusive
zones which have a great strategic and economic significance. The Indian Ocean
is becoming an area of competition.
We need national priority for internal security
management and once the policy is decided we should execute it. If it's not
executed then it means India is a soft state.