Author: Maneeza Hossain
Publication: Hudson Institute
Date: November 2006
URL: http://hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Maneeza.pdf
Cultural Radicalization in Bangladesh
Located in a hidden corner of South Asia,
poised to become either a thriving democracy or a failed state, Bangladesh
has the potential of becoming a major front in the global confrontation with
radical Islamism. If democracy is preserved and enhanced, Bangladesh can serve
as a model of how to counter radical incursions into Muslim democratic environments;
if democracy is defeated, this will be the first such victory for radical
Islamism and will likely unleash a global wave of radical Islamist activism,
similar to that following the Islamist victory over the Soviet-backed Communist
regime in Afghanistan. The fact that Islamists in Bangladesh have been striving
to lay the foundation of a Sharia state is no secret. Their efforts present
a complex set of difficulties for democratic life in the country, similar
to those faced by democratic systems that had allowed the activities of Communist
parties prior to the fall of the Soviet empire. In the case of both Communism
and Islamism, we are faced with ideologies that tactically accept the democratic
rules of the game in order to promote and eventually establish a system that
negates democracy. The issue in Bangladesh is two-fold: (1) There might not
be a sufficient appreciation of the nature of the Islamist threat. Some doubt
that the program of the Islamists includes the establishment of a Sharia state,
or they are skeptical of the Islamists' ability to reach their goal. (2) There
is no counter program in effect to address the comprehensive character of
the Islamists' agenda, notably in the area of cultural radicalization. To
date, attempts by those aware of the risks of cultural radicalization have
only deepened the effects of the Islamist program.
Defining Cultural Radicalization
Radicalization is the attempt to "restore"
a society's cultural purity by reconnecting it °© in practices and
in rights °© with an idealized Golden Age distant in space and time.
This so-called restoration often comes at the expense of the society's actual
historical and cultural legacies. In the case of Bangladesh, the cultural
radicalization sought by Islamists posits a fictionalized "society of
the Prophet" that overshadows the lived and shared experiences and traditions
of the millennia-old Bengali culture.
Bengali culture at its apogee was a synthesis
of Islamic values and local traditions and practices. Islam has always been
an integral part of Bengali culture, while Bengali culture has been the backbone
of the moral, intellectual, literary, and societal life of the Muslims of
Bengal.
As part of their program of cultural radicalization
in Bangladesh, Islamists have created a dichotomy between a fictionalized
monolithic Islam and a local culture redefined and rebranded as Hindu, but
this is an artificial dichotomy that is better understood as a top-down expression
of power and control than as a reflection of a genuine native conflict. This
_expression of power does in deed have antecedents, notably in the attempt
by the former West Pakistani leadership to subjugate and regiment their East
Pakistani subjects. Even prior to the rise of independent Pakistan, a similar
_expression of power was manifested in Mughal times in the promotion of Persian
and Urdu as languages of the elite at the expense of the local culture. The
process of cultural radicalization in Bangladesh today is propelled by this
history of top-down control as well as by the current global experience of
Islamism across the Muslim world. The cultural radicalization currently faced
by Bangladesh has the potential of instituting longer-term cultural conflicts.
Addressing it is necessary in order to maintain local stability and to face
down the threat of political radicalization that it feeds. The issue of cultural
radicalization, both cause and effect of the political radicalism that has
surfaced, has been underreported and little investigated. Slowly but surely,
proponents of a monolithic understanding of Islam have been implementing elements
of their program of cultural "purification. " Their means range
from the peaceful to the violent. Bangladesh, traditionally a tolerant and
pluralistic society, is therefore experiencing the possibility of an irreversible
transformation. While members of civil society who support a more open conception
of society, culture, and politics fail to react to the emergent threat with
any coherent program, we must ask ourselves whether this impetus for transformation
and the lack of response to it reflect a changing cultural mood in Bangladesh,
or whether they are due to extrinsic political factors. More importantly,
can Bangladesh survive as a pluralistic and tolerant society, or is it indeed
witnessing a fateful evolution towards religious regimentation?
Background
With a population of over 145 million, Bangladesh
is home to the third-largest Muslim community in the world. The former East
Pakistan (previously East Bengal) has had a tumultuous political history since
gaining its independence in 1971. Of particular note are the assassinations
of two presidents who were also the founders of the major political par-ties
that dominate Bangladeshi politics to this day. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
charismatic leader of the Awami League (AL), whose daughter Sheikh Hasina
is the current opposition leader, was killed in 1975; and Ziaur Rahman, the
founder of the Bangladesh Nation al Party (BNP), the main part ner in the
ruling coalition (now led by Rah man's widow, Khaleda Zia), was killed in
1981.
After almost a decade of military dictatorship,
the restoration of the democratic process in 1991 brought a new era of political
vigor to Bangladesh. However, the political system was prone to corruption.
Successive elections relied heavily on patronage and cronyism, leading to
a growing disenchantment with the democratic process and the two main political
movements. This gave Jamaate-Islam, the prominent Islamist party that is now
part of a coalition with the BNP, an opportunity to promote a platform seeking
the fundamental transformation of Bangladeshi society through the eventual
creation of a Sharia-based state. It is not surprising that Islam should play
a role in Bengali politics given how deeply rooted Islam is in Bengali identity
and history. The important function of Islam in Bengali life prompted even
secularist ideo-logues, such as Mujibur Rahman, to seek to accommodate it.
It is the exploitation of Islam's central role in Bengali identity and the
refusal to acknowledge any other components of this iden tity that become
the hall-mark of Islamist activism.
That the Jamaate has a long-term plan for
Bangladesh is not a secret. Born of Islamist revivalist thought in the first
half of the twentieth century, the Jamaate has moved with other Islamist groups
throughout the world to embrace some precepts of Salafism, a rigid understanding
of the Sharia-based state. In so doing, it has paved the way in Bangladesh
for the emergence of Salafi groups. These have made their entry into the cultural
and political scene through conservative ulemas (religious scholars) inhabiting
mosques in many districts of the country, and through the militant jihadist
group Jamatual Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The Jamaate advocates the establishment
of a Sharia state through the violent overthrow of the established order.
In accordance with a pattern of penetration adopted by a multitude of sister
Islamist organizations world wide, the Jamaate is also seeking a presence
in student, worker, and professional sectors. Its gains have been considerable,
although they are still checked by an established tradition in Bangladesh
of religion-free activism in all three sectors.
The Current Evolution of Cultural Radicalization
Those seeking cultural radicalization in Bangladesh
have sought both to promote ideas and to act. The ideas have sought to suppress
other ideas in the cultural marketplace, and the actions undertaken have often
been violent and coercive. Some of the promoters of cultural radicalization
have systematically targeted key communities. Journalists have been singled
out for harassment and not-so-occasional assassinations; authors have been
muted or ostracized; NGO workers have been threatened. The overall result
of these actions is the creation of an atmosphere of fear that has affected
the traditional tolerance that Bangladesh has historically enjoyed. A brief
survey of the changing face of Bangladesh through a sampling and categorization
of incidents and attacks illustrates the gravity of the situation.
The actions taken in the service of cultural
radicalization can be labeled either retrospective (those targeting the history
and traditions of Bangladesh) or prospective (those seeking to influence the
country's future through its youth). Retrospective actions include the systematic
attack on free thought and expression and the invasive transformation which
targets the creative and artistic communities. Prospective actions include
the rise of the madrasas in order to prepare the next generation of culturally
"pure" youth. These two approaches have compounding cumulative effects
on culture in Bangladesh and are altering its current face and reshaping it
along Islamist ideological lines. It is possible to identify at least six
different groups targeted by the promoters of cultural radicalization as they
seek to implement their program of purification: (1) "Hindu," (2)
"Christian," (3) heretics or apostates, (4) minorities, (5) those
considered socially deviant, and (6) critical voices.
1. The "Hindu" Target:
The quotation marks around "Hindu" indicate its use by the radicalizers
as a euphemism for various traditional components of the Bengali cultural
legacy not sanctioned by the Islamist utopia. This target includes many aspects
of culture in Bangladesh, from the music that dots every-day life, to cultural
celebrations, to matters of dress and other visual display, to the political
process itself. The millennia-old Bengali New Year celebration, until recently
a cultural staple in Bangladesh, is now ignored, contested, questioned, and
occasionally even the scene of violent attacks. In a spontaneous popular reaction
to these attacks, many Bengalis now embrace this celebration even more energetically.
The fact remains, however, that the initiative is in the hands of those who
challenge it.
2. The "Christian" Target:
"Christian" serves as the radicalizers' euphemism for any and all
components of public life that stem from the pool of cultural, political,
educational, and social facets of Western civilization. The use of English
as a language of communication, the reliance on democratic institutions (such
as the Constitution) , the wearing of Western-style dress, are all viewed
as markers of a Christian contamination of Bangladesh and are met with the
call for purification.
3. The "Heretic" Target:
"Heretics," according to the radicalizers, are those Muslims who
choose a path of belief in contradiction with the monolithic faith promoted
by radical Islamists. The Ahmadiyyaa South Asian Islamic religious movement,
which the radicalizers refuse to acknowledge as Islamic, has been a favorite
target. Ahmadiyya mosques have been attacked, and Ahmadiyya families have
been ostracized and occasionally subjected to violence. Promoters of cultural
radicalization have introduced intolerance and calls to violent actions into
the normal public discourse in Bangladesh, while the government reacts with
apathy, or, in some cases, seems to assist the radicalizers: even English-language
dailies will publish the dates and locations of the intended attacks on Ahmadiyya
mosques, and the Religious Affairs Ministry bans publications, sales, and
distribution of literature by the Ahmadiyya community.
4. The "Minorities" Target:
With the term "Hindu" now being affixed to Bengali culture in general,
the actual Hindus are further relegated to a more marginal status, that of
the physically undesirable/ unacceptable. Hindus and other religious minorities
live under constant threat, their lives dominated by the feeling of being
systematically targeted. Public statements by radical politicians, as well
as the brutal targeting of symbols of Bangladeshi open culture, have reinforced
this atmosphere of fear. An effective ethnic cleansing program was implemented
in Bangladesh even before the rise of organized cultural radicalization. Hindus,
at one point a sizeable minority within the Bangladeshi population, are today
a vanishing relic of times by gone. The promoters of cultural radicalization
view this loss suffered by Bangladesh as a victory in their cultural jihad.
5. The "Socially Deviant" Target:
"Deviant" social behavior, according to the stated and unstated
positions of the promoters of cultural radicalization, is often associated
with women, and in particular women activists. The status, physical appearance,
and behavior of women that fail to conform to the radicalizers' view of what
is acceptable is labeled deviant. Across the Muslim world, Islamist movements
have measured their success by their ability to alter and control women and
to box them into predefined support roles. The place of women in traditional
Bengali society was not restricted to the private realm. Promoters of cultural
radicalization in Bangladesh have therefore been rather shy in their attempts
to force women into conformity with the segregation standard. How ever, from
separate seating at Jamaate events to the absence of women at public events,
it is apparent that an implicit project of segregation and marginalization
is in effect. While mainstream Islamist movements in Bangladesh have been
careful in handling the women issue, NGOs and women activists have been regular
targets of under-ground movements connected to the cultural radicalization
project.
6. The Critical Voices Target:
It has been suggested that Bangladesh is enduring a project for theocracy
and a project for autocracy. Both projects negate the traditional Bangladeshi
practices of open communication, tolerance, freedom of expression, and diversity
of opinions. This suggestion may be subject to debate.
What is not is that many journalists and opinion
makers have been dismissed, harassed, battered, and imprisoned by the government
and Islamist groups. Even voices that are constructively critical are rebuked
as damaging the country's image. This official, or quasi official, atmosphere
of intolerance feeds upon the cultural radicalization project and, in turn,
nourishes it. The end result is the potential slide of Bangladesh away from
its hard-earned status as a free and open society.
Current Responses To Cultural Radicalization:
As noted, the cultural radicalization project
in Bangladesh is a top-down effort with an ideological impetus. It has generated
diverse reactions, some spontaneous and some deliberate. All these reactions
can be seen, depending on their origin, either as social responses or political
counteractions. Social responses have been numerous. From the use of the teep
(bindi) on the forehead, to the revival of Bengali-style fashion at the various
socio economic levels, Bangladeshi society has displayed its desire to preserve
its diverse cultural legacy and not to succumb to the uniform vision espoused
by the promoters of cultural radicalization. Resistance to the radicalization
effort has also taken the form of art that documents, continues, and develops
the cultural legacy of Bengal. New artists, vocal as well visual, are offering
works rooted in Bengali traditions to an appreciative wider public. Although
not explicitly conceived as or offered as a comprehensive rejection of cultural
radicalization, this art, retaining its individual and unorganized character,
constitutes an organic resistance movement that is virtually impossible to
defeat. As to the political counteractions, these have been as varied as the
forces that inhabit the Bangladeshi political spectrum. The configuration
of political currents in Bangladesh can be schematically rendered, from the
extreme "left" to the extreme "right," into five divisions,
each of which has reacted to cultural radicalization in its own way:
1. Socialist and Communist movements at the
extreme left have preserved a nationalistic tone in their discourse and have
therefore been consistently critical of cultural radicalization, often by
linking it to the antirevolutionary forces that fought against the independence
of Bangladesh in 1971. For these movements, cultural radicalization echoes
the era of East Pakistan and their rejection of it on political as well as
social grounds. These leftist movements view the current rise of Islamism
in Bangladesh as a continuation of an attempt by Pakistan to reinsert itself
in Bangladesh and gain back its 1971 losses. It should be pointed out that
while some Pakistani agencies and political players have played a role in
the rise of Islamism in Bangladesh, reducing the phenomenon of cultural radicalization
to a mainly Pakistani intervention, as these movements do, ignores the latent
native factors that are contributing to it.
2. The left-of-center mainline political movement,
the Awami League, heir to the Founder of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
posits itself as the secular (if not secularist) response to the project of
cultural radicalization. The AL has displayed an awareness of the spread of
the phenomenon and repeatedly announced a deliberate program of cultural reinvigoration
to address it. Some components of this program are at the grassroots level
and therefore not readily measurable in their effect and impact. However,
a clearer comprehensive plan for the AL remains to be articulated.
3. The right-of-center Bangladesh National
Party maintains that the two main components of Bangladeshi culture, namely
the Bengali heritage and the Islamic contribution, exist in a stable equilibrium.
BNP officials have often noted the resistance of Bangladeshi culture to any
induced change and therefore have characterized warnings against cultural
radicalization as politically motivated and/or alarmist. How ever, this BNP
assessment ignores the reality of an incremental but steady alteration of
the cultural landscape of Bangladesh. Furthermore, it inadvertently masks
some of the more radical change taking place through the ruling coalition
it formed with the Jamaate-Islam.
4. To the right of the BNP, the Jamaate favors
the cultural radicalization that the country is witnessing °©without
applying the label "radicalization" to it. Jamaate officials might
stress the peaceful character of their Islamization. However, their actions
and words tell another story. The extremity of the Jamaate's true beliefs
is evident in the statement of a Jamaate official who characterized the induced
flight of Hindu Bangladeshis from the country as similar to the human body
getting rid of excrement.
5. To the extreme right are the radical Islamist
underground movements, which, driving the violent implementation of the cultural
transformation, can be expected not to have any complaint about it, except
perhaps its slow pace. What this quick overview indicates is that Bangladesh
urgently needs a counter-program to cultural radicalization that takes into
account the symptoms of its implementation (indicated by its six aforementioned
targets), its methods, and the deep causes of its success, however limited.
Such a program cannot be reactive, and it cannot let the promoters of cultural
radicalization define its areas of operation.
The Methods of Cultural Radicalization
Although violence has been the most prominent
of the methods pushing towards cultural radicalization, it is by no means
the sole or main vehicle for this program. Two other methods have been part
of the radicalizers' arsenal: cultural saturation and a method best characterized
as bait-and-switch. The backbone of the cultural saturation method is the
previously mentioned madrasa-alternative education system, as well as publications,
broadcasts, and sermons designed to instill in Bangladeshi culture Islamist
values. While in a free society the Islamists' program would compete with
other ideas and values, the atmosphere of fear in Bangladesh has destroyed
the level playing field. Any approach to the problem of cultural radicalization
will have to have as its main objective the restoration of an atmosphere where
competing ideas can be freely exchanged. The main reason why cultural radicalization
has been possible in Bangladesh is not related to culture. The spread of corruption,
the degradation in government services, and the ensuing waning of con fidence
in the political system have created a fertile ground for the implementation
of a bait-and-switch method: promoters of cultural radicalization offer social
and economic services and imbue them with ideas, values, and cultural elements
in conformity with their ideology. Bangladeshi citizens take advantage of
these needed services and in the process are subject to a program of cultural
radicalization. This process has created a situation akin to a state-within-
a-state in Bangladesh, as explained below. Since independence in 1971, the
Jamaate has developed institutions parallel to the government's. Citizens
of Bangladesh view themselves as immune to the risk of religious extremism.
And yet, societies have engendered alternative egos that posit Sharia as the
ideal of rule, at the expense of their democracy. Jamaate-Islam of Bangladesh
may never have had official connections with other national Islamist movements.
However, Jamaate's grassroots mobilization and political action methods resemble
those of other movements. The model is one that capitalizes on the inefficiency,
corruption, and lack of political vision in the mainstream, providing alternatives
in practice, morality, and ideology. In the cases of Bangladesh, the respective
Islamist movements have behaved not as conventional political parties, which
monitor the government's performance and point out deficiencies, but rather
as the kernel of an alternative system altogether.
For example, where state schools fail to provide
lunch for students, the Jamaate sponsored madrasas not only furnish lunch,
they also offer after-school tutorials for students. In so doing, the madrasas
become competitors to the state schools, creating an alternative network that
incorporates religious education. To the poor and pious of Bangladesh, this
combination of lunch and God is an attractive package that trumps what any
public school can offer. Needless to say, the kind of religious education
provided in these madrasas is a militant version with its own understanding
of what is the pure Islam, one that clashes with traditional practice prevalent
in Bangladesh. In the banking sector, the Jamaate-influenced Islamic Bank
has been outperforming other banking institutions. This has effectively created
a parallel economy that fosters Islamist businesses while remaining out of
the mainstream control of the state. In what may be an ominous sign of further
Islamization of the banking system, the largest state bank was recently purchased
by Saudi interests. Public medical care in Bangladesh is full of gaps, but
the Jamaate-sponsored Ibn Sina Hospital provides state-of-the- art health
services that were un heard of in the country until recently. In the health
sector, as well as education and banking, Jamaate institutions are viewed
as models of performance, efficiency, and integrity. In addition to providing
necessary services for the population at large, these Jamaate institutions
are excellent venues for employment for young professionals associated with
the Jamaate movement.
Where the state has failed in providing the
expected services in education, banking, health, and social welfare, the Jamaate
has stepped in with exemplary albeit highly ideological institutions. The
result is the creation of an effective state-within- the-state, one that does
not rely on conventional measures to assert its influence. The number of seats
in parliament is of little relevance in understanding the power of the Jamaate.
The Jamaate's twelve seats are often dismissed by those who re fuse to see
the growing impact of Jamaate institutions all over Bangladesh. The criterion
used here does not take into account the fact that the Jamaate seeks power
through transforming society, not through gaining parliamentary seats. All
indicators point to the fact that this trans-formation is taking place. Most
Bangladeshis engage in wishful thinking when they convince themselves that
this change is not real, or, at worst, real but contained. They need only
look west to countries such as Lebanon to see what a presumably containable
state-within- a-state can bring to a thriving society.
Conclusion: Suggestions For A Comprehensive
Strategy
If cultural radicalization is about inducing
conflict where none has existed, the response to it should not be simply to
accept that a conflict exists and defend the component of culture that is
considered under attack. Islamist cultural radicalization targets Bengali
culture. Countering it should not be a mere defense of Bengali culture, but
instead a rejection of the posited dichotomy between Islam and Bengali culture.
Bangladesh can assert pride in its Islamic heritage with out having to pass
a test of Islamicity artificially imposed by the promoters of cultural radicalization.
Further more, Bangladesh can declare its embrace of global civilization in
all its facets, including democracy and secularism, without feeling the need
to justify it in Islamic (or more appropriately, Islamist) terms. Addressing
the growing threat of cultural radicalization requires this spirit of no apology.
The plan to counter cultural radicalization has to be based on solid premises:
(1) Recognition of the universality of human rights and values and a rejection
of their attribution to a Western or Christian origin. Malaysia's societal
Islam, Islam Hadari, can be invoked as a form of Islam that accepts traditional
cultural practices. (2) An insistence on the intrinsic relation between Islam
not only as a culture and a civilization but also as a religion, with Bengal
as land, society, and history. In other words, any artificially posited dichotomy
between Bengali identity and Muslim identity must be rejected. (3) A positive
insistence on the future of Bangladesh as a state for all of its citizens,
with a recognition of the ancient and proven Islamic values of tolerance,
diversity, and acceptance of others Muslim or not and rejection of the new
Islamist conception of a monolithic Sharia state. (4) An insistence on zero
tolerance for any movement, ideology, or political group that uses violence
and intimidation as a way of achieving its aims, and the development of a
national consensus towards that effect.
Proponents of liberal democratic values have
often claimed the innate compatibility of the notions they advocate with Bangladeshi
culture. The current situation is indeed the test of this view, which holds
that the country's current climate of intolerance is a transformation brought
about by promoters of radical political views. It is against a backdrop of
political corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency that promoters of radical
movements present themselves, often credibly, as a counter model of efficiency
and integrity. The cultural dimension is therefore not their primary offering.
It does, however, follow. Presented as the "true" form of the religion
to a pious society, the transformation progresses, often as a by-product of
the political dimension. The implications of this phenomenon in Bangladesh
are also considerable in the Bangladeshi diaspora. Cultural radicalization
paves the way for political movements that often espouse violence as the means
for change. Europe has al ready experienced the effects of a radicalization
that originated overseas. The future of cultural radicalization is conditioned
on the success of its promoters in positing a clash of cultures in Bangladesh.
Defusing their program and thereby avoiding their program's ensuing political
adventurism can be achieved through reclaiming the cultural space and denying
them the institutions that they have usurped.
Maneeza Hossain, a specialist on the politics
and culture of Bangladesh, is a Senior Fellow at Hudson Institute. Ms. Hossain,
a U.S.-trained lawyer and native of Dhaka who has written several monographs
on Islamism in Bangladesh, is currently producing a study of the political
evolution of Bangladesh.
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