Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: September 23, 2008
Introduction: Pakistan cannot any longer afford
to be soft on terror
The massive explosion at the Marriott Hotel
in Islamabad, not far from the residence of the Pakistani prime minister,
was a clear message to the Pakistani army, civil society and political parties.
The message was delivered a few hours after President Asif Ali Zardari talked
about his three-pronged strategy to deal with terrorism. After the explosion,
Zardari vowed to eliminate the "cancer" of terrorism.
So far no organisation has claimed responsibility
for the attack. However, given the fact there were prior threats and an attack
of this magnitude could not have been an individual act, it is evident that
this was a well-planned attack by a major terrorist organisation designed
to convey a message to the Pakistani establishment. The common aim of al-Qaeda
and the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban is to establish an Islamic caliphate.
What could be a better way of initiating efforts towards that objective than
to strike terror in Pakistan and extend Taliban control in Pakistani territory?
Surely, such successful attacks on iconic targets in the Pakistani capital
will boost the standing and reputation of Taliban among some people.
This is a moment of truth for the Pakistani
army, government and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Everyone in Pakistan
knows that Mullah Omar, leader of the Afghan Taliban, is in Quetta and enjoys
the hospitality of the Pakistani army and the ISI. There is a widespread opinion
in Pakistan that such attacks are the result of Islamabad siding with Washington
in the war on terrorism. But there is no assurance that if Pakistan pulls
out of operations against Taliban, the country will be able to save itself
from such attacks. The Afghan Taliban uses Pakistani territory as a safe haven
for attacks on American and International Security Alliance Forces (ISAF)
in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban asserts that movement across the Durand
line is an inherent right of Pakhtuns on both sides.
Drugs from Afghanistan flow through Pakistan
to the world market to raise resources for the Taliban to sustain its war.
Pakistan provides a lifeline for US forces and ISAF in Afghanistan. In other
words, the US and NATO war against Afghan Taliban cannot be pursued without
Pakistani support for which Islamabad has been paid billions of dollars over
the last seven years and without which the Pakistani economy is likely to
plunge into a crisis.
Whatever may be the Pakistan army's and government's
decisions on cooperation with the US in the war against Afghan Taliban, it
is clear that the latter will continue its operations against US and NATO
forces in Afghanistan. Does Pakistan have an option to delink itself from
US efforts to carry on operations against Taliban? Can Pakistan afford to
forego American aid? If Pakistan decides to distance itself from US operations
on account of Taliban pressure, will not a victorious Taliban then try to
extend its control over Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Till now, the ISI and the Pakistani army appear
to have operated under the assumption that they are in a position to control
the Taliban and limit their operations. The demolition of the Marriott Hotel
appears to indicate that this may no longer be the case. So did the earlier
Lal Masjid uprising, Benazir Bhutto's assassination and the militancy in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Taliban, which the Pakistani
army and ISI nurtured and hoped to use to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan
and to bleed India, has turned into a monster with an agenda of its own.
Can there be a deal between the Taliban -
both the Afghan and Pakistani units - and the Pakistani army? It does not
seem to be likely since the Taliban has tasted power not only in nearly half
the territory of Afghanistan but also in FATA and other border areas of Pakistan.
Further, the Taliban makes plenty of money from the narcotics trade. The Taliban
will also hope that US military operations against Pakistan will alienate
the Pakistani people and align them in its favour. In such circumstances,
a realistic and lasting ceasefire arrangement between the Pakistani army and
the Taliban does not appear to be feasible. The only viable option open to
Washington is to confront the Pakistani army with the choice that future aid
to Pakistan will be calibrated on the results obtained in its operations against
Taliban. That course of action will also be imposed on the army if the Pakistani
state, civil society and the middle class do not want to get Talibanised but
desire a moderate Islamic state.
If the Pakistani army takes the final decision
to fight the Taliban and the ISI can be disciplined and controlled to ensure
that there is no leakage of information to the Taliban, then there will be
less need for US troops to operate on their own in Pakistani territory. This
is a deciding moment for the Pakistani army and government. Will Zardari's
words about ridding the country of the cancer of terrorism be translated into
action? He will have an opportunity to communicate Pakistan's decision to
President George Bush during his current visit to America.
If the Pakistani government and army waver
in their resolve to fight the war against terrorism, India along with the
rest of the world should be prepared for an extremely unstable situation in
this region in the coming years.
- The writer is a Delhi-based strategic affairs
analyst.