Author: Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
Publication: The Tribune
Date: January 2, 2009
URL: http://www.tribuneindia.com/2009/20090102/edit.htm#4
Rushing to the UN will not do
It is more than two decades since Pakistan
started the policy of "thousand cuts and bleeding India through a low-cost
option". In Jammu and Kashmir, it has been a combination of insurgency
and terrorism while elsewhere in India, simply terrorism. What was seen in
Punjab during the eighties and the early nineties could not be termed as insurgency
as there was no local support or sympathy, except what emerged consequent
to police excesses. The vicious scale of insurgency in J and K can best be
judged from the fact that in the last decade nearly 25000 civilians and around
8200 military personnel, including more than 500 officers, have died combating
it and this figure excludes Kargil casualties.
This year alone there have been 16 terrorist
attacks in India, outside of J and K. Though from time to time India has been
lodging diplomatic protests, these have been of no avail. Considering India's
size and resources vis-a-vis Pakistan, it would appear implausible for the
latter to attempt such a policy and hope to get away from its consequences.
In such cases it is essentially deterrence that should work. Deterrence works
when the opponent is convinced that retribution will follow with the same
certainty as day follows night and that it will be immediate and violent.
Unfortunately, India has miserably failed
to convince Pakistan that cross-border terrorism and support to insurgency
could invite an immediate and strong military reaction.
India's pusillanimity was first demonstrated
at Kargil where in spite of large-scale aggression by Pakistan, we did not
even attempt to cross the Line of Control and tackle the enemy's ingress along
tactically appropriate and viable approaches and instead opted for suicidal
frontal attacks, up impossible slopes. Later, a senior officer from the Pakistan
Army, in an article explained, how India lost a God-given opportunity to retaliate
to the Kargil aggression and take Skardu, unhinging Pakistani positions at
Kargil and Siachen, and also threaten the Northern Areas-Karakoram Highway.
Admittedly, there would be any number of excuses, the more obvious being that
India did not want to escalate the war. Therefore, the question that can be
raised is: how far has Pakistan to go for an Indian retaliation?
Then there was the famous mobilisation of
the Indian military in 2002, consequent on the attack on Parliament. This
was followed by an ignominious climb-down. Why posture when the issue has
not been thought through? Or when we simply lack the will and the resolve
to take the bull by the horns. The Indian reaction to Pakistan's policy of
"a thousand cuts" is stymied by the self-induced fear that the latter
will use nuclear weapons the moment we cross the border. It is this conclusion
which has acted as a deterrent to Indian response and encouraged Pakistan
to continue with its dangerous policy. Thus, India has on its own reckoning
frightened itself out of its wits and brought about mental paralysis.
Even in the face of the Mumbai attack, the
Defence Minister has ruled out the military option, but there are Press reports
that while the terrorist attack was in progress at Mumbai, the IAF had been
alerted to strike at terrorist camps in Pakistan. Perhaps, like in other areas
consequent on the Mumbai carnage, this too was a knee-jerk reaction, which
once more conveyed to Pakistan that we lack the gumption to retaliate.
The BJP leadership is now baying for retaliation,
asking for not an eye for an eye but both eyes for an eye. But they have a
short memory, as it was the BJP government that chickened out at Kargil and
later during the famous mobilisation of the Indian military
As a response to the Mumbai attack, some defence
analysts are advocating a limited military action against known terrorist
camps both in Pakistan and in PoK. One of these is "surgical air strikes"
against the targets. This form of retaliation is easier than a ground action.
In this case, too, two factors come into play. One is the complete secrecy
of the operation and the other is accurate location of the target and the
timings so as to catch the maximum number of terrorists in the strike. This
calls for very detailed and precise intelligence related to the camps, which
may not be forthcoming and the strikes may end in large civilian casualties,
which will result in adverse worldwide publicity. The possibility of the operation
ending in a failure cannot be ruled out and, therefore, the nation should
be prepared for such an eventuality and also against retaliation by Pakistan.
There is then the suggestion to engage these
camps with long-range artillery and rockets. In this case, besides the issue
of accurate intelligence, there is the requirement to have observation of
the target to correct-fire. Using artillery without the ability to correct-fire
through observation is akin to dumping artillery shells in a black hole as
it happened at Kargil while engaging targets in depth where we had no observation.
In both cases retaliation from Pakistan must be accepted.
In the case of artillery duels, Pakistan is
better placed due to the advantage it enjoys in observation and correction
of fire through modules it can position in our territory.
It is nobody's case to start a war with Pakistan
and launch any kind of strikes against that country when this has all the
portents of escalating into a larger conflagration. Yet India cannot baulk
away from this possibility and let itself be bled indefinitely. In the event
of a larger conflagration, India must be in a position to inflict crippling
damage on Pakistan in the shortest possible timeframe, before world powers
and the UN intervene to bring an end to the hostilities. Given the prevalent
state of the IAF and the morale of the military, this may not be possible.
India's options are extremely limited. The
US and Britain cannot put pressure on Pakistan beyond a point to end terrorism.
Rushing to the UN Security Council just to seek a declaration on the Jamaat-ud
Dawa as a terrorist outfit is an exercise in futility. The Lashkar-e-Taiyaba
(LeT), too, is an outlawed terrorist outfit in Pakistan, but it is still operating.
Given the long record of terrorist acts against India by groups aided and
abetted by Pakistan (the ISI, the army and the government included), we should
have at least demanded that Pakistan must be declared a terrorist state. Though
the world knows that Pakistan is the fount of worldwide terrorism, it was
not likely to be declared a terrorist state due to other compulsions. But
India would have made a strong point and opened an avenue for another action.
That action is to put Pakistan on notice for
the annulment of treaties, and the first of these will be the Indus Water
Treaty. The World Bank could have been informed in this regard.
India should give Pakistan six months to stop
terrorist attacks and dismantle the terrorism-related infrastructure in that
country, failing which we will annul the Indus Water Treaty. Simultaneously,
start a survey of the projects to divert the waters of the Chenab. This simple
move can make Pakistan realise that some of its canals will go dry. A threat
to convert dams on the rivers Chenab and Jehlum from the "run of the
river" to a "storage reservoirs" should be conveyed to Pakistan.
This should be done in a manner to appear that India means business.
