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Bengal heading for agitational politics, spiralling violence!

Bengal heading for agitational politics, spiralling violence!

Author: Swapan Dasgupta
Publication: Free Press Journal
Date: October 6, 2009
URL: http://www.freepressjournal.in/fpj/fpj/2009/10/06/index.shtml?Search=Y&ArtId=005_014

With Mamata trying to outdo the CPI(M) in being cussed and difficult, there is a feeling that the run-up to the Assembly election will witness a rash of agitational politics and spiralling violence. To cap it all, as the CPI(M) loosens its control, there is the additional threat of Maoist violence and the growth of Muslim communal politics.
From a media perspective, there are three markedly different ways of assessing the politics of an Indian state. There is, first, the worm's eye view of events; there is the view from the discreet vantage point of the regional capital; and there is, finally, what may be called the Google Earth detachment. What follows is an exploration of how the present churning in West Bengal is being seen from a distance.

A convenient starting point may be the Lok Sabha elections held earlier this year. In the aftermath of its disastrous performance, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) issued a sombre statement on June 22. The Party, it admitted, "has suffered serious reverses", having won only nine seats (its allies won a further six) in West Bengal. While noting that the 5.33 per cent popular vote it secured throughout India was only 0.33 per cent below what it polled in 2004 (but had yielded only 16 seats compared to 43 in 2004), it expressed "concern about the erosion in the Party's support base in West Bengal and Kerala." At the same it put on a brave face, pointing out that the Left Front in West Bengal secured around 1.85 crore votes and in Kerala the Left Democratic Front had polled 67.17 lakh vote. Its conclusion was characteristically blasi: "Though there is some erosion, the main base of the Party is intact by and large in these two states." Setting aside the details of the anticipated debacle in Kerala, where election results invariably follow a see-saw pattern, the Central Committee can be accused of being wilfully disingenuous in its assessment of West Bengal. True, the popular vote for the LF slumped only nominally, from 1.88 crore to 1.85 crore. However, in the context of the turnout and an enhanced electorate, its support fell by a staggering 7.42 per cent, from 50.72 per cent in 2004 to 43.30 per cent in 2009. The CPI(M)'s own vote share fell from 38.57 per cent to 33.10 per cent. More important, the LF lost nearly every seat in what is loosely called the FM belt around Kolkata. There is ample evidence to suggest that a substantial body of Muslim voters switched over to the Congress-Trinamool Congress alliance and contributed to the LF defeat. The ruling coalition just about managed to save face by winning a clutch of seats in the JalpaiguriCooch Behar belt of North Bengal and successfully defending its strongholds in the outlying districts.

The electoral transformation of a state that has been a Red stronghold for the past 32 years-the LF won a majority of seats in every Lok Sabha and Assembly election since 1977-is calculated to have traumatic consequences. Left rule in West Bengal was qualitatively different from other states in India.
It was based on the principle of ascending control: loosest at the very top of the social pyramid and rigidly suffocating at the base.

Other "bourgeois" political parties that run state governments operate primarily as electoral machines and build fledgling networks of patronage. They leave day-to-day governance and development projects to the bureaucracy. The CPI(M) politicised almost every aspect of administration in West Bengal. It empowered its local committees, particularly in semiurban and rural localities, to work as a parallel administration, overseeing all government work including policing. The process began in 1978 during Operation Barga but gradually engulfed every institution, including the arbitration of local disputes. Education was a particular casualty of political control: the CPI(M) insisted on controlling every appointment, from the peon to the vice chancellor. The CPI(M) control of local administration proved politically rewarding. The party also became a permanent election machine, blessed with the ability to deliver votes through means both fair and foul. Dependent on spontaneity (the proverbial 'wave') and the charisma of individual leaders, its opponents were in no position to match this streamlined machinery of harnessing votes.

A structure based on over-intrusiveness could endure as long as electoral success was guaranteed.
The undivided Congress always had a vote share of nearly 40 per cent impressive, but never enough to take on a united Left. After 1997, a divided opposition made the task of the Left very much easier but also added to its complacency and arrogance. The excesses of Nandigram and the perceived over-zealousness of the Chief Minister in Singur revealed chinks in the CPI(M) rural base. Muslims ended up being particularly agitated and the ultra-Left, a euphemism for Maoist fractions, entered into a tactical alliance with Mamata Bannerjee to settle scores with the main enemy. The TMC-Congress alliance ensured a level playing field in electoral arithmetic.
The chemistry of an all-India election did the rest.

The immediate effect of the LF defeat is that the structures of control are fast unravelling. Many of those who sided with the CPI(M) because it was locally convenient have switched sides and others, including a section of the police, are negotiating their safe passage.
The Maoists have taken advantage of Mamata's political umbrella and the indulgence of the Leftleaning intelligentsia to both settle scores with the CPI(M) and build bases in outlying areas. A section of Muslims with a sectarian agenda are eyeing a post-CPI(M) dispensation as being favourable to a brand of politics that West Bengal hasn't witnessed for a very long time. For the moment the minority community is either with the Congress or the TMC. But will its sectarian fringe don true colours after the Assembly election of 2011?
The Left is in a state of paralysis for two reasons. First, the more ideological of the comrades have realised that large contingents of the party's foot-soldiers were mercenaries and fair weather friends.
They are relieved at their departure but also recognise the damaging impact of these desertions on the party's election machinery.

Secondly, the Lok Sabha election was a personal defeat for the development politics of Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. The verdict has made it abundantly clear that state-facilitated industrialisation will be thwarted by the general opposition to land acquisition. The beneficiaries of Operation Barga, it would seem, are loath to abandon their attachment to land in just one generation. To the outside world, these developments are alarming. Since 1967, West Bengal has acquired a reputation for being obstreperous, mindlessly militant, over-politicised and even violent. The impressions may have been based on stereotypes but they were real and contributed immeasurably to the state being left out of India's growth story.

For a brief period it seemed that the Chief Minister was reinventing West Bengal. Now that seems like an illusion. With Mamata trying to outdo the CPI(M) in being cussed and difficult, there is a feeling that the run-up to the Assembly election will witness a rash of agitational politics and spiralling violence. To cap it all, as the CPI(M) loosens its control, there is the additional threat of Maoist violence and the growth of Muslim communal politics. West Bengal may be on the cusp of momentous political change and the end of Left dominance. But the process of change is likely to be very damaging.


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