Author: Shashi Shekhar
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: January 5, 2010
URL: http://www.dailypioneer.com/227128/The-Karachi-Project.html
The unfolding Headley-Rana saga continues
to expose how the Pakistani establishment, the military-jihadi nexus and Islamists
of various shades have been working in tandem to plan and execute terrorist
attacks in foreign lands, especially India. The US can't claim to have been
ignorant of the sinister alliance at work to promote cross-border jihad and
export death and destruction
In recent months, much of what we have known
about the circumstances and events leading up to the 2008 fidayeen attacks
on Mumbai has changed. The alleged death of Ilyas Kashmiri, an Al Qaeda-affiliated
terrorist, in a drone strike in Pakistan started unravelling myriad threads
which now include US and Canadian citizens and multiple Government and terrorist
agencies.
Overlaying developments in the sub-continent
with the latest revelations in the Chicago conspiracy case helps us piece
together a narrative highlighting four distinct yet interlinked dynamics within
the Pakistani military-jihadi complex that led to the 26/11 attacks and subsequent
planning for future attacks.
First, the Pakistani military establishment
continued to patronise Lashkar-e-Tayyeba - as a counterweight to anti-establishment
jihadi groups - even after officially banning it in December 2001. Second,
the ISI's Karachi front office came to be the focal point of this strategy
even as it collaborated with American agencies to expose pro-Al Qaeda elements
with the outfit. Third, a game of deceit within the Pakistani establishment
saw ostensibly pro-establishment ISI-Lashkar elements collaborate with pro-Al
Qaeda elements on terrorism directed outwards, against India and other countries.
Fourth, anti-establishment elements within the Pakistani military-jihadi complex
used the compact on anti-India terrorism to orchestrate events in Pakistan
as leverage against the US's AfPak strategy.
Much has been said about David Coleman Headley's
troubled personal history and conviction in the 1990s on charges of drug-trafficking.
It is now a settled fact that Headley was working as an agent for the US Drug
Enforcement Administration to expose Pakistani drug cartels. But at some point
in the early years of the last decade, Headley, (then known by his original
name Daood Sayed Gilani), might have started working for US intelligence on
penetrating Pakistan-based terrorist outfits. At this time though, there is
no official confirmation on this.
The events in Pakistan in the years after
the September 11, 2001 terrorist strikes help explain ISI's patronage of Lashkar
while simultaneously working with the US to expose pro-Al Qaeda elements within
it.
In late-2003, Asia Times carried extensive
reports of American pressure to shut down "Forward Section 23" in
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir leading to the closure of all training camps and
ISI operations offices in that region. These reports mentioned a clandestine
special investigation cell jointly headed by a member of Pakistan's Federal
Investigation Agency and a member of a US federal agency. The report also
revealed that many jihadi groups were actually paramilitary organisations
where the unit commander reported to an Army officer. Pakistani military officers
were invested in the jihad in Jammu & Kashmir including with the management
of funds for training and recruitment.
After the closure of Forward Section 23, the
ISI section in Karachi became the hub for the anti-India jihad. In December
2008, the Times News Network quoting unnamed Indian intelligence sources described
the "Karachi Project" as involving jihadi fugitives from India,
sheltered in Pakistan, luring vulnerable Indian Muslim youth to conduct terrorist
attacks against India.
Charge-sheets reveal that Headley first started
training with the LeT in 2002. French investigations - into the 2002 killing
of submarine engineers and in the Willie Brigitte case - indicate that Brigitte
trained with the LeT in the same time frame. The French case mentions two
Americans training with Brigitte at a LeT camp at a time when the camp was
audited by US federal agents. The LeT commander in the Brigitte case was described
as Sajid Mir, a Pakistani military officer. The same Sajid Mir is widely presumed
to be the unnamed LeT operative in the Headley case.
The ISI leveraged real-estate contracts in
Karachi to fund clandestine activities that often saw the wires crossed between
Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Of specific interest are the public accounts
of a Dawood Qasmi, who was affiliated to the LeT. Qasmi, in an interview in
2003, describes his interrogations by US authorities on his alleged links
to Al Qaeda. His daughter has related how an ISI colonel approached him to
rejoin the LeT after his 're-appearance' and his subsequent charity work for
the Jamaat-ud-Dawa'h. An FBI initiative to trace terror funding through Islamic
charities saw Qasmi being detained for a second time for his links with Arif
Qasmani, an alleged double agent and financier of Al Qaeda, the ISI and the
LeT. Qasmani had been detained between late 2005 and February 2007. His assets
were frozen by the US in 2009 after he was accused of having financed the
bomb attack on Mumbai local trains in 2006 and the Samjhauta Express in 2007.
Qasmi's story reveals one side of the coin
that saw the ISI playing a deceptive game of 'good Lashkar' and 'bad Lashkar'
under the watch of US authorities. Qasmani's story reveals the other side
where LeT-affiliated individuals deceived Al Qaeda and the Taliban under the
watch of elements within the ISI.
Another double agent, Ghulam Mustafa, had
two roles, one as chief coordinator of finances and logistics for militant
activities in Jammu & Kashmir, and the other as organiser of Al Qaeda's
transfer of money and human resources between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mustafa,
who has been described as "Al Qaeda's Man who Knew Too Much", was
detained in 2006 by Pakistan.
Headley's two Pakistan-based controllers came
from each of the two sides. Retired Major Abdur Rehman (Hashim) represented
the ex-ISI/Al Qaeda side of the equation in his role as the bridge to Ilyas
Kashmiri. A Army Major, possibly LeT's Sajid Mir, represented the ISI-LeT
side.
US agencies knew of Mir: The Headley charge-sheet
describes him as a senior LeT figure who was well-known to the Government.
There have been several reports of joint US-Pakistan operations that have
engaged pro-establishment elements within LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed as a counter-balance
to the Al Qaeda friendly anti-establishment radicals. One such joint facility
was the target of a suicide attack in Lahore in March 2008.
The Chicago charge-sheets and investigation
reports reveal several aspects of this dynamic with the ex-ISI/Al Qaeda on
the one hand and serving ISI-LeT on the other. Individuals from the two sides
had no compunctions on collaborating with each other on acts of terror outside
Pakistan. They did, however, have differences in the priorities on the targets
of such attacks - India versus other international targets. The factional
faultlines between them were about acts of terror within Pakistan.
Mumbai 26/11 represented a unique convergence
of interests between these factions. It served the objectives of the Karachi
Project in furthering jihad in India. It also offered the anti-establishment
factions the prospect of instability in Pakistan in the wake of an Indian
reaction.
Indian agencies have failed to penetrate the
multiple assumed identities used by ISI officers running the LeT. Many analysts
assume that Mir is the 'Zarar Shah' who was earlier named in connection with
the 26/11 attacks. He has not been on the Indian radar to date for any acts
of terror committed against India. Qasmani was not even charged by India in
the Mumbai train bombings case. Also, the veil needs to be lifted on the true
identities of those who have been known to India only as Abu al-Qama, Muzammil
and Azam Cheema.
Maj Hashim was arrested by Pakistani authorities
in August 2009 in connection with the assassination of Maj-Gen Faisal Alvi,
but was let off. The Headley charge-sheet quotes Sajid Mir expressing concerns
about Maj Hashim cutting a deal with the Pakistani establishment by exposing
pro-Al Qaeda elements. The drone strike that allegedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri
came after Maj Hashim was released.
It is widely assumed that Maj Hashim also
controlled the Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul-Jihad-Islami modules that have been
responsible for terrorism in India. This thread needs to be further investigated
to assess if and how it links to the 'Indian Mujahideen' modules led by Abdul
Subhan Tauqeer and Riyaz Bhatkal.
The most significant revelation from the Headley-Rana
saga is the existence of 'jihadi free agents' like Headley who occupied the
space in between the two sides, comfortably offering services to either. These
constitute the latest dimension in the proxy war against India. The US must
be more forthcoming in sharing intelligence with Indian authorities in order
to unearth the entire story. As long as Pakistan engages in the use of jihadi
militants as strategic assets, the complex dynamics will result in terrorist
threats to India and other countries. The US would do well to recognise this
and act accordingly.
- The writer tracks terrorism in South Asia.
