Author: Mohammed Hanif
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: August 2, 2010
URL: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/a-case-of-exploded-myths/654757/
Introduction: Stop looking for allies in Pakistan's
elite. They're just an India-obsessed military's civilian cousins
Pakistan's premier intelligence agency, the
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, has been accused of many bad
things in its own country. It has been held responsible for rigging elections,
sponsoring violent sectarian groups and running torture chambers for political
dissidents. More recently, it has been accused of abducting Pakistanis and
handing them over to the United States for cash.
But last week - after thousands of classified
United States Army documents were released by WikiLeaks, and American and
British officials and pundits accused the ISI of double-dealing in Afghanistan
- the Pakistani news media were very vocal in their defence of their spies.
On talk show after talk show, the ISI's accusers in the West were criticised
for short-sightedness and shifting the blame to Pakistan for their doomed
campaign in Afghanistan.
Suddenly, the distinction between the state
and the state within the state was blurred. It is our ISI that is being accused,
we felt. How, we wondered, can the Americans have fallen for raw intelligence
provided by paid informants and, in many cases, Afghan intelligence? And why
shouldn't Pakistan, asked the pundits, keep its options open for a post-American
Afghanistan?
More generally, the WikiLeaks fallout brought
back ugly memories, reminding Pakistanis what happens whenever we get involved
with the Americans. In fact, one person at the centre of the document dump
is our primary object lesson for staying away from America's foreign adventures.
Hameed Gul, now a retired general, led the
ISI during the end years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and together
with his CIA friends unwittingly in the 1990s spurred the mujahedeen to turn
Kabul - the city they had set out to liberate - into rubble. According to
the newly released documents, Gul met with Qaeda operatives in Pakistan in
2006 and told them to "make the snow warm in Kabul ... set Kabul aflame."
This would seem highly sinister except that,
today, Gul is nothing more than a glorified television evangelist and, as
the columnist Nadir Hassan noted, "known only for being on half a dozen
talk shows simultaneously." He is also, for Pakistanis, a throwback to
the lost years of our American-backed military dictatorships, a stark reminder
of why we distrust the US.
The ISI and the CIA have colluded twice in
the destruction of Afghanistan. Their complicity has brought war to Pakistan's
cities. After every round of cloak-and-dagger games, they behave like a squabbling
couple who keep getting back together and telling the world that they are
doing it for the children's sake. But whenever these two reunite, a lot of
children's lives are wrecked.
In the West, the ISI is often described as
ideologically allied to the Taliban. But Pakistan's military-security establishment
has only one ideology, and it's not Islamism. It's spelled I-N-D-I-A. It will
do anybody's bidding if it's occasionally allowed to show India a bit of muscle.
Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, the Pakistani Army chief,
has just been given an unexpected three-year extension in his office, due
in large part, it is said, to American pressure on Islamabad. Yet Gen. Kayani
headed the ISI during the period that the WikiLeaks documents cover. Since
he became the head of the Pakistan army - and a frequent host to Adm. Mike
Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - the number of drone attacks
on Pakistani territory have increased substantially. It seems he has found
a way to overcome his ISI past.
While he generally keeps a low profile, Gen.
Kayani in February gave an off-the-record presentation to Pakistani journalists.
His point was clear: Pakistan's military remains India-centric. His explanation
was simple: we go by the enemy's capacity, not its immediate intentions. This
came in a year when Pakistan lost more civilians and soldiers than it has
in any war with India.
Yet it has become very clear that an overwhelming
majority of Pakistani people do not share the army's India obsession or its
yearning for "strategic depth" - that is, a continuing deadly muddle
- in Afghanistan. They want a peaceful settlement with India over the disputed
territory of Kashmir and a safer neighbourhood. None of the leading parties
in Parliament made a big deal about India, Afghanistan or jihad in their election
campaigns. They were elected on promises of justice, transparency and reasonably
priced electricity.
Lately, Americans seem to have woken up to
the fact that there is something called a Parliament and a civil society in
Pakistan. But even so, it seems that Americans are courting the same ruling
class - the military elite's civilian cousins - that has thrived on American
aid and obviously wants an even closer relationship with Washington. A popular
TV presenter who interviewed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her
visit later jibed, "What kind of close relationship is this? I don't
even get invited to Chelsea's wedding?"
Pakistan's military and civil elite should
take a good look around before they pitch another marquee and invite their
American friends over for tea and war talk. There are a lot of hungry people
looking in, and the strung lights are sucking up electricity that could run
a small factory, or illuminate a village. Besides, they're not likely to know
what WikiLeaks is - they've been too busy cleaning up after their masters'
guests.
- Hanif, the former head of the BBC's Urdu
service, is the author of 'A Case of Exploding Mangoes'
