Hindu Vivek Kendra

A White Paper doctored to he 'harsh' on the BJP

1.1. In the month of February, 1993, the Narasimha Rao Government finally came out with the official version of the Ayodhya events. It is titled "White Paper on Ayodhya". Much before its appearance, it received some unflattering publicity. Shri Arjun Singh, the Cabinet Minister incharge of Human Resources Development, resigned as the head of the Cabinet Committee set up by Shri Narasimha Rao to finalise the White Paper. The newspaper reports suggested that Shri Arjun Singh was upset over the fact that the draft White Paper of the Government did not adequately damn the BJP, the RSS and the VHP. The contents of the Government's White Paper were thus not to be settled by facts, but by what Shri Arjun Singh or someone else wanted. The primary target of Shri Arjun Singh was not the BJP or the RSS or the VHP - it is Shri Narasimha Rao himself. 

1.2. So with Shri Arjun Singh's resignation charging, although not publicly, that the White paper of the Government was soft, there must have been pressures on the Prime Minister to make the White Paper 'harsh' on the BJP, the RSS, the VHP and the Bajrang Dal. So, it can be presumed that the White Paper presented by the Government is Shri Narasimha Rao's strongest case against the BJP and the RSS Parivar, and the worst that the Government can put together against them.

Four vital facts in the White Paper condemn the Prime Minister and endorse BJP

2.1. An analysis of the Government's White Paper reveals four vital facts - one implied and three express - which indict none other than the Prime Minister himself, and endorse, the views of the BJP and the RSS.

The Prime Minster's charge of conspiracy repudiated by the White Paper

2.2. First, while Shri Narasimha Rao had expressly charged the RSS, the VHP and even the BJP with hatching a conspiracy and pre-planning to demolish the mosque, the White paper does not even remotely hint at a conspiracy. In fact, it contains evidence which rules out any conspiracy.

Thus, his Government's own White Paper has falsified Shri Narasimha Rao's charge of conspiracy against the Ayodhya movement leaders.

Significantly, more than 7 weeks before the White Paper was out, Shri S. B. Chavan the Union Home Minister had said: "There was no conspiracy to destroy the mosque."

The White Paper admits that the structure was being not used as a mosque

2.3. Second, the Government confesses in the White Paper, on the very first page, that "In effect from October 1949 till December 6, 1992, the structure had not been used as a mosque

The White Paper refers to the structure as "disputed structure" and not as "Mosque" 

2.4. Third, in page after page, the White Paper refers to the demolished structure as "disputed structure", nowhere has the White Paper used the word "mosque" for the disputed structure.

The Paper says that the focus of the Ayodhya movement was to build the Temple, leaving the structure intact

2.5. Fourth, the White Paper, again on the very first page, admits that the focus of Ayodhya movement from October, 1991 onwards was to start construction of the Temple by way of Kar Seva on the land acquired by the Uttar Pradesh Government while leaving the disputed structure intact.

The White Paper condemns the Prime Minister

2.6. The first two express references completely refute the Prime Minister's view expressed not once but many times, that the disputed structure was a mosque. The Prime Minister told the Parliament and the public of India on many occasions that demolished structure on December 6 was of a mosque. He repeated this over the Doordarshan when his speech was telecast on December 6, 1992. The White Paper disagrees with the Prime Minister when it consistently refuses to use the word "mosque" and mentions only a disputed structure. Even when the White Paper specifically refers to the Prime Minister's statement in Parliament on July 27, 1992 (extracted in the White Paper at pp. 80-81) in which the word mosque" is used, it uses only the expression "disputed structure 

2.7. While the Prime Minister says in his statement on 27th July, 1992 that "The Congress is for the construction of the temple without demolishing the mosque", the White Paper says at page 2 that "The Government of India was for the construction of the temple at Ayodhya while leaving the disputed structure intact."

2.8. Thus, without openly saying so, the White Paper of the Government repudiates the Prime Minister's stand that there was a pre-planned conspiracy to demolish the structure, and that the demolished structure was a mosque. The stand of the Government in the White Paper is to endorse and uphold the views of the BJP and the Sangh Parivar and the Sants, that

a. there was no conspiracy or pre-planning of the demolition;

b. the demolished structure was not a mosque, but a disputed structure;

c. from December 1949, the demolished structure was not being used as a mosque; and

d. the intent of the Ayodhya movement from 1991 was to construct and leave out the structure, meaning that the target of the Karsevaks was not the structure.

The two charges in the White Paper

3.1. The White Paper of the Government makes two explicit charges against the Sants, the VHP, the BJP and the Uttar Pradesh Government.

Charge I: Negotiations disrupted to opt for confrontation:

First, when crucial decisions were expected in the next round of talks between the VHP and the AIBMAC stated on November 8, 1992, in a sudden and unexpected move, the Margadarshak Mandal and Dharma Sansad announced, on October 30-31, 1992, that the Kar Seva would re-commence on December 6, 1992. The White Paper says: "This move was totally inexplicable in view of the smooth movement of the negotiations. The only explanation imaginable could be that the intention of this unilateral announcement was to disrupt the course of the negotiations and prevent the expected reference of the dispute to Supreme Court, thus dragging the matter into confrontation again" (Paras 1.15/1.16).

Charge II: Because of the Chief Minister's orders not to use force, the mosque was demolished

Second, referring to the sudden demolition that place, the White Paper says:

"While this criminal activity was going on, the local authorities and the police appeared to be smiling as mute spectators, ostensibly under the instructions of the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. This dismal picture of inaction and the State Government's dereliction of duty was because of orders of the Chief Minister of UP not to use force. Even the small contingent of Central Reserve Police was rendered inactive and powerless by express direction given to them by the local Magistrate and higher State Government authorities. A worse example of irresponsibility and abdication of power by those who had taken oath to defend the Constitution and uphold the rule of law cannot be imagined. 

"The demolition of the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid structure at Ayodhya on 6th December, 1992 was a most reprehensible act. The perpetrators of this deed struck not only against a place of worship, but also at the principles of secularism, democracy and the rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. In a move as sudden as it was shameful, a few thousand people managed to outrage the sentiments of millions of Indians of all communities who have reacted to this incident with anguish and dismay.

What happened on December 6, 1992 was not a failure of the system as a whole, nor of the wisdom inherent in India's Constitution, nor yet of the power of tolerance, brotherhood and compassion that has so vividly informed the life of independent India. It was the Supreme Court observed on that day, 'a great pity that a Constitutionally elected Government could not discharge its duties in a matter of this sensitiveness and magnitude'. Commitments to the Court and Constitution, pledges to Parliament and the people, were simply cast aside. Therein lay the failure, therein the betrayal."

3.2. In simple terms, these two charges mean that

a. The VHP abandoned and broke the negotiations and opted for confrontation.

b. When the demolition was going on, the Uttar Pradesh Police did not act, nor could the Central forces act, because the Chief Minister had ordered them not to use force, and as a result the demolition really struck at secularism, democracy and the rule of law.

If these two charges are answered, there is nothing left in the White Paper except a resume of events mainly relating to the history of the Ayodhya movement from July 1992, and several mis-statements which need separate attention.

Did the VHP disrupt the course of the negotiations, and opt for confrontation by announcing the Kar Seva decision on October 30-31, 1992? 

4.1. These charges are based on four assumptions:

* First, that (on 30-31 October, 1992) the talks were pregnant with productive results;

* Second, crucial decisions were expected in the next round of negotiations on 8th November, 1992;

* Third, the announcement of die Kar Seva decision on October 30-31, 1992 wad sudden and inexplicable; and
v* Fourth, the announcement was intended to disrupt the course of the negotiations.

4.2. It can be proved that each one of these assumptions is incorrect. They are, in fact, assertions because the Government has not cited a single piece of evidence, oral or documentary, in support of them. And, evidence to the contrary, to disprove the assertions, exists.

Was the VHP-AIBMAC dialogue pregnant with productive results on October 30-31, 1992?

4.3. First of all, as explained in detail in Chapter VI, the Prime Minister did not actually give much weight to the VHP-AIBMAC talks. He followed, unlike Shri Chandrashekhar who trusted only the direct dialogue, a hydra-headed strategy in which the revival of the VHP-AIBMAC dialogue was the last resort. The revival of the dialogue which should not have taken more than a week, actually took 70 days, after the Prime Minister promised the Parliament that he would proceed from where Shri Chandrashekhar had left. The VHP-AIBMAC dialogue commenced with only 20 days to go for the expiry of the three months time the Prime Minister had secured from the Sants. It is obvious that this dialogue was not among his priorities at all. As would be seen later and as explained in Chapter VI, the reasons given in the White Paper for the delay in the resumption of the VHP-AIBMAC talks are patently false.

Direct talks - a farce

4.4. Next, as explained in Chapter VI, the diverse channels through which the Prime Minister was circulating, or allowing the circulation of, different proposals, and disowning them whenever any proposal came up for serious consideration or close to acceptance, undermined the direct and optic dialogue between VHP-AIBMAC, and virtually made it a farce, more to exchange documents, notes and opinions than to suggest or offer any formula for solution.

Talks not for solution, but to mark time

4.5. Finally, during the month of October 1992, only two meetings had taken place, between the VHP and the AIBMAC - the first was on October 3, 1992 and the second on October 16. The second meeting was over, it became clear to everyone that the talks were not directed to finding a solution. Shri Bhairon Singh Shekhawat who participated in the talks in 1990 as well as in 1992, contrasting the first one under Shri Chandrashekhar and the second, under Shri Narasimha Rao, said: 'Shri Chandrashekhar wanted the talks to be directed to make a reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143 to find out whether a Hindu structure existed at the site."

4.6. But Shri Narasimha Rao set no such objective for the talks. When asked by Shri Shekhawat as to what was the object of the talks, the Prime Minister advised him "to keep the talks going; about the objective we shall see later." 

4.7. This was the position not just before the talks began. This, according to Shri Shekhawat, continued to be the position oven after the talks commenced and progressed from the first meeting on October 3, to the second meeting on October 16. This was the position even on October 18, 1992 when Shri Shekhawat could not help expressing his view that the Prime Minister was merely marking time by the dialogue. This was also reported in newspapers.

Evidence and counter-evidence not concluded

4.8. When the evidence and counter-evidence were tendered on 29th October, 1992, it became clear that the talks would never end and would go on and on. The "independent historians", Prof. D.N. Jha, R.S. Sharma, M. Athar Ali and Suraj Bhan, representing the AIBMAC wrote a letter to the Government stating as follows:

"We are enclosing our interim comments on Ayodhya material shown to us at Purana Qila and also on the evidence shown on the audio-visual cassette. After having perused the material mentioned above on 23rd October 1992, we are convinced of the necessity for us to visit Ayodhya along with a team of at least eight scholars to make an on the spot assessment of the material. This is possible only if the Government of India makes necessary arrangements for our travel to, and stay and security at Ayodhya as well as for the availability of the material said to be found there."

This made it clear that the process of assessing evidence, far from ending, had not really crossed the stage of investigation. And yet, the White Paper claims (at pp. 4 and 20) that crucial decisions were expected on November 8, 1992 as the work of presenting evidence and offering comments thereon had concluded.

Nothing had concluded. There was only an interim reply from AIBMAC's consultants; they wanted to go to Ayodhya and the Government was asked to provide for their travel and stay, and guarantee their security.

It was all over on 29 October, 1992, says Shri Shekhawat

4.9. Shri Shekhawat has testified that "it was clear on 29th October that it was all over, and the talks had virtually collapsed. But Shri Sharad Pawar and myself just wanted that we should not say it is over and withheld the announcement." Therefore, far from being pregnant the dialogue had become sterile, (as it was intended to be) by October 29, 1992.

Was any crucial decision expected on November 8, 1992?

4.10. Second, on whether any crucial decision was expected on November 8. 1992, Shri Shekhawat says: "No, no decision was expected. No one, neither myself, nor Shri Sharad Pawar or Subodh Kant Sahay or P.R. Kumaramangalam knew what the talks were for, at least I did not know it and if I did not, no one in the open meeting would have known it. No one, none of the Central Ministers or Shri Sahay gave me or anyone else the impression that there was any meaning in the talks after 29th October, 1992. In fact, Shri Sharad Pawar did not disagree with me on the view that by 29th October, 1992 the talks had collapsed". 

4.11. The assertion in the White Paper that crucial decisions were expected, is a clear concoction; there is not a single statement from the Government between October 30-31, and November 8, 1992, or thereafter, that crucial decisions expected on November 8, 1992 could not be taken because of the Kar Seva announcement.

Was the Kar Seva announcement sudden, and inexplicable?

4.12. Third, as already explained in detail, the Kar Seva announcement on October 30-31, 1992 was in accordance with the stand explicitly stated by the VHP repeatedly. Even on the very day, 26th July, 1992, when the VHP suspended the' Kar Seva, the Karsevaks were clearly told that the next Kar Seva would be in October or November 1992 when the three month time frame expires. This was repeated in public on 28th July, 21st September (when the date of the meeting of Dharma Sansad as October 30-31 was also decided), 29th September; 16th October, 18th October, and 20th October. The meeting of Dharma Sansad of 5000 Sants had been set only to fix a date for Kar Seva. Only if the Sansad had not fixed the date it would have been unexpected and inexplicable.

Was the announcement intended to disrupt the dialogue?

4.13. Fourth, the date of Kar Seva was fixed on October 30-31, 1992 after five weeks on December 6, 1992 only to enable the negotiations to proceed. So the intention was to continue and not disrupt the talks. In fact, only a decision to recommence Kar Seva had been announced by October 31, 1992. The Kar Seva had not commenced by November 8, 1992 when the AIBMAC wanted the Kar Seva call withdrawn. In contrast, in December 1990, the dialogue between the VHP and the AIBMAC was going on from 1st December, 1990 to 6th February, 1991 along with a massive Satyagraha for Kar Seva from 6th December, 1990 in which lakhs of Karsevaks participated. If the AIBMAC could participate in the talks when the actual Satyagraha was on, and decided to participate earlier when the call for Satyagraha was pending, why should they withdraw from the talks on a mere announcement. In fact, the VHP could not have intended that the AIBMAC should walk out of the talks. Therefore the allegation that the Kar Seva call was intended to disrupt the talks is clearly untenable.

4.14. Again, the VHP was entitled to expect, given the December 1990 experience, that the talks would not be disrupted by the announcement even as a result.

4.15. If the VHP did not intend to disrupt the talks, as it could not have and in fact did not, in the circumstances explained above, the consequential charge that it opted for confrontation also fails.

Does the conduct of the UP Chief Minister, Shri Kalyan Singh, in ordering the forces not to use force, amounts to striking at secularism, democracy and rifle of law, and also betrayal?

5.1. While answering this issue, the first point to be clarified is that Shri Kalyan did not order the forces not to use force, but only not to fire upon the unarmed Karsevaks. This very issue has been explained by Shri Kalyan Singh himself in his affidavit filed before the Supreme Court. The former Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister says in his affidavit:

"At 12.17 p.m. on 6.12.92, a large crowd suddenly attacked the disputed structure overcoming all the arrangements. Tear gas and lathi-charge was resorted to but it was of no avail. I personally contacted the D. M. on phone immediately and asked him to take the help of the Central force stationed at Ayodhya. Phone message was confirmed by following fax message from Principal Secretary Home to D.M. Faizabad:

'No.17391/G.S./92 dated 6.12.1992. As directed on Telephone around 12.35 Hrs. Please make use of Central Forces immediately to control the situation in Ayodhya. Report compliance.'

A special I.B. team had been deputed by the Union Home Ministry to study the situation on the spot so that the said Ministry is in full know of the ground situation at any given moment. The Union Home Minister who was fully posted with the ground situation talked to me at about 1.00 p.m. on 6.12.1992 and was satisfied that nothing better could be done than what was being done to handle the situation.

"The District Administration approached the Deputy Director General, C.R.P.F. for making available 50 Companies but the Central Forces could not reach the spot. The Home Department received the following Radiogram from D.M./S.S.P., Faizabad:

'Magistrate and Circle Officer moved with CRPF from Faizabad towards Ayodhya. Thousands of Kar Sewaks have scaled all the roads leading to Ayodhya. CRPF cannot move in Ayodhya without heavy firing resulting in massacre. Instruction solicited.' 

The Home Secretary immediately put up the following note:

'At 12.35 p.m. today the D.M. Faizabad was asked to make use of Central Para Military Forces to handle the situation. It has been reported that the Central Fortes are not able to move to Ayodhya on account of obstruction by big crowds of Kar Sevaks. The District Administration have sought instructions as to whether or not firing should be resorted to resulting in massacre. The Chief Minister had directed that Central Para Military Forces be utilised without resorting to firing. In the circumstances necessary instructions have to be issued to the District Administration.'

The State Government agreed that firing would result in massacre and such a great amount of bloodshed that it will make the situation still more tragic and its backlash will further result in flames of violence engulfing the State and the, country. The order passed by the then Chief Minister i.e. myself is as under:

'Having regard to the situation at Ayodhya there is every possibility of firing leading to large scale bloodshed, flames of which can engulf the entire state and also the entire country which will he more tragic and unfortunate. Firing should therefore not be done. Except firing, all possible steps be taken to control the situation.'

It was, therefore, directed that short of firing all possible steps he taken to handle die situation. I respectfully submit that in a democratic functioning of the Government a Chief Minister, who is collectively responsible with his Ministers. while taking administrative decisions, has to give weight to the advice of his colleagues, on the spot assessment of any situation by its officers and an overall view of the matter. All these have a strong influence in taking a final decision.

"I, as also the State Government and its Officers, have throughout acted bonafide and in good faith. Although the State Government and its Officers had done their best in handling the situation, I accepted moral responsibility and tendered resignation of my Council of Ministers. It may be mentioned that even after imposition of President's Rule, it was not considered advisable to resort to firing on account of reports of the ground commanders on their assessment of the situation."

The six points in Shri Kalyan Singh's testimony

5.2. Six points emerge from Shri Kalyan Singh's sworn statement

* One, the Karsevaks' attack on the structure was sudden;

* Two, tear gas shelling and lathi-charge proved of no avail;

* Three, Shri Kalyan Singh himself directed the District Magistrate to take the help of Central Forces and followed it up with a fax message to that effect from the Principal Secretary Home to DM Faizabad;

* Four, even the Union Home Minister after talking to Shri Kalyan Singh was satisfied at 1 p.m. that nothing better could be done;

* Five, D.M. Faizabad wanted instructions to order firing which would result in massacre, as otherwise the Central Forces could not enter Ayodhya;

* Six, it was then that Shri. Kalyan Singh ordered that except firing (which will have uncontrollable consequences) all possible steps should be taken to control the situation.

Kalyan Singh asked for Central Forces, but ordered them not to fire

5.3. By reference to documents, Shri Kalyan Singh establishes that far from being averse to use of the Central Forces, he ordered their use, but they could not be used unless he also authorised them to fire upon the Karsevaks - a course which he decided against and was rather prepared to quit office on moral grounds of not being able to protect the disputed structure than fire upon and massacre people.

The White Paper supports Kalyan Singh's testimony

5.4. There is nothing in the White Paper which contradicts what Shri Kalyan Singh has In fact, the White Paper is untrue when it says that the State. Government was unwilling to use the Central Forces and the D.M. sent them back at 2.20 p.m. (page 7). The question arises that having earlier requested for the Forces at 12.45 p.m., why did the D.M. send the Central Forces back. The answer is in the White Paper itself:

2.20 p.m. DG, ITBP informed MHA that 3 battalions which had moved from DRC had met resistance and obstructions. Enroute there were a lot of road blocks and people stopped vehicles. The convoy reached with great difficulty at Saket Degree College where the force was again stopped and the road was blocked. Minor pelting of stones also took place. The magistrate asked them in writing to return. DG, ITBP further informed that the 3 battalions had returned accordingly. The Commissioner had been contacted who informed that CM, UP had ordered that there will be no firing under any circumstances.

2.25 p.m. HS spoke to DGP, UP informing him of sending back of the force by the local administration and requested to issue necessary instructions for use of force. DGP, UP informed that CM's instructions were that firing should not be resorted to but other kinds of force could be used. HS asked DGP, UP that State Government should issue necessary instructions immediately. DGP promised to attend to this matter immediately.

2.30 p.m. HS spoke to Chief Secretary, UP and requested him also similarly.

2.35 p.m. HS spoke to Defence Secretary to keep helicopters ready if any force would have to be moved by air immediately. He was also requested to keep one or two transport planes ready for movement of additional troops if necessary.

3.30-4.30 p.m. HS was informed that communal incidents had started occurring in Ayodhya, and spoke to DGP, UP and told him that the situation was fast deteriorating and not only Central Forces had been unable to move but there was serious apprehension of communal riots. DGP, UP informed that situation cannot be controlled without resorting to firing and orders of CM were being obtained.

Thus, the question was not, as the White Paper falsely alleges, whether to use the Central Forces or not, but how to use them. The CM had clearly instructed, in his own hand, at 12.45 p.m. (which was made known forthwith at 1.00 p.m. by the CM to Home Minister Shri S.B. Chavan) and again at 2.20 p.m. (page 7) that under no circumstances firing should be resorted to.

Who should have ordered raring?

5.6. So the Central Government knew, and Shri Narasimha Rao also knew (as from 9.30 a.m. to 7.30 p.m. on December 6, 1992 the Home Minister was continuously in touch with the Prime Minister) that Shri Kalyan Singh had decided not to order firing upon the Karsevaks and that without firing, the Central Forces could not even enter Ayodhya. Why then did Shri Narasimha Rao not dismiss the Kalyan Singh Government and order firing, which Shri Kalyan Singh had defiantly refused to do? The. White Paper says everything except that at 5.30 p.m. Shri Kalyan Singh resigned as CM. It was thereafter that the reinstallation of the idols (6.45 p.m.) and the Kar Seva for the temporary Temple (7.30 P.m.) commenced. Why did the Central Government, that is Shri Narasimha Rao, not act dismiss Kalyan Singh, impose President's Rule, and fire upon the Karsevaks? In fact, the constitutional duty of the PM to act - dismiss Shri Kalyan Singh and order firing - became imminent and inevitable the minute Shri Kalyan Singh refused to order firing. That a court order operated on Shri, Kalyan 'Singh and not on Shri Narasimha Rao, did not make any difference to Shri Rao's constitutional obligations, the court order on Shri Kalyan Singh does not reduce the constitutional obligations of the Prime Minister. In fact, once Shri Kalyan Singh failed and failed to the knowledge of the PM, the latter's responsibility became double. 

5.7. Notwithstanding this constitutional argument, why did the Prime Minister not act? The reason is simple. No Government can order firing on Ramabhaktas at Ayodhya. As Mark Tully said over BBC on 6th December, 1992, "no Government could afford to fire on Hindus in Ayodhya". The Narasimha Rao Government wanted Shri Kalyan Singh to order firing, which he would not. The Central Government did not have the courage either to say that it also would not fire upon Karsevaks, or to dismiss the UP Government and order firing. The question was not whether to fire or not, but who should order it. Shri Kalyan Singh courageously owned up the decision. Again, the stand of the Kalyan Singh Government on 6th December, 1992 that it would not order firing, was not a new or surprising decision. Even in the July 1992 Kar Seva, the UP Government under Shri Kalyan Singh had refused to order firing to enforce the court orders.

The charge in the White Paper holds good, not only against Kalyan Singh, but against the Prime Minister too

5.8. The charge in the Government White Paper that Shri Kalyan Singh, by allowing the demolition contrary to his own assurance to the court, betrayed the courts, the rule of law, secularism and democracy, is clearly misconceived. The charge proceeds on the assumption that a Chief Minister is accountable to rule of law, secularism and democracy only because he has given an undertaking to the court. But the undertaking is only a confirmation of his duty. It does not add to his duty. If he does not perform his constitutional duty he is no less guilty even if he has given no undertaking to the court. Thus, the fact that Shri Kalyan Singh gave an undertaking to the court does not make his constitutional duty higher or stricter than otherwise. And merely because the Central Government did not give any such undertaking to the court, its constitutional duty is not qualitatively inferior. If, Shri Kalyan Singh was guilty of betrayal, of striking at secularism, democracy and rule of law, by not ordering firing, the same charge can be made against the Central Government too, not just from 12.45 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. on 6th December, 1992, but upto the morning hours of 8th December, 1992. If the argument in the White Paper were accepted, only if there are binding court orders, as in the case of Shri Kalyan Singh, a Government will have constitutional obligations, and where there are no binding court orders, as in the case of Shri Narasimha Rao, keeping quiet and asking Shri Kalyan Singh to order firing because he has to comply with court orders, would be legitimate. The entire charge against Shri Kalyan Singh holds good equally against Shri Narasimha Rao, unless it is accepted that no responsible Government could have ordered firing in Ayodhya on that day.

Expressly and by implication the, Government's White Paper conceals the truth and tell lies

6.1. In para 1.10 (page 3) the White Paper states that although the Prime Minister was meeting several persons on Ayodhya, it was merely being accessible to those persons and no specific proposal or suggestion was made on behalf of the Government.

As explained in Chapter VI, the Prime Minister was trying various methods allowing proposals to be circulated with his knowledge, trying, to delay the solution, and even dividing the movement. The contention that the Prime Minister was merely being accessible to those who wanted to meet him, that he was not calling or inviting anyone, that he was having non-serious dialogue with them over perhaps a coffee or a dinner, and that he was spending days and months on such useless exercise to no specific purpose, is a clear lie. 

6.2. The defence in para 1.9 as to the delay in the work of the Special Cell, namely, that authentication of the documents took time, is, as explained in Chapter VI, clearly untenable.

6.3. The White Paper dismisses the 450 year history of the struggle over Ramjanmabhoomi in just 450 words on the first page, and yet it claims to be a document "on Ayodhya".

6.4. The White Paper has dealt mostly with what happened under the Present Government, and withheld the details of what the earlier Governments did. As also the intensity of the movement and its depth.

6.5. The Government version also suppresses the fact that in the year 1988, Shri Narasimha Rao was made by Shri Rajiv Gandhi the head of the Group of Ministers to solve the problem. If it had been mentioned, it could be seen that the Prime Minister was not new to the subject.

6.6. The White Paper incorrectly says (p. 17, para 3.10) that it was only in July 1992 that the Prime Minister took initiative in the matter. 

6.7. The White Paper totally suppresses the details of the negotiations by the Prime Minister from July 1992 to December 5, 1992. Thus, the White Paper of the Government is neither a truthful document on what happened during the regime of Shri Narasimha Rao, nor a comprehensive document on the Ayodhya movement. To call it a White Paper on Ayodhya is to understate the depth and expanse of the Ayodhya movement and to name it a White Paper is to upgrade its worth beyond its actual probate value.

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