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Srikrishna Commission Report
Chapter II

1.2 The Commission has given four reasons for the Muslim action in the period immediately after Dec 6. First it talks about the mobilisation of the Hindus for the Kar Seva. Here it also talks about the propaganda against the construction of the mandir at the Ram Janmabhoomi by the Students Islamic Movement of India and Bombay Muslim Action Committee. Second it talks about the formal announcement of the Kar Seva for Dec 6 and the various programmes in that respect. Third it talks about the Rath Yatra of the BJP. And fourth it talks about the demolition of the illegal structures by the Mumbai Municipality and the Mumbai Police action against criminals.

The Commission says that the Muslim action was spontaneous. Then how is the propaganda by SIMI and BMAC relevant? While SIMI is a well known organisation, the antecedents of the BMAC are not well established. According to our information, this is a paper organisation, and the Dec 2 meeting was attended by religious and secular leaders. It was also attended by criminals, and those businessmen who operate at the edge of the law, both Muslims. At the meeting it was stated that if the police remain a spectator, then the Muslims would have no problem in attacking the Hindus. However, if the police do their job, then it would be difficult to foment trouble. It is quite clear that this organisation was prepared to create problem, and the myth of spontaneous reaction has to remain a myth. This committee is no longer in existence, since its utility of fomenting trouble is over.

The programmes for Kar Seva was an all India programme and were also undertaken in other parts of Maharashtra as well. It would have been necessary for the Commission to have inquired why so much trouble took place in Mumbai, and not in other parts of Maharashtra or the country.

Juxtaposing the Rath Yatra in the sequence of events is mischievous. This had taken place 1990, that is two years prior to Dec 6, 1992. Furthermore, at the time a petition was taken out, as a Public Interest litigation to ban the Yatra. The court declined to do so.

The fourth reason given is incredible. These are secular events, and how the Muslim community should take affront needs to be explained. The Commission has accepted that these were not targeted against the Muslim, but against all irrespective of their religious identity. The Commission should explain how the Muslims can be mobilised through their religious identity. And how does this conform to its spontaneous reaction theory.

In accepting the validity of the fourth reason, the Commission has put forward a dangerous principle that every time normal action has to be taken, the law enforcement machinery has to take into cognisance that it may lead to communal tensions. Thus, any miscreant can always threaten such consequence to avoid being punished. We do not understand how the Commission has not given the issue a serious thought before accepting the validity.

Two of the persons against whom actions were taken are Shri Hitendra Thakur and Shri Pappu Kalani, both of whom were MLAs from the Congress party, belonging to the faction opposing Shri Sudhakar Naik, the then Chief Minister from the same Congress party. It has been alleged that part of the problems that Shri Naik had within his party were due to his actions against these two persons.

1.3A(i) On Dec 6, in the context of the destruction of the Babri structure, the Commission says, "The cry of danger to Islam reverberated in the air."

This issue of Islam being in danger has a history going back to the independence struggle. It was on this basis that the partition of the country was demanded by the Muslim League. In the post-independence era, this bogey was continued. To a certain extent, the Commission has accepted this in Chapter I, para 2.1. The issue of the Ram Janmabhoomi has nothing to do with this slogan.

Moreover, since the Commission decided to deal with the issue, it should have also investigated what would have happened if there was a peaceful transfer of the site, given the just demand of the Hindus.

1.3A(ii) The Commission says that the so-called Muslim reaction turned violent because of the ‘victory’ rally in Dharavi and the police mishandling due to an aggressive posture.

How does ONE rally in Dharavi (Central Mumbai) create a reaction in the Muslim dominated areas in South Mumbai? See the comments on para 4.8 of Chapter I above.

The ‘aggressive posture’ of the police is a constant refrain by the Commission. In Vol II, para 16.3, page 94, the Commission says that the Muslim mob turned violent at the sight of the police! At the same time, the Commission has accepted in para 1.6 (pg 12) that the police did not fire on the Muslim crowd with an intention to target and liquidate them.

1.3A(iii) "At this juncture the Hindus had nothing to complain and should have left the matter to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order."

The Commission should have documented in how many cases the Hindus took to immediate retaliation of the Muslim violence. In fact, the press reports at the time clearly show that the media had blamed the police for taking ‘harsh’ action against the Muslims. The Hindu reaction had come a few days after the Muslims acted, clearly pointing to the fact that the Hindus did leave the matter to the police, and reacted only when their patience ran out. This refrain of blaming the Hindus comes through again and again throughout the report.

The Commission’s contention of significant Hindu reaction should be viewed along with the ATR (pg 19, para 34) where the following table for police firing is given:

Police Firings

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

December

153

30

133

93

189

January

308

80

90

326

146

This table clearly shows that the Hindus did, by and large, leave ‘the matter to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order’ in December. The January figures also clearly shows that when the Hindus came out on the streets to retaliate, the police did not distinguish the religious identity of the rioters. This point has to be borne in mind in discussing the alleged bias of the police.

Here it is pertinent to mention that the Commission in an indirect way accepts that the order to the police not to shoot at the Muslim rioters did aggravate the problem. In 1.3 C (ii), the Commission accepts this contention in the following words: "Perhaps as a matter- of political prudence, the Chief Minister advised the Commissioner of Police to instruct his officers and men to "go easy" with the firing. These instructions were conveyed by B.C. Message No.414 dated 8th December 1992 instructing the police to control the rioting mobs by using tear gas and lathi charge without resorting to firing." Both the then Police Commissioner of Mumbai and the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra have denied that the message was authorised. Whatever may be the case, there seems to be some impression in the minds of the police that the political masters would not stand behind them. Here, the issue is not merely the alleged message, but also the propaganda conducted in certain sections of the media and some politicians about the police deliberately targeting the Muslims. The Commission has dealt on this issue in para 1.4.

1.3A(v) "In the jurisdiction of Deonar there was a sharp counter reaction by Muslims who stoned the house of a local Bharatiya Janata Party leader."

The Commission should have explained whether the ‘reaction’ was justified. Why does the Commission not pontificate that the Muslims should have left it to the law and order machinery to deal with the situation instead of ‘reacting’?

1.3A(v) "The situation was getting uglier with attacks on Hindu temples in this area. Efforts of the police to control the situation brought forth forceful violent reaction from Muslims against them. Large scale firing resulted, which perhaps justified to quell the violent riots, was construed as an unwarranted act of suppression by police of what the violent Muslim elements thought was their legitimate protest."

If the police action was justified then how does it become an ‘unwarranted act of suppression’ of a ‘legitimate protest’? Such type of rationalisation of Muslim actions abounds in the report. We have seen it earlier when the Municipal action against illegal construction, and police action against criminals, was turned by the Muslim leadership into a communal issue.

This incident is related to an attack by the Muslims on two temples and a school, as mentioned in Vol II, para 9.6, page 37. Is it that the Commission accepts that attacking temples and schools by the Muslims as legitimate protest?

1.3B(i) "From 7th December 1992 onwards there was a qualitative transformation in the situation. Large mobs of Muslims came on the streets and there was recourse taken to violence without doubt. This time the Muslim mobs appear to have come out with the intention of mounting violent attacks as noticed from their preparedness with weapons of offence. There were violent attacks on the policemen in Muslim dominated areas like Bhendi Bazar and its vicinity. The jurisdictional areas affected were mostly Muslim dominated or mixed localities in which the misguided and irresponsible Hindu youths aggravated the situation by engaging the rioting Muslims, leading to a situation where the police found it difficult to restrain both sections; when the police did it by force, the police came to be attacked by both Hindu and Muslim mobs."

A ‘spontaneous’ and peaceful action of 6th December turns into a violent one with ‘preparedness and weapons of offence’ the very next day! Most of the so-called spontaneous events mentioned in para 4 of Chapter I appear to be a fiction of imagination of the Commission. The fact that the Muslim actions started only on December 7 has to imply that the Muslim action was organised. Here the meeting of the Bombay Muslim Action Committee on December 2 is important. See comments on para 1.1 of Chapter IV.

The Commission talks about Hindus engaging the Muslim crowd obviously bent on destruction. Does it mean that every time Hindus must just take a beating without reacting? Kindly refer to the table given in the explanation to 1.3A(iii) and the comments thereon.

1.3B(ii) "By this time the protest had degenerated into a full scale communal riot between Hindus and Muslims. Eleven temples in different jurisdictions were damaged, demolished or set on fire. The Hindus did not fall behind and damaged Mosques and Madrassas in different jurisdictions. BEST Buses in the Bombay Central Bus Depot and BEST Bus stops became easy targets for the Muslim mobs and were damaged and/or set on fire."

The police records show that there were a total of 42 temples destroyed and 4 mosques. Why has the Commission not given the full information where Hindus are at the receiving end?

1.3B(iii) "Two Constables in Deonar jurisdiction were killed with choppers and swords by the rampaging Muslims. While one lay on the ground bleeding to death, the body of another was dragged and thrown into the garbage heap from where it was recovered seven days later. One constable was done to death in Byculla jurisdiction. Several police officers and policeman who bravely attempted to stem the tide sustained injuries in mob action."

On this day, in the whole city, three police personnel were killed and 216 injured.

1.3B(iv) "A police officer carrying on his duty received a bullet injury in his head and died subsequently, though it cannot be said with certitude that it was a case of private firing."

The Commission consistently denies the issue of private firings. It is done on the basis of non-capture of private weapons by the police. The police’s explanation that they were not able to mount combing operations immediately after the private firings due to other pressing matters and lack of manpower is not accepted by the Commission, even though the Commission has accepted that there is an overall shortage of manpower to handle even routine activities. However, the existence of sophisticated weapons in the underworld, which is dominated by the Muslims, is common knowledge both prior to the December 6 events and afterwards. These are the tools of the trade for the underworld which is dominated by the Muslims.

1.3C(ii) With respect to Dec 8, the Commission says, "The police firing resulted in the death of a large number of Muslims as compared to Hindus. A clamour went up that the police were deliberately targeting Muslims for attack. Perhaps as a matter of political prudence, the Chief Minister advised the Commissioner of Police to instruct his officers and men to "go easy" with the firing. These instructions were conveyed by B.C. Message No.414 dated 8th December 1992 instructing the police to control the rioting mobs by using tear gas and lathi charge without resorting to firing."

In the same para, the number of people killed in police firing is given as 21 Hindus, 31 Muslims, and three others. It is clear that it was the Muslims who were attacking both the Hindus and the police. Yet the slightly larger proportion of Muslims killed was enough to raise a cry that the Muslims were being deliberately targeted. In para 1.4, the Commission has clearly identified that the ones who raised this cry were not only the politicians but also the media. The Commission is silent on who should be held responsible for raising this cry and misleading the government.

From the police statistics, it would appear that in police firing the number of Hindus dead was 6 and of Muslims was 52. The injured figure given is 21 Hindus, 37 Muslims, and 3 others. Has the Commission taken the injured figure for deaths? This is a grave error on part of the Commission. The police figures would confirm the violence that the Muslims were indulging in and that the Hindus had ‘left the matter to be dealt with by the police as a problem of law and order’. The police figures would demolish the Commission’s theory of peaceful Muslims, and also the charge made against the Hindus in para 1.3A(iii).

1.3(D) For the 9th Dec, the Commission accepts that the ‘situation improved for the better’.

This would show that the police had taken a proper stand in controlling the situation, and the charge of excessive force made by the media and some politicians does not hold water. The improvement in the situation is also accepted by the Commission for the days after 9th Dec.

1.4 "Media had criticized the police for having used unnecessary and excessive fire power, going far as to suggest that Muslim were intentionally targeted and selectively killed. This refrain was repeated by political leaders and ministers, past and current. The explanation of the Commissioner of a Police that the aggressive and violent mobs in the initial stages comprised Muslims and, therefore, Muslim casualties were higher, does not appear to be as far fetched as it has been made out by Muslims, nor can it be dismissed offhand."

It was this that created a lot of confusion in the minds of the police of the way they should be taking action against the rioting Muslims. It had also made the Hindus feel that the government would not protect them. Yet, the Commission has not taken the whole episode seriously enough. It should have named the media and the politicians who were responsible. This has been one of the serious lapses on part of the Commission. The Commission has also used a very guarded language in dealing with the issue.

1.5 "Considering it from all aspects, the Commission is not inclined to give serious credence to the theory that disproportionately large number of Muslim deaths in December 1992 was necessarily indicative of an attempt on the part of the police to target and liquidate Muslims because of bias."

In para 1.4 immediately above this para, the Commission mentions that the media has criticised the police for using ‘unnecessary and excessive fire power’ and ‘intentionally’ targeting and ‘selectively’ killing the Muslims. It is clear from the Commission’s findings that these atrocious charges were absurd. However, the Commission does not find any reporter and/or publication guilty in this respect. One has to ask the Commission why it has chosen not to appropriate the blame in the right direction. The Commission had accepted that because of such media reports, the hands of the police were tied. There is an implicit assumption that this made the police not to take firm action against the Muslim rioters, who were targeting not only the government property but also the Hindus. At the same time, the Commission expects that the Hindus should have kept quiet and let the police handle the situation, knowing fully well that the police were not allowed to do their task. It was imperative for the Commission to have gone into the issue of biased media reporting in this case.

It is pertinent to note that in case of the killings of the Mathadi workers on January 5, the Commission identifies two Sena leaders for making speeches which are alleged to have turned ‘a case of simple murder into a communally motivated murder’ (Vol II, pg 133, para 23.14).

1.6 "The Commission is of the view that there is evidence of police bias against Muslims which has manifested itself in other ways like the harsh treatment given to them, failure to register even cognizable offences by Muslim complainants and the indecent haste shown in classifying offences registered in "A" summary in cases where Muslim complainants had specifically indicated the names and even addresses of the miscreants."

This sentence is so obviously in complete deviation from para 1.5, that one wonders how it has come into the report. If there was a bias on part of the police, then they would have resorted to indiscriminate killings, which the Commission says did not happen. It needs to be pointed out that in Vol II, it is rare that the Commission accepts the police version, while it accepts almost all the statements given by the Muslims against the police.

1.6 "That there was a general bias against the Muslims in the minds of the average policemen which was evident in the way they dealt with the Muslims, is accepted by the officer of the rank of Additional Commissioner, V.N. Deshmukh."

The charge of bias is on the basis of the testimony of one police officer whose political opinion is clear from the following: "Deshmukh has no hesitation in calling Bharatiya Janata Party and Shiv Sena as communal parties as the records show that they have been preaching communal hatred." (Vol II, para 4.14, page 162.)

To establish such a major charge on the basis of only one officer’s opinion does not show a proper application of the principle of natural justice. And that too from a person with a strong political leanings as accepted by himself. We have been given to understand that another officer, Shri AA Khan, has deposed that the police are not biased. Similarly, other police officers like AS Samra, RD Tyagi and SK Bapat have also said that the police are not baised. This type of selectivity does no justice to the Commission. The deposition of Shri Khan and Shri Samra, who have placed the police in favourable light, has not been covered in Vol II.

  1. The heading is "12th Dec 1992 to 5th Jan 1993".

The first event recorded is for Dec 20. Does this mean that nothing of consequence happened between Dec 12 and Dec 20?

1.7(i) "On 20th December 1992 two Muslims were locked inside a room and the room was set on fire in Goregaon jurisdiction as a result of which they suffered severe burns resulting in the death of one."

This event does not find mention in Vol II. However, the police records do show such an incident having taken place.

1.7(ii) The Commission has dismissed the stabbing of a mathadi worker on 24th/25th December as an action of an alcoholic, even though he is a Muslim.

Given the atmosphere that existed at the time, it was quite easy to believe that there was a communal angle. During this period there were stabbing of Hindus in many parts of Mumbai, and there was very little police action to try and control the situation. This happened in a Muslim dominated area, and there was a reaction from the Hindus the next day, when shutters were downed. There is also a clear signal that the Hindus tried to undertake a peaceful protest, given that there were very few incidents in the two days immediately following the stabbing.

It has to be also mentioned that in Vol II, para 11.16, page 62, the date given is December 26. Such mistakes abound in the report, and one wonders if it was not prepared in haste.

1.7(iii) The Commission defends the calling of Azans (by using loudspeakers) from the mosques, and the Namaz on the streets by terming them as ‘minor irritants’.

Why does the Commission time and again rationalise and justify Muslim behaviour which irritates the Hindus? Calling these happenings as ‘minor irritants’ clearly shows a lack of respect for the sensibilities of the Hindus. The issue of Azans is a major one all over the country. Last year, the High Court in Calcutta has taken cognisance of the nuisance value of this obnoxious system, which does not exist in other parts of the world. It is surprising that the Commission is not aware of this. See also comments on para 1.2 of Chapter IV. It is also surprising that the Commission is not aware that the Mumbai High Court had in the past asked the government that the Namaz on the streets should be restricted.

1.7(iii) "The Mahaartis were started from 26th December 1992 and kept adding to the communal tension and endangering the fragile peace which had been established. Some of the Mahaartis were later used as occasions for delivering communally inciting speeches and the crowds dispersing from the "Mahaarti" indulged in damage, looting and arson of Muslim establishments in the vicinity and on their way. The Mahaartis continued unabated throughout January 1993 and came to an end only by or about the first week of February 1993."

What is it that made the peace so fragile? The Commission has accepted in the same paragraph that the Mahaartis were in response to ‘a sudden spurt in attendance at Friday Namaaz in Mosques’.

There were a total of 462 Mahaartis starting from Dec 26. Out of these, up to Jan 5 the number was 52. Thus most of the Mahaartis happened in the Hindu retaliation phase. Yet these Mahaartis have been construed as a provocation by the media, certain politicians, and to an extent by the Commission. Most of the Mahaartis have taken place after the Hindu backlash commenced.

Time and again the police have deposed that very few of the Mahartis witnessed communal speeches. But the Commission has chosen to disregard these depositions. To establish the charge made by the Commission, it should have given the number of Mahartis that were conducted, in how many cases were communal speeches given, and after how many were there violence and when. In the DB Marg Police Station police jurisdiction (Vol II, para 8.6, page 32), out of the 11 Mahartis, only one witnessed violence after the event. This too was in the second phase of the January riots when the Hindu backlash had commenced.

1.7(iv) "The last week of December 1992 and first week of January 1993, particularly between 1st to 5th, saw a series of stabbing incidents in which both Hindus and Muslims were victims, though the majority of such incidents took place in Muslim dominated areas of South Bombay and a majority of victims were Hindus."

The Commission should have given the numbers of stabbing incidents, and in how many cases were the Hindus the victims. The reticence comes through whenever the issue is of Hindus as victims. According to the police information there were 134 cases of stabbing in the first week of January, and 99 casualties were Hindus. While the Commission goes into great details in cases were the Muslims are the victims, there is a marked glossing over of the magnitude where the Hindus are the victims. It should also be recognised that these stabbing were going on for two weeks, prior to the murders of the Mathadi workers, and the Radhabai Chawl incident.

1.7(iv) "The killers had not been then identified in several cases, though it was presumed, at least in the cases where the Hindus were victims, that the killers were Muslims. The motive for the stabbing appears to have been to whip up communal frenzy between Hindus and Muslims. Some of the Muslim criminal elements operating in South Bombay, like Salim Rampuri and Firoz Konkani, have been identified as the brains behind the stabbing incidents. That they were criminals was underplayed by Hindus; that they were Muslims was all that mattered, and a cry went up that the Muslims were bent upon a second round of riots."

The Commission is very quick to identify the Hindus as aggressors wherever the Muslims are the victims. In the opposite cases, there is an attempt to almost deny the communal identity of the aggressors. If the fact that 99 Hindus were stabbed had been mentioned, it would have been very difficult for the Commission to say with a straight face that it was done by two criminals who incidentally happened to be Muslims.

The identity of Konkani was discovered only in his confession statement when he was arrested in a murder case (that of a senior BJP leader Ramdas Nayak) in 1995, two years after the stabbing incidents had happened. At the time it was treated by all concerned as Muslims attacking Hindus.

Furthermore, it is obvious that the Commission accepts that it is quite easy to ‘whip up communal frenzy’ where the Muslim community is concerned.

1.7(vi) "On 2nd January 1993 a number of Muslim hutments in M.P. Mill Compound in Tardeo jurisdiction were set on fire. On the same day there was an incident in Dharavi jurisdiction in which two Muslims were assaulted with iron rods by Hindus."

In Vol II, neither event is mentioned in the details of the respective police stations. However, the MP Mill incident is mentioned at para 2.14, page 157, with respect to the statement on Shri S K Bapat, the then Commissioner of Police. Hence, the Commission has relied on an allegation made by the Muslims, but one which is not recorded in the police station.

1.7(viii) "On 4th January 1993 a big mob of Hindus led by Shri Gajanan Kirtikar, Shri Ramesh More and other Shiv Sena activists took a morcha to the Jogeshwari Police Station complaining of lack of security for Hindus. Some of the people in the morcha attacked Chacha Nagar Masjid and the Muslims in the vicinity and injured them. Several Muslims huts in Magdum Nagar in Mahim jurisdiction were set on fire by Hindus."

Does this not establish the Hindu insecurity? Kindly note the date of the morcha. Similar sentiments had been expressed all over the city by many Hindus. Also this is yet another instance where the Hindus asked for police to do their job in protecting the Hindus from being targeted.

As far as the attack on Muslims is concerned, Vol II, para 14.20, page 84, says that one Muslim was injured. The extent of damage to the mosque is not indicated. The Magdum Nagar incident is not mention in Vol II.

1.7 (ix) On the issue of the opinion of the Commission on the murders of four Mathadi workers these are summarised in Vol II, pg 133, 23.14, where it says that ‘a case of simple murder’ was converted ‘into a communally motivated murder’.

In trying to explain away the magnitude of the incident, the Commission has once again exposed its bias. It is very difficult to argue with such blatant statements, and there are many of them in the report.

1.8(i) The casualties for Jan 6, 1993, are given as follows:

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbing

1

1

13

1

Mob violence

7

1

9

8

No information is available for casualties in arson or police firing.

1.8(ii) "The situation in Mahim went out of control at 2100 hours (Jan 6). Hindus attacked Muslims in Muslim pockets in Mahim area led by Shiv Sena Corporator, Milind Vaidya, and a Police Constable Sanjay Gawade, openly carrying a sword. There were serious riots in which frenzied mobs of Hindus and Muslims attacked each other."

Reading the section on the Mahim police station in Vol II (para 19.18), it is clear that there were attacks on Hindus, just prior to January 6. Also in Para 19.20, it has been clearly stated that the two persons mentioned above were arrested on the spot. This clearly shows that even in case where there was a Hindu reaction, the police did take the appropriate action. If the Commission had mentioned these facts, then it would have to do away with the theory of rationalising the Muslim actions, and also about the police bias.

1.10 The information provided by the Commission for the events on Jan 7 is as follows:

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbing

16

4

41

12

Mob violence

2

-

10

2

Arson

2

-

5

2

Police firing

-

-

6

5

Burning

-

2

-

-

Total

20

6

62

21

The attacks on Hindus is quite clear. Also the report mentions that the above happenings are in 16 police station, most of which are Muslim dominated areas, and the fiction that this was the handiwork of two Muslim criminals should remain as a fiction. The table also establishes that the police have attempted to be fair in dealing with the violence. In fact, given that the Hindus have been on the receiving end from the Muslims, there really should have been more Muslim casualties in the police firings.

1.10 "A taxi in which two Muslims were travelling was set on fire in Pratiksha Nagar, Antop Hill jurisdiction resulting in the two Muslims being burnt alive."

In Vol II with respect to the Antop Hill Police Station (pg 6+), there is no mention about such an incident. The closest one gets is at 2.14 (pg 7) where it talks about three (not two) Muslims being burnt in a Maruti car (not a taxi) on Jan 14 (not Jan 7). This is yet another example of inconsistency in the two volumes.

1.11(i) "During the wee hours of 8th January 1993, at about 0030 hours, some of the Hindu residences in a chawl popularly known as Radhabai Chawl in Jogeshwari jurisdiction were locked from outside and set on fire by miscreants. one male and five female members of a Hindu family (Bane) and their neighbours were charred to death and three other Hindus sustained serious burn injuries. One of the victims was a handicapped girl. This incident was sensationalized by the media by giving exaggerated and provoking reports."

This was the major incident of the whole episode, and one that provoked the maximum anger of the Hindus against the Muslims. It is obvious that the Commission has tried to minimise the magnitude of the incident, because those killed were Hindus. It is also pertinent that no angry adjectives are used to describe the incident. The ATR has the following to say on the subject: "This was such a horrifying, cruel and gruesome incident that even an ordinary person would have got highly excited and would have lost his mental balance. Government is surprised as to how the Commission does not acknowledge this incident with adequate gravity and, on the control, blames some parties for inciting religious frenzy and alleges that some Marathi newspapers gave exaggerated reports and sensationalised the issue. Government cannot accept these conclusions because the news items were indeed based on facts."

In the Vol II of the report (14.25, pg 85), this incident is covered in less than 25% of a page. In contrast the coverage given to incidents where Muslims are attacked is quite extensive, even in cases where there are individual attacks on the Muslims, and where there is injury and not deaths. The whole emphasis is to downplay the communal angle in the Radhabai Chawl case, and blame the votaries of Hindutva for the so-called playing up the incident. The Commission has refused to look at this incident in context of the overall attacks that were taking place against the Hindus, and has treated it as an isolated incident.

1.11(ii) This para starts with the sentence "The Hindu ‘backlash’ commenced."

One does not understand why the word ‘backlash’ is in quotes. Perhaps the Commission wants to maintain the fiction that there was no ‘backlash’ as such. The backlash is accepted by the police, by the government (both of the time and the present), and by the Hindutvavadi political parties. In fact in para 1.12(ii), narrating the events of 9th January, the Commission has said that ‘the Shiv Sainiks mobilised themselves for retaliating against the Muslims.’

If the Commission is correct, then how did the trouble which was in 16 police stations areas on January 7 went up to 32 on January 8? The figures of casualties for Jan 8 are as follows:

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbings

11

15

29

30

Mob violence

-

6

11

17

Arson

6

2

2

5

Police firing

9

18

20

24

Total

26

41

62

76

Even though the Hindus were still being attacked, it is clear that the Hindu retaliation had started and the Muslims were now getting to be at the receiving end as well.

1.11(iii) "That the rioters had become defiant and the authority of the police was considerably eroded, appeared clear when a crude bomb was hurled at the Police Commissioner's car from one of the buildings in Pydhonie jurisdiction and exploded on the road."

The authority of the police was eroded because they were not permitted to take the necessary action. The reasons for this has been stated by the Commission earlier. Had there been a proper maintenance of the law and order, then the severity of the whole situation would have been far less. For this the blame should not be laid on the police. It should be laid on the then political masters, and the media which projected the police action in a perverted manner.

1.12 (i) The Commission reports the summary of the events for Jan 9 as follows:

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbing

8

18

27

33

Mob violence

1

6

19

24

Arson

3

6

4

6

Police firing

15

22

52

37

Total

27

52

102

100

This is another evidence of the Hindu retaliation.

1.12(ii) "The Shiv Sainiks mobilized themselves for retaliating against the Muslims. The shakhas in different jurisdictional areas turned into centres of local commands. The attacks on Muslims by the Shiv Sainiks were mounted with military precision, with list of establishments and voter's list in hand."

That the Sena mobilisation started on Jan 9 clearly establishes that there was a retaliation of the events that had happened in the previous fifteen days. It is also clear that the Hindus did not react immediately, but did so when their patience was stretched to the limit. Between Jan 1 and Jan 7, out of 134 stabbing casualties, 99 were Hindus.

The incident of going around with the voters’ list is mentioned in only one case in Vol II at the Antop Hill Police Station jurisdiction. This cannot be taken as a rule. Moreover, as the ATR has also commented (para 14(8), pg 15), ‘group of young persons’ in Vol II (para 2.6, pg 7) becomes Shiv Sainiks in Vol I. Just as the Commission has converted one so-called victory rally at Dharavi (para 1.3A(ii)) as victory rallies, the Commission is guilty of blowing up one incident to make it look like it was the rule. In case of the Muslims, the Commission does exactly the opposite.

1.12(iii) "Police suspected terrorists to be holed up on the terrace of Suleman Usman Bakery in Pydhonie jurisdiction. Operation launched against the alleged terrorists by the Special Operation Squad (SOS) under the direction of Joint Commissioner of Police, R.D. Tyagi, and extensive firing by the SOS resulted in deaths of nine Muslims. The police failed to apprehend even a single so-called terrorist, nor did they seize any fire-arms, sophisticated or otherwise, from which firing was done at them as claimed."

The Suleman Bakery is not under Pydhonie but Dongri police station, as mentioned in Vol II, where the incident is covered in great details, and goes on for three pages. At the same time, the Radhabai Chawl incident is covered in less than 25% of a page.

The police version is completely disbelieved, while the Muslim version is completely accepted. The Commission goes out of the way to disprove the police case, as it has done in many other incidents as well. There were 9 Muslims who were killed in the action, and 78 were captured. If one were to accept the Commission’s contention of bias and indiscriminate firing, surely there would have been more killed.

In Shri Bapat’s affidavit, he states that after the operations, the police found four empties of AK47, one slug of AK47, two live cartridges of AK47, one empty of 7.62 SLR and two empties of 9mm pistols. Surely, the Commission does not want to say that police planted them!

1.13 (i) The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of various events on Jan 10.

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbing

10

39

24

42

Mob violence

2

9

13

27

Arson

1

5

1

1

Police firing

22

23

77

27

Total

35

76

115

97

In para 1.13(ii), the report has stated that the police were given orders to fire. This had removed the confusion that was existing in the minds of the police. In The Times of India (Jan 10, 1993), it says, "However, in view of the unprecedented riots last night, Mr Naik, it is learnt, has issued strict instructions to the police to be ‘tough and no nonsense’. He is believed to have assured the city police commissioner that he would answer allegations in the press, if any, of ‘police excesses’." As will be seen from the above table, there were significant Hindu casualties in police firing. Also, when the Hindu retaliation commenced, the police treated the Hindu reaction as a law and order issue, once again demolishing the Commission theory of bias against the Muslims. The police ‘bias’ against Muslims of December that was made so much hue and cry by the media and certain politicians does not exist. As the police have been saying, when they see a rioter on the street they do not distinguish the communal identity of the person.

Since it was the Hindus who were at the receiving end, the media, of course, did not raise a hue and cry about a community being specifically targeted by the police. Shri Naik did not have to face any awkward situation in this case!

1.14 The Commission gives the following summary of the casualties of various events on January 11.

Killed

Injured

Hindus

Muslims

Hindus

Muslims

Stabbing

11

44

23

58

Mob violence

4

19

12

26

Arson

2

12

-

7

Police firing

19

7

45

21

Total

36

82

80

112

1.15(i) "A gruesome incident occurs in Devipada in Kasturba Marg jurisdiction." This incident relates to an assault on two Muslim women, one of whom is killed. The uncle is also killed in his attempt to rescue them.

The Commission rightly calls this incident ‘gruesome’. However, in dealing with the murders of the mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl incident, the Commission does not use any ‘angry’ adjectives. In fact, the Commission has tried to pass off these incidents where Hindus are the victims as minor and of little significance in the whole events that have happened.

(From Jan 13 onwards, the situation started to improve considerably. The figures for subsequent days are given in the table enclosed.)

1.24 The report summarises the casualties for December and January as follows:

Dead

Injured

Hindus

275

893

Muslims

575

1105

Unknown

45

38

Others

5

-

Total

900

2036

The causes of the deaths are summarised as follows:

Police firing 356
Stabbing 347
Arson 91
Mob action 80
Private firing 22
Others 4

Total 900

The Commission has admitted to 22 deaths due to private firings. However, when one reads the Vol II, there is a consistent doubt that is placed on the veracity of private firings. The Commission has pointed out that there have been no arms seizure, and has refused to accept the police version that this was due to the fact that sufficient force was not available to undertake the exercise. In its habit of being inconsistent, the Commission has also accepted that the police are understaffed to the extent of 30% for normal duties.

1.25 "After studying the conclusions of the expert panel the Commission is inclined to accept the report and conclusions drawn by the panel of experts from the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS). Class conflict, Economic Competition, Decline in employment opportunities, Changing Political Discourse are some of the immediate causes of urban riots in different studies undertaken by sociologists."

Our reading of the report of the experts from TISS is that except for ‘Changing Political Discourse’ none of the other factors are important. There seems to be an effort on part of the Commission to down play the essential findings of the TISS, since it does not conform to the leftist propaganda of the past to explain the occurrence of riots. Probably for the first time, some experts, and that too from an institute that is well known for its leftist leanings, have come out with debunking a theory that the people always knew to be false. These factors have been used only to cover up the deficiencies of the ‘secular’ politicians and intellectuals.

1.25E(ii) On the issue of the Changing Political Discourse, the TISS findings say, "Originally confined to the forward caste and the middle class in Mumbai, Hindutva has recently gained currency and fashionableness and its appeal cuts across economic strata and linguistic divisions."

It has to be accepted that the ideology of Hindutva has come to the centre stage only since the mid-80s. Even the Shiv Sena adopted this programme at that time. Until this change took place, the destiny of the nation was being guided by the leftists, who projected that they had all the answers to the problems being faced by the nation. They were the ones who had control of the levers of power, not only political but also intellectual. Many of the latter are still clinging on to the positions that they have allotted themselves, and are living off the funds provided to them by the society. What the TISS findings do not touch upon is why the ideology of Hindutva has gained currency amongst all the sections of the society. Controlling the intellectual space enables them to undertake a propaganda against the votaries of Hindutva. Yet the people seem to be not listening to them. A recent poll in one of the many national weeklies which are editorially controlled by the leftists, clearly show that the people of Mumbai are not satisfied with findings of the Commission.

The TISS findings can also be disproved when one considers that the riots took place only in Mumbai, while the ideology of Hindutva has ‘gained currency and fashionableness’ in other parts of Maharashtra and the rest of India.

1.25E(iii) "Unlike elsewhere in the country the Muslims have not acquired sufficient political clout, nor have they been able to increase their representation in B.M.C. or in the Legislative Assembly. This has contributed to the Hindutva idiom gaining ground."

It is not correct to say that it is ONLY in Mumbai that the Muslims have not acquired sufficient political clout. This has happened in many other places in India, and they have not resulted in the violence of the type that has been seen in Mumbai. One will have to find other reasons for explanation, which reasons the Commission has chosen to ignore and instead rationalise and justify the so-called anger of the Muslims. The non-Hindutva politicians and academics have been projecting (and they still try and do it) that they are the protectors and benefactors of the Muslims.

This analysis of TISS is also an exhibition of the mind set of vote bank politics, because it makes a clear assumption that it is only through political clout that the Muslims will be able to address their problems. The fact of the matter is not that the Muslims have not been able to ‘acquire sufficient political clout’ but that they have lost whatever clout that they have had. This clout was available to them because the votaries (political and otherwise) of the so-called secularism have used them for their own agenda, and not to create an environment whereby the Muslims benefit economically and socially.

1.26(i) In the Commission’s opinion: "The immediate causes of the communal riots on 6th December 1992 were: (a) the demolition of Babri Masjid, (b) the aggravation of Muslim sentiments by the Hindus with their celebration rallies and (c) the insensitive and harsh approach of the police while handling the protesting mobs which initially were not violent."

With respect to (a) an honest inquiry was needed to find out whether there were efforts made by the Hindus to come at a negotiated solution. And also an inquiry was needed why the negotiations had failed. This inquiry would have revealed that there is a very strong historical case for the Hindus to ask for the site back, since it is considered holy by the Hindus for the last at least 3000 years, when there was no Islam around. Not only did the Commission not make the inquiry, but prevented the votaries of Hindutva to present their point of view.

As far as (b) is concerned, the Commission bases its whole conclusion on one event, namely the cycle rally at Dharavi. While an explanation for the same has been provided by the Sena and the police, the Commission has chosen to ignore it. And this cycle rally seems to have been given importance much, much later, and not at the time.

As far as (c) is concerned, the Commission has taken it upon itself to rationalise and sweep under the carpets the real reasons. Even while accepting that the police were not specifically targeting the Muslims, it has come to this conclusion. Had the police been biased as claimed in para 1.5 (pg 12), they could have easily used the opportunity of the Muslims being on the streets to do the things a biased person would do

1.27(i) "As far as the causes for January 1993 phase of the rioting is concerned, the Commission does not accept the theory that it was merely a backlash of the Hindus because of the stabbing, Mathadi murders incidents and the Radhabai Chawl incident."

The Commission would like the people to believe that the Sena acted entirely on its own, and that there was no provocation of the Hindus. And that the Hindu anger was created by the Sena out of thin air. We think that this has severely eroded the credibility of the Commission.

This is from a paper which the Commission would not like to dismiss out of hand. "The Maharashtra govt has cited incidents in three areas in Bombay as the causes for January riots. The first is the fatal stabbing of two Mathadi workers with a sword and chopper by a gang of goondas at Vijay Laxmi godown in Dongri. The second is the killing of 37 people, following 138 cases of stabbing in Dongri, Pydhonie, Nagpada, and VP Road police station jurisdictions in 48 hours, after January 6. The burning to death of four members of a family in Radhabai Chawl at Jogeshwari on the night of January 7 and 8 is mentioned as the third main reason..... Though the Mahrashtra govt has not said so, a clear inference which can be drawn from the incidents mentioned is that the attacks by the minority community provoked the riots." (The Times of India, Feb 18, 1993.) Kindly note that the Maharashtra govt at the time was of the Congress party.

1.27(ii) The Commission says that the stabbing incidents that happened between Dec 12 and Jan 15 were the handiwork of a couple of criminals (who incidentally happened to be Muslims). The Commission says that ‘the communal passions of the Hindus were aroused to fever pitch by the inciting exaggerated accounts of the Mathadi murders and the Radhabai Chawl incidents.’ Here the Commission particularly blames Saamna and Navakal. The Commission says that at least from Jan 8 the Shiv Sena leadership in general, and Balasaheb Thackcray in particular, assumed the leadership of the retaliation. Subsequently the criminal elements took over, and when the Sena felt that the retaliation was sufficient, it issued an appeal for peace.

One has to really stretch one’s imagination beyond the maximum limit to think that 136 stabbing incidents in the first week of January, out of which 99 were Hindus, were the handiwork of two criminals.

If only the mathadi workers’ murders and the Radhabai Chawl incidents had happened, without the others that preceded it, probably one could agree with the Commission. But one has to see the situation as a whole. And one should, in any case, understand the horrific element in the Radhabai Chawl incident. Given the situation of attacks on the Hindus in the first week of January, the killings of the Mathadi workers and the Radhabai Chawl incident, one has to see the whole thing as part of a concerted programme of targeting Hindus. It is difficult to understand why the Commission has taken it upon itself to play down this incident.

As far as the media is concerned, the Radhabai incident has been reported in all the papers, and not only the two that the Commission names. Again, one has to see it in terms of the straw that broke the camel’s back, and not in isolation.

With respect to the writings in Saamna, we are sure that the Commission is aware of the Public Interest Litigation that was filed by two so-called conscious citizens of the country residing in Mumbai. The High Court said that it did not agree with the litigants that the writings broke any law of the land. In the judgement on the petition, the High Court judges opined that Balasaheb was referring to Muslims who were working against the nation, and not the whole community. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court, which did not even admit the same. All this had happened before the Commission finished its hearing and started to write the report.

That Balasaheb and the Shiv Sena took the lead in channelling the Hindu anger is something that is accepted by everybody, including Balasaheb. However, without a genuine Hindu anger, no organisation would have been able to create it. The Commission has accepted that the backlash has started from Jan 8, and the Sena mobilisation from Jan 9.

1.28 "Effete political leadership, vacillation for political reasons and conflicting orders issued to the Commissioner of Police and percolated downwards created a general sense of confusion in the lower ranks of the police, resulting in the dilemma "to shoot or not to shoot" Four precious days were lost for the Chief Minister to consider and issue orders as to effective use of Army for controlling the riots."

The effete and vacillating leadership was reflected in the way the January stabbing by the Muslims were handled. Due to the media pressure, the government had given orders not to shoot at the rioters then. Even while all the stabbing of Hindus was going on in late December and early January, there was no effort made by the police, under pressure of the political leadership, to control them. There is also a clear case that there has been internal bickering in the then ruling party, namely the Congress. The Commission has reported at many places in Vol II about the interference of Congress ministers, both in the state and the centre, in the working of the police. In Vol I of the report, the Commission has not mentioned the persons who were responsible for the interference, and not recommended any action that should be taken against them.

"The assertion by All India Congress Committee general secretary Janardhan Poojari in Hyderabad today that the Bombay riots were cause of infighting within the Maharashtra unit of the party is being echoed by senior Congressmen here. According to a UNI report, Poojari said that "some disgruntled elements within the Congress" were fanning communal violence in order to seek the removal of Chief Minister Sudhakar Naik." (The Sunday Observer, Jan 10, 1993.)

Then there is the case of compensation to the families victims of the riot. For political reasons, the amount that was given was announced by the state government as Rs 1 lakh. This was increased to Rs 2 lakhs by the central government. Both of them were of the Congress party. This compensation was given even to the criminals who had instigated the riots, and not only to innocent bystanders, and those who were provoked. This compensation was also doled out in a public function, giving it political overtones. This created a great deal of demoralisation amongst the police, who were less inclined to do their duty.

The role of the so-called secular media in December has also got to be analysed. Their reporting and placing of the blame on the police for killing the rioters was biased. The Commission has blamed the two Marathi papers for reporting the news. But it has completely ignored the so-called secular media for perverting the news about an alleged police bias, as well as the Urdu press.

1.29 "The built-in bias of the police force against Muslims became more pronounced with murderous attacks on the Constabulary and officers and manifested in their reluctance to firmly put down incidents of violence, looting and arson which went on unchecked."

Here the Commission is talking about not putting down the Hindu reaction firmly. However, even from the Commission’s own report of the number of Hindu casualties during the retaliation phase of the January riots, it is clear the police took firm action when the confusion of the December order was removed, and orders to fire were given on Jan 10, that is within 48 hours of the start of the retaliation. There is also The Times of India report, quoted above, that the then Chief Minister gave clear indications to the police that he was behind them if there was any criticism on their action as had happened earlier. In Vol I, the Commission has mentioned that the media and the anti-Hindutvavadi politicians has unfairly criticised the police for taking harsh action against the Muslim rioters during the first phase of the December riots. It is also to be mentioned that in Vol II, in its report on individual police stations, the Commission criticises the police for dealing harshly with the Muslim rioters, who were supposed to be peaceful at the beginning and became violent only when the police started to take the necessary action.

On the issue of bias, the Commission has contradicted itself, as has been pointed out earlier.

The first part of the above statement is quite confusing.


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