1.8 - In his statement to Parliament on 27, July 1992 (the full text of which is at Appendix-IX), the Prime Minister affirmed that the efforts of the Central Government had been to “defuse the situation, avoid a confrontationist approach and to bring about a reconciliation of the views of various concerned parties". The Prime Minister confirmed that he had been making preliminary soundings for some time past towards an amicable settlement through negotiations. In addition to these, he would revive the efforts in this regard by the previous government that had remained unfinished. In case it became necessary the litigation pending in various courts on the subject would be consolidated and considered by one judicial authority, whose decision would be binding on all parties.

1.9 - As a follow up measure a special Cell on Ayodhya was set up in the Prime Minister's Office which started its work of collection, authentication and examination of the record relating to the negotiations started by the previous Government and preparation of summaries of cases sought to be established by the two sides. It also set about its task of collecting details of cases pending in the High Court and the Supreme Court relating to the dispute, not with standing the difficulty that the Union of India was not a party to most of the proceedings. Special arrangements were made to obtain copies of important documents and orders relating to these cases and arrangements put in place for regular monitoring of the proceedings in the Supreme Court and the High Court.

1.10 - Simultaneously, the Prime Minister held a large number of meetings with individuals and groups directly concerned with the dispute as well as journalists, political, religious and social leaders. The discussions held by the Prime Minister facilitated a better understanding of the position of the parties concerned and enabled various sections of opinion to put forward their own insights into the various facets of the problem. No specific proposal or suggestion for a solution was put forward on behalf of the Government, whose endeavour was to be accessible and open to any ideas that might contribute to a settlement. These consultations, backed by the examination of the record by the Special Cell on Ayodhya, helped prepare the ground for the start of the negotiations. On the eve of the resumption of these talks, the Prime Minister wrote to the leaders of all recognised parties requesting their support, the text of which letter is at Appendix-X.

1.11 - On October 3, 1992, the Home Minister presided over the meeting between the AIBMAC and the VHP, the two parties to the earlier negotiations, which was joined by historical and archaeological experts nominated by them. The two sides exchanged and agreed to respond to the statement of case of the VHP presented on 24th February, 1991 and the report of historians by the AIBMAC presented in May, 1991. The VHP also presented a questionnaire addressed to the AIBMAC. A unanimous résolution agreed to carry forward the negotiations, the submission of evidence and comments there on and to maintain peace during the negotiations,

1.12 At the second meeting, on October 16, 1992, several decisions seeking to make the negotiations more meaningful were taken. It was decided that both, sides would give their written opinion on the material and the evidence so far presented to the Government in a week’s time, by which date any fresh evidence would be accepted and copies made available to the other side the next day. The AIBMAC presented a questionnaire to the VHP. The meeting also decided that the archaeologists and historians nominated by both sides would be given an opportunity to examine the material relating to the excavations conducted by Prof. B.B.Lal and reports from boths sides would be submitted to the Government by 29th October, 1992.

1.13 - Two controversies relating to archaeology and history were raised and resolved in this meeting. The VHP had objected to the historians nominated by he AIBMAC describing themselves as “independent" and argued that the report given by the nominees of the AIBMAC in May, 1991 could not, in that case, be considered as the statament of case by AIBMAC and placed no obligation on the VHP to respond to it. However, upon the AIBMAC formally adopting the report, the VHP agreed to respond to it.

1.14 The other controversy related to the excavations conducted by Prof. B.B. Lal at Ayodhya. His discovery of some pillar bases close to the disputed structure was cited by VHP to support its case. The authenticity of this findiag was, however, disputed by AIBMAC which alleged that its historians had been denied the opportunity to examine the original record relatig to the excavation. This was settled by making available material relating ta Prof. Lal’s excavations to the experts of both sides.

1.15 By October 29, 1992, both sides had furnished to the Government their statement of case and comments on the evidence furnished by the other side. In consultation with the two sides, the date of next meeting was fixed on 8th November, 1992 at which crucial decisions were expected, now that the work of presentation of evidence and offering comments on it had concluded.

1.16 - It was at this point that in a sudden and unexpected move, the Kendriya Margadarshak Mandal of the VHP met in New Delhi, followed by a Dharma Sansad, between 29 and 31 October, 1992 and announced the call for resumption of kar seva from 6 December 1992. This move was totally inexplicable in view of the smooth movement of the negotiations as detailed in the foregoing paragraph. The only explanation imaginable could be that the intention of this unilateral announcement was disrupt the course of the negotiation and prevent the expected reference of the dispute to the Supreme Court, thus dragging the matter into confrontation again.

1.17 In the meantime, an application was moved by a private party in the Supreme Court seeking inter alia, a direction to the Government of India to take possession of the disputed property as receiver to ensure safety of the RJM-BM structure and to prevent kar seva on the acquired land. On being asked, by the Supreme Court the Government of India through the Attorney General for India assured the Court of all assistance to ensure compliance of court orders. The Government of UP also gave assurances to the court on securing the safety of the structure as well as the implementation of court orders. It gave an undertaking in the court backed by letters from Swami Chinmayanand and Smt. Vijaya Raje Scindia, prominent members of the BJP and VHP that the kar seva would be symbolic in nature and would not involve any construction activity in violation of court orders. After some initial hesitation, this undertaking of the Government of UP was accepted by all organisations involved in the temple construction movement and thus, by the 5th of December, it was felt that the kar seva to be started the next day would be confined to certain religious ceremonies and symbolic manual labour and would not involve any construction work. The safety of the disputed structure itself was never the chief issue during 1991 and 1992, though the Government of India regularly expressed concern to the Government of Uttar Pradesh on this matter. The commitment of the State Government on this count was always clear and unequivocal. In fact some of the leaders had claimed from time to time that the disputed structure was a functioning as atemple. As a measure of abundant caution, however, the Central Government had stationed 195 companies of Central Para-military Forces near Ayodhya in November 1992 so that these could be made available at short notice if and when required by the State Government or for any other contingent purpose. The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh protested against this stationing of forces. However, it was not the position of the State Government that they would not use Central Para-Military Forces even if it became necessary to do so. In fact, the services of the bomb detection squads and sniffer dog squads were actually utilised by the Suite Government after the Central Government brought to its notice the possibility of threat by explosives. The presumption thus appeared to be that the State Government would use the Central forces if the need arose.

1.18 - Initial reports from Ayodhya on 6th December indicated an air of normaley. About 70,000 persons had assembled in the Ram Katha Kunj for a public meeting with some 500 sadhus and sants gathered on the foundation terrace for performing puja. Everything seemed to be going according to the plan announced by the organisers for doing a symbolic kar seva and observing other formalities of kar seva not involving violation of court orders. As the crowd was being addressed by leaders of the BJP, VHP etc roughly 150 persons in a sudden move broke through the cordon on the terrace, regrouped and started pelting stones at the police personnel. All this happened a few minutes before noon and within a very little time, around a thousand persons broke into the RJB-BM structure. Around 12.20 Hrs about 80 persons had managed to climb the RJB-BM structure and started damaging the domes. At this time, the crowd inside the complex was around 25,000 with larger numbers milling around outside. By 14.40 Hrs crowd had increased to about 75,000.

1.19 - While this criminal activity was going on, the local authorities and the police appearead to be standing as mute spectators, ostensibly under the instructions of the Chief Ministor of Uttar Pradesh. This dismal picture of inaction and the State Government's dereliction of duty was because of orders of the Chief Minister of UP not to use force. Even the small contingent of Central Reserve Police was rendered inactive and powerless by express direction given to them by the local Magiastrate and higher State Government authorities. A worse example of irresponsibility and abdication of power by those who had taken oath to defend the Constitution and uphold the rule of law cannot be imagined.

1.20 The following chronology would show that the Central Government hed maintained constant contact with the Government of Uttar Pradesh and the officers of the Central Para-Military Force/(CPMF) at Ayodhya. The chronology would also show that constant pressure was kept on the State Government to make use of the Central forces for the protection of the structure. The State Government at no stage explicitly stated that it would not make use of these forces. On more than one occasion during the day, the forces were actually requisitioned but their movement was delayed due to non-availability of Magistrates. Even when eventually a Magistrate accompanied a force comprising a few companies, he sent the forces back after going part of the way. Thus the State Government kept up a pretense without actually using the Central Forces effectively.

9.30 - a.m. - Union Home Seerctary (HS) telephoned the Director General, Indo-Tibetan Border Police (DG-ITBP) in Faizabad to keep the CPMF ready and to respond immediately to any request for assistance received from the State Government without waiting for formal order from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

11.30 a.m. - Everything was reported to be peaceful. Gathering of about 50,000-60,000 kar sevaks was being addressed by top leaders of VHP and BJP.

12.00 noon - Information was received in the Home Ministry through Intelligence Bureau and also through the Central Reserve Police Coatrol Room at Ayodhya that about 150 kar sevaks had stormed the disputed complex. The State Police and the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC) did not check them though senior officers were present close to the structure. Local authorities also did not intervene. The kar sevaks started damaging the disputed structure. This information was immediately conveyed to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister.

12.10 p.m. - HS tried to speak to Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh who was not available. He spoke to Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh and urged him to make use of Central forces located near Ayodhya.

12.25 p.m. - HS spoke to Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh at Cheif Minister's residence asking him to persuade the Cheif Minister to accept the assistance of Central forces. Principal Secretary, Home, Government of Uttar Pradesh said that Central forces would be requisitioned after consulting the Cheif Minister. He also said that Home Minister was speaking to Cheif Minister on phone at that time.

12.25 p.m. - The Union Home Minister spoke to the Cheif Minister of Uttar Pradesh expressing his anxiety about the attack on the structure by the kar sevaks and urged that all attempts should be made protect the structure. He also urged that Central Para-Military forces should be utilised.

The Chief Minister said he had received conflicting reports of entry into the complex. He would verify and deal with the matter. He, however, did not call HM back as promised.

12.35 p.m. - HS's instructions again conveyed to Director General, ITPB by MHA to provide help to the local administration immediately on demand.

12.40 p.m. - DG, ITBP informed MHA that 2 battalions of Rapid Action force (RAF) at Dogra Regimental Centre (DRC) at Faizabad were ready te move. He also informed that action to damage the structure continued unabated and no action was heing taken though Senior Officers of the State Government like Inspector General (IG) Zone and Deputy Inspector General (DIG) (Range), IG and DIG, PAC as also District Magistrate (DM), Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) were present in the Police Control room.

12.45 p.m. - DM, Faizabad approached DIG, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) asking for 30 companies of Para-Military Forces (PMF). DG, ITBP and DG, CRPF in Faizabad were contacted and 30 companies were immediately released.

12.50 p.m. - Again DG, ITBP conveyed to DIG, CRPF and DCO 76 Battalion who were present on the spot to request the DM and SSP, Faizabad to send magistrates to accompany the troops.

1.00 p.m. - HM spoke to Governor, UP drawing attention to the assault on the disputed structure and stressing the need to take action for its protection.

1.15 p.m. - One magistrate and one Circle Officer reached DRC, Faizabad to accompany the CPMFs.

1.25 p.m. - 3 battalions of CPMFs left DRC along with the Magistrate and Circle Officer. Remaining Battalions awaited arrival of magistrates.

1.40 p.m. - HS again directed that all CPMFs at Ayodhya and elsewhere be kept in a state of red alert for use in Ayodhya and elsewhere in Uttar Pradesh. Message conveyed to DG, ITBP by MHA.

1.45 p.m. - DG, ITBP informed MHA that considerable damage to the structure had taken place but UP Police was not taking any action.

1.50 p.m. - DG, ITBP informed MHA that 3 battalions had moved out of DRC along with a magistrate and Circle Officer at 1.25 PM and the remaining battalions were
waiting for the magistrates to arrive. He also intimated that the District Administration had asked for 50 companies and had been requested to send magistrates wherever PMFs were stationed so that forces could converge and be used by the local administration.

2.00 p.m. - HM again spoke to CM, Uttar Pradesh to enquire about the action taken for the protection of the Structure.

2.20 p.m. - DG, ITBP informed MHA that 3 battalions which had moved from DRC had met resistance and obstructions. Enroute there were a lot of road blocks and people stopped vehicles. The convoy reached with great difficulty at Saket Degree College where the force was again stopped and the road was blocked. Minor pelting of stones also took place. The magistrate asked them in writing to return. DG, ITBP further informed that the 3 battalions had returned accordingly. The Commissioner had been contacted who informed that CM, UP had ordered that there will be no firing under any circumstances.

2.25 p.m. - HS spoke to DGP, UP informing him of sending back of the force by the local administration and requested to issue necessary instructions for use of force.
DGP, UP informed that CM’s instructions were that firing should not be resorted to but other kinds of force could be used. HS asked DGP, UP that State Government should issue necessary instructions immediately. DGP promised to attend to this matter immediately.

2.30 p.m. - HS spoke to Chief Secretary, UP and requested him also similarly.

2.35 p.m. - HS spoke to Defence Secretary to keep helicopters ready if any force would have to be moved by air immediately. He was also requested to keep one or two
transport planes ready for movement of additional troops if necessary.

3.30-4.30 p.m. - HS was informed that communal incidents had started occurring in Ayodhya, and spoke to DGP, UP and told him that the situation was fast deteriorating
and not only Central Forces had been unable to move but there was serious apprehension of communal riots. DGP, UP informed that situation cannot be controlled without resorting to firing and orders of CM were being obtained.

HS also spoke to Chief Secretary, UP and mentioned the same position urging him to take necessary action.

HS also spoke to Chief of Army Staff (COAS) requesting him that in case of communal situation deteriorating in other parts of the country, assistance of Army authorities may be provided. COAS informed that he had already issued instructions to this effect. HS also spoke to Defence Secretary on the same lines.

4.45-6.45 p.m. - Chief Secretaries, Home Secretaries and DGPs of different States/Union Territories were informed by MHA about developments in Ayodhya and told that in case additional forces are required by the State Governments and Union Territories, the local Army authorities may be approached directly since the Ministry of Defence had issued instructions to provide necessary aid.

5.00 p.m. - HM again spoke to Governor, UP

5.05 p.m. - MHA alerted Ministry of Defence that air transport support may be required for movement of forces.

DGP, UP was telephonically contacted. He was told that Army has been asked to remain alert and that Ministry of Defence have agreed to release armed forces wherever and whenever the District Magistrate requisitioned them. The DG was also informed that the plea of DM/SSP that the Chief Minister or the Chief Secretary had asked them not to act will not be tenable in view of their statutory responsibilities in such situations.

5.35 p.m. - MHA asked Ministry of Defence to place 3 AN-32 airplanes at Lucknow at 11 a.m. on 7th December, 1992 since the option of large scale lifting of PMFs by air, and if necessary ferrying them from Lucknow to Faizabad, was being explored.

5.40 p.m. - No order to move was received by PMFs in Ayodhya till about 5.40 p.m.

Additional District Magistrate (ADM) came and reported that they were trying to get magistrates, but since he came alone without any magistrate, he was asked to arrange for the magistrates immediately.

6.30 p.m. - ADM came to the camp where the troops were in readiness, but without any magistrates and said that the magistrates will be provided at Kotwali.

DM and SSP Faizabad were again informed by the Control room through signal that our troops were in readiness for deployment from 1200 hrs but they could not be deployed in the absence of magistrates and in the absence of clearcut orders for deployment.

6.45 p.m. - Idols were placed back where the erstwhile disputed structure stood.

7.10 p.m. - Out of 50 companies kept ready for deployment, 6 companies went with ADM and SDO Police for deployment in Faizabad and reached Kotwali. The remaining
companies could not move since magistrates were not provided.

7.30 p.m. - Work started on the construction of a temporary structure for the idols.

1.21 - During this entire period, the Union Home Secretary was continuously in touch with the Prime

Minister. In view of the developments of late afternoon on 6th December, a meeting of the Union Cabinet

was called at 6.00 p.m. The Cabinet resolved to recommend issue of proclamation under article 356 of the

Constitution with the President assuming to himself all the functions of the Government of Uttar Pradesh and dissolving the U.P. Vidhan Sabha. This recommendation was taken personally by the Home Minister to Rashtrapati Bhavan and the proclamation was issued by 9.10 p.m. that very night. In order to assist the Governor, two senior officers were posted as his Advisors. In view of the situation in RJB-BM complex and the presence of over 200,000 kar sevaks in aggressive and militant mood, the decision about the timing of entry of the Central forces was left to the forces themselves. Action was also initiated for evacuation of kar sevaks from Ayodhya, As a result, by the evening of the 7th December nearly 70,000 persons had left Ayodhya. The officers commanding the security forces decided to move the force in the night of 7th and 8th December so as to use minimum force. Action was taken accordingly, and the RJB-BM area was quickly secured. This was managed without having to resort to firing.

1.22 - Govrnment considered the situation at Ayodhya after the imposition of President's rule and took the following decisions as a first set of measures :

(i) communal organisations will be banned

(ii) strongest action possible under the law will be taken to book the culprits who committed various offences connected with the demolition of the Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid structure on 6th December, 1992, including those who incited and abetted the offences;

(iii) the responsibility of various authorities in the lapses that occurred on 6th December will be fixed with a view to taking disciplinary proceedings against them, including prosecution where necessary;

(iv) the Government will see to it that the demolished structure is re-built; and

(v) appropriate steps will be taken regarding new Ram temple.”

1.23 - Pursuant to the above, cases under relevant provisions of law were registered and some arrests also made of persons charged with inciting the people to coinmit the crime at ths RJB-BM complex on 6th December. The investigations into these offences have been entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

1.24 After completing the necessary formalities, Government have declared the Bajrang Dal, the Islamic Seva Sangh. the Jamait-e-Islami, the Rashtriya Svayam Sevak Sangh and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad as unlawful associations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

1.25 - On the night of 15th December, 1992, after receiving, the reports of the Governors of Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. that the Governments could not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution President’s rule was imposed in these three States.

1.26 - A decision was also taken to set up a Commission of Inquiry consisting of a sitting judge of a High Court to inquire into the matters relating to the events in Ayodhya on 6th December, 1992. The notification in this respect was issued on December 16, 1992.

1.27 - Being deeply concerned at the cowardly assault on Press-persons and photographers at Ayodhya who were performing an important public duty, this has been includad as a specific term of reference to the Commission of Inquiry. Government of Uttar Pradesh has, on the directions of the Central Government, also set up a special cell for the investigation of these offences under the charge of an officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police.

1.28 - The guiding principle followed by the Government of India in the contentious RJB-BM dispute was to leave no stone unturned in the search for an amicable settlement. Herculean efforts have been made in this direction after the Prime Minister’s statement in Parliament on 27th July, 1992. The Prime Minister had wide-ranging consultations with a larg number of individuals and groups. These included representatives of the two sides, leaders of political parties, representatives from the media, religious leaders and others. These meetings were held to understand the basic stand of the parties concerned and elicit views of different sections in order to gain better insights into all facets of the problem. Even after the resumed negotiations were jeoparidised by the sudden and inexplicable call to resume kar seva, the Prime Minister and his colleagues made every effort to make the leaders of the VHP and allied organisations see reason and agrees to some acceptable approach to resolve the vexed issue and to call of the kar seva. As part ot this process discussions were also held with the Cheif Minister of Uttar Pradesh on 30th November, 1992. In this meeting the Cheif Minister did not agree with the Central Government's suggestion to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 138 of the Constitution which would have enabled an agreed formula for expediting final judicial determination by the Supreme Court.

1.29 - The security of the RJB-BM structure was a matter of constant concern for the Central Government. The Home Minister took up this matter with the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh on innumerable occasions through meetings, discussions, letters, etc. He had suggested to the Chief Minister that a comprehensive review of the security plan for the structure be carried out in which representatives of Central organisations should also be associated, but this suggestion was not accepted by the State Government despite repeated requests from Government of India. Particular shortcomings in the security measures taken by the State Government were also pointed out to the State Government. The Central Government also shared with the State Government its assessment that the forces deployed at Ayodhya by the State Government for security purposes were not adequate if any untoward development were to take place. The inadequacy of the security arrangements was also brought to the notice of the Supreme Court on the 30th November, 1992. Central paramilitary forces were stationed at various places in the proximity of Ayodhya on the 24th November itself by Central Government as a contingency measure so that these could be made available to the State Government for deployment at short notice.

1.30 - The Central Government had constantly expressed its concern that Court orders regarding the RJB-BM structure and the land acuqired in the vicinity by the State Government should not be violated. In particular, when the Supreme Court called upon the Cental Gernment on 20th November to indicate how it could assist in the enforcement of the earlier court orders, the Central Government assured the court that it would be prepared to give the State Government whatever assistance was required and would also take whatever action the court directed it to take. Throughout November 1992, the unfolding situation with regard to the RJB-BM dispute had been under continuous examination of the Central Government at various levels. Besides consideration at the Cabinet Committee level, there were regular discussions among the group of Ministers concerned and between Ministers and officials. Even during the absence of the Prime Minister on tour abroad, daily meetings were held by the members of the CCPA to review the developing situation. A number of alternatives and proposals to deal with the situation likely to arise from the proposed kar seva were discussed in these meetings, including the option of taking over the administration of the State of Uttar Pradesh under article 356 of the Constitution. Contingency plans to be put into operation in the event of use of Article 356 were also formulated. For reasons discussed below, however, no decision was taken in favour of this option.

1.31 - In so far as the security of the RJB-BM structure was concerned, the U.P. Government had consistently given an unequivocal commitment at the highest level that this would be ensured under all circumstances. Even during the events of July 1992, this commitment was kept by the State Government. Against this background, there was no valid reason to believe that the solemn assurances given to the Parliament, the Supreme Court, The National Integration Council, The Central Government and to the people of the country, by a democratically elected Government, sworn to uphold the Constitution, would be broken.

1.32 - The exercise of the executive power in our country has to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution which provide for separate executive powers for the Centre and the States. The maintenance of public order is the primary duty of the State Government. It will be seen that the

Central Government on its own to stationed substantial para-military forces in the State of Uttar Pradesh to come promptly to its aid in the maintenance of law and order. At places near Ayodhya alone, 195 companies of para-military forces had been stationed with orders to immediately respond to the State Government’s request for assistance without even the prior clearance of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

1.33 - The Centre cannot and should not dismiss a State Government every time it starts feeling apprehensive about the State Government's commitment to upholding the rule of law especially when it is giving all assurances and making a firm commitment before the apex court of the country. Taking precipitate action in such cases will not be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. In this particular case at Ayodhya, it is true that the Central Government and others were conscious of the possible risks inherent in the situation. On the other hand, there were the most solemn assurances of the U.P. Government given to the Supreme Court, the Central Government, Parliament and the NIC that the safety of the disputed structure would be ensured. In fact, such public assurances had been given also by the senior leaders of the BJP and the organisers of the kar seva on 4th and 5th December, 1992. In the circumstances then prevailing the Governor of U.P. was asked to send his assessment. In his letter of 1st of December, 1992 he advised against the imposition of President’s rule in the State. His letter even hinted at the possible threat to the disputed structure in the event of such imposition. It is on a balance of all these factors that the option of taking recourse to the provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution was not exercised.

1.34 - In a tragedy of such dimensions, analysis and therefore criticism, by benefit of hindsight is inevitable. To an extent, such self-analysis and criticism carried out in a constructive manner is beneficial. It is to be noted, however, that the assurances repeatedly given by the Government of U.P., the public announcements made by the organisers and finally the decisions taken on the 5th December by the Kendriya Marg Darshak Mandal had raised every hope that things would not go out of control during the symbolic kar seva planned for the 6th December. In fact, various political parties, columnists writers, editors had all heaved a sigh of relief at this turn of events. This is borne out by the newsreports, commentaries, editorials which appeared in the newspapers and magazines that came out just prior to the tragic events of 6th December.

1.35 - The demolition of the Ram Janma Bhoomi-Babri Masjid structure at Ayodhya on 6th December, 1992 was a most reprehensible act. The perpetrators of this deed struck not only against a place of worship, but also at the principlesof secularism, democracy and the rule of law enshrined in our Constitution. In a move as sudden as it was shameful, a few thousand people managed to outrage the sentiments of millions of Indians of all communities who have reacted to this incident with anguish and dismay.

1.36 - What happened on December 6,1992 wa not a failure of the system as a whole, nor of the wisdom inherent in India's Constitution, nor yet of the power of tolerance, brotherhood and comapssion that has so vividly inform the life of independent India. It was the Supreme Court observed on that day, "a graet pity that a Constitutionally elected Government could not discharge its duties in a matter of this sensitiveness and magnitude". Commitments to the Court and Constitution, pledges to Parliament and the people, were simply cast aside. Therein lay the failure, therein the betrayal.

1.37 - Today India seeks to heal, and not reopen its wounds; to look forward with hope, and not backwards with fear; to reconcile reason with faith. Above all, India is determined to press ahead with the National Agenda, undeterred by aberrations.