7.1 - After UP Government's assurance to the Supreme Court that the kar seva from 4th December, Ward be symbolic, it was expected that the Ministers of UP. Government and the senior leaders of BIP and the VHP would tone dawn the mobilisation efforts and refrain from saying or doing anything that could provoke the kar sevaks to dishonour the undertaking given fa the Court. In reality, however, mobilisition efforts were stepped up and the statements of senior leaders on the idea of symbolic kar seva became more and more ambivalent,
Mobilisation of Kar Sevaks
7.2 - As early as 1st December, 25,000 kar sevaks had reached Ayodhya. 370 tents and a kitchen were set up at the Ram Katha Kunj where 16,000 kar sevaks were accommodated in close proximity of the disputed structure. The number of kar sevaks went up to 60,000 by the afternoon of 2nd December and crossed one lakh on 3rd December. On 5th December, ie. on the eve of the kar seva the number had exceeded two lakhs.
7.3 - In order to ledge such a large number of kar sevaks, about 800 tents had been erected by 4th December. In addition, kar sevaks were also staying in schools and colleges, houses of local citizens verandahs of houses and big shops, temples, Ram Ki Pauri; and even in the open in the RJB-BM complex. The local administration stepped up its efforts to increase civic amenities in Ayodhya in view of the arrival of such large numbers.
7.4 - A number of kitchens were set up for the kar sevaks. Apart from the kitchens at Ayodhya, the district units of VHP in neighbouring districts were directed to prepare and send food packets and eatables everyday.
7.5 - The Central Government viewed the large scale mobilisation with concern as the presence of such large numbers made the job of ensuring a disciplined conduct of ‘token’ kar seva more difficult. The large numbers also strained the civic amenities, thereby entailing the risk of epidemic. Finally there was the concern that a section of the crowd could go out of the control of the organisers and cause damage to the shrine. The Union Home Minister, in his letter of 1st December, 1992 to the Chief Minister, highlighted the increased threat to the structure on account of the large influx of kar sevaks and requested him to give ‘urgent and serious consideration’ lo the suggestions made by the Central Government for the security of the structure. In his letter of 3rd December, the Home Minister dealt with the Chief Minister's objections to stationing of Central para-military forces near Ayodhya and urged him to make effective use of them.
7.6 - On 5 December, 1992, i.e., the day before the proposed kar seva, the Home Minister again alerted the Chief Minister of U.P. He pointed out, “There are reports that the kar sevaks are in restive and even belligerent mood and that many of them are resorting to extensive purchases of Trishuls which can even be used for offensive purposes................... As I had written to you earlier the security arrangements made by the State Government may not be adequate for the occasion, especially if any violence breaks out. It has been reported that the control at entry points between the outer and inner cordons is lax because of which large batches of visitors are exerting heavy pressure to enter the disputed structure.................In View of the prevailing situation and the fact that the site of the proposed kar seva and other activities will be in the immediate vicinity of the disputed structure, it is necessary to upgrade the security arrangements substantially, I would suggest that the State Government should examine this matter very carefully and take immediate measures to strengthen the security measures.........As you are aware contingents of Central para-military forces have already been stationed at various places in U.P. so as to make them available at short notice if required In the State Government for the security of the disputed structure and maintenance of law and order in view of the call given for the kar seva. I understand that only about 23 coys, including 4 coys. of CRPE are currently deployed for the security arrangements in and around the RIB BM complex, It is felt that this strength may not be sufficient to meet the security requirements, especially if any untoward development takes place. I shall be obliged if you can have this matter looked info personally”,
Statement of the Leaders about the nature of Kar Seva
7.7 - A summary of the statements made by leaders of VHP and BJP noticed between 15th November, to 6th December in the context of the kar seva is at Appendix-XIII, A perusal of this would show that initially senior leaders of BJP/VHP/RSS and allied organisations had not quite accepted the idea of symbolic kar seva. Many of the senior leaders including Shri Ashok Singhal and Shri M.M. Joshi said that they would abide by the decision of the Kendriya Marg Darshak Mandal (KMDM) rather than that of the Supreme Court regarding the nature of the kar seva. The KMDM meeting held on 5th December defined the programme of the kar seva in a manner that was consistent with the court orders and the assurances given by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. Statements of leaders like Shri L. K. Advani also changed in emphasis by 5th December and favoured a symbolic kar seva or construction on undisputed land.
Rath Yatras of Shri Advani and Shri Joshi
7.8 - The Bhartiya Janata Party decided to re-enact the Rath Yatra by Shri L.K. Advani and Shri M.M. Joshi on the pattern of the 1990 Rath Yatra of Shri Advani with the objective of mobilising people and kar sevaks. Shri Advani announced on 30th November 1992 that his arrest at Samastipur in 1990 during the Rath Yatra had prevented him from touring the eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh before reaching Ayodhya. Therefore, he wanted to complete the last lap of his unfinished Rath Yatra of 1990.
Shri Advani stated that they had now decided to plunge in the Ram temple movement in full strength.
7.9 - The Rath Yatras started on 1st December 1992. Shri L.K. Advani started from Varanasi and Shri M.M. Joshi from Mathura. The starting points had their own sinister significance for the future demands and programmes for restoration of the temples at both these places. Shri Advani travelled through the important towns of Eastern Uttar Pradesh and reached Ayodhya. Shri M M. Joshi travelled through the important towns of West Uttar Pradesh and reached Ayodhya. During their yatra both these leaders gave provocative speeches and mobilised kar sevaks and asked their workers and people to reach Ayodhya in large numbers to perform kar seva.
7.10 - Shri L.K. Advani, during the Rath Yatra, kept constantly appealing to the kar sevaks to take the plunge and not bother about the survival of the Kalyan Singh Government. Shri Advani also kept saying that kar seva in Ayodhya would net remain restricted to “bhajan or kirtan” but would involve physical labour. .
7.11 Shri M.M. Joshi, during the Rath Yatra, maintained that the BJP Government in U.P. would not use force against the kar sevaks in Ayodhya. The nature of kar seva would be decided by the Sants/ Mahants and the RJB-BM issue was a religious matter and it could be solved by the Dharmacharyas and not by the Supreme Court. Sh. Joshi threatened serious consequences if the BJP Government in U.P. was dismissed.
Statements of senior leaders of VHP/BJP on security of the Structure
7.12 - While the statements of the senior lenders of BJP/VHP/RSS on the nature of the kar seva wore
characterised by ambivalence, their attitude towards the security of the structure was, by and large, reassuring. Leaders of VHP had criticised the Prime Minister for terming the disputed structure as a mosque in his Independence Day speech. Sadhvi Ritambhara said that Hindu Samaj was ‘shocked’ when Prime Minister called the disputed structure a mosque. Shri Ashok Singhal and Shri Vinay
Katiyar made clear-cut statements that there was to be no damage to the structure as long as the idols of Ram were installed there. Some threatening statements had come to notice hinting at the possibility of demolition but these were generally contingent upon some ‘provocative’ action by the Central Government like the dismissal of the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
7.13 - To sum up, the situation during the first week of December was marked by uncertainty about the nature of kar seva. However, the decision of the KMDM on 5th December, 1992 reduced this uncertainty considerably. Even a rehearsal of the symbolic kar seva was organised on 5th December. Seen in the context of the developments of July, 1992 in which there was construction on the acquired land in violation of court orders but there was at no stage any threat to the structure, the doubts that did remain were almost entirely on the question of ‘symbolic’ nature of kar seva, The declared program me of the organisers of the kar seva, as it stood on the evening of 5th December. 1992, did not envisage any threat to the structure and in fact also promised to respect the court orders. Keeping in view, however, the risks inherent in the situation, Central Government had, as a measure of abundant caution stationed its para-military forces near Ayodhya and shared its concern on the security of the structure with the State Government on a continuous basis right upto the fateful day.
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