HVK Archives: The Taliban: Myth and reality
The Taliban: Myth and reality - The Economic Times
Praful Bidwai
()
4 October 1996
Title : The Taliban : Myth and reality
Author : Praful Bidwai
Publication : The Economic Times
Date : October 4, 1996
As has been their wont in recent years, a number of
commentators on security affairs have rushed into print
on the Taliban militia's takeover of Kabul, describing it
as part of a grand design involving the spread of preda-
tory Islamic fundamentalism, which has serious implica-
tions not just for Southwest and South Asia, but also for
Indian security, especially as regards Kashmir. The
Taliban has been described as a creation of the Pakistani
establishment and a "remote-controlled" Pakistani proxy,
as well as a force armed and funded by Islamabad. It is
credited with great military prowess, as well as fanati-
cal devotion to a sectarian brand of Islam basically
alien to South Asia.
Several suggestions have been offered on how India could
play a "key role" in the region to combat a new US-Pakis-
tan-Taliban "axis". Some of these writings nostalgically
refer to missed past opportunities, and assume that the
regrettably soft US line on the Taliban - and its double
standards on Islamic fundamentalism - is a direct conse-
quence of America's close strategic links" with Pakistan.
This article argues that this prevalent picture of the
Taliban is partly correct but dangerously misleading.
The reality about the Taliban's ideology and its links
with Pakistan is far more complex and nuanced. The
implications of the Kabul developments may be wholly
different for the pro-Jamaat-i-Islami militancy in Jammu
and Kashmir than assumed so far.
To start with, however, there cannot be the slightest
doubt about the Taliban's comprehensively undemocratic
and despotic character. Their acts including the hanging
of former president Najibullah by a lamp-post, in utter
contempt for the law and United Nations sanctuary, and
their first fatwa asking "all sisters who have outside
work" to "stay at home" and "have their faces totally
covered" in public-prove this. Their subsequent actions,
including the killing of two former Najibullah aides,
ordering men to grow beards, and beating up women who are
not covered from head to toe, only confirm this.
The Taliban movement has its origins in Deoband school
madrassas (Islamic seminaries) run in the regions of
Baluchistan and the NWFP adjoining Afghanistan. Their
genealogy is strongly South Asian (Deoband is in Uttar
Pradesh) and linked to the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI),
a party present in India as well as Pakistan, although
Mullah Mohammed Omar's theology is probably a gross
distortion of the original Deobandi Hanafi tradition
(which incidentally opposed partition even while being
conservative). The JUI is led in Pakistan by Maulana
Fazlur Rehman. It has had an understanding with the
Bhutto government on sharing certain ambassador-ships.
The JUI-Deoband link sets the Taliban distinctly apart
from the Jamaat-i-Islami, a group which too operates in
both India and Pakistan, and with which Mr Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar has been associated for two decades. Mr Hekma-
tyar has indeed been strongly backed by Islamabad, which
also supports several pro-Pakistan militant groups in the
Kashmir valley, who are markedly different in their
orientation from the more independent-minded azaadi
groups (some of which, e.g. People's League and JKLF,
profess broadly secular pluralist ideas).
This does not mean that there is no Pakistani connection
with the Taliban. Of course, there is. But it is neith-
er exclusive nor unitedly supported by the Pakistani
establishment. The Establishment is badly divided over
the Taliban. The Taliban support operation is led primar-
ily by interior minister Nasrullah Babar, himself a
Pathan. It is strongly opposed by the foreign ministry.
The ISI role in it is said to be limited. The Taliban
enjoy Pakistani backing, but it would be wrong to believe
that they are pro-Pakistani or controlled by Islamabad,
leave alone servile to it.
The Taliban's prowess as ferocious, highly efficient
fighters may be exaggerated. True, it has taken over two-
thirds Afghanistan and put Mr Hekmatyar and some of Mr
Ahmed Shah Masood's well-trained forces on the run.
However, it has succeeded mostly without a fight. It is
hard to name a single great battle which the Taliban has
actually fought and won. Its takeover of Jalalabad and
Kabul was free of bloodshed because there was no resist-
ance. The Taliban is of course a highly disciplined
force, unlike most rag-tag, dispirited and poorly moti-
vated local militias that have ruled Afghanistan over the
past four years. But the fear of the Taliban and the
power of its puritanical-fanatical ideology, as well as
general war-weariness, may have played a bigger role in
its victory than its actual, demonstrated war-fighting
ability.
There are at least two other noteworthy sources of the
Taliban's ability to inspire awe. First, it is fiercely
Pusthtoon in ethnic composition, inclination and loyalty.
This is both a great strength and a weakness. It could
limit the Taliban's ability to effectively rule Afghanis-
tan's non-Pushtoon, non-Sunni areas. These include much
of the Tajik-and Uzbek-dominated north and parts of the
west adjacent to Iran (populated by the Shia Hazaras).
This could impel the Taliban to share power with non-
Pushtun forces in a limited way. There are suggestions
that they have sent out signals to the Uzbek General
Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban's Pushtun identity could
also complicate relations with Mr Hekmatyar, an other
Pushtun.
Secondly, the Taliban has become acceptable to the war-
exhausted population of Afghanistan partly because it has
run a relatively honest, corruption-free local adminis-
tration. It imposes less harsh levies upon the people
than many Mujaheedin commanders. And in true vigilante
fashion, the Taliban has delivered exemplary punishment
to power-drunk Mujaheedin. Indeed, its very birth in
1994 was related to the excesses of a particular comman-
der in the Kandahar area, who raped three women, and
against whom Mullah Omar organised his Madrassa students.
However, at the root of the Taliban's discipline and
honesty - and hence acceptability among people - is an
element of fanaticism, whose acceptability is open to
question. It is male-supremacist and misogynist, believes
in burning television sets and closing girls' schools,
and even views sports with suspicion, as arousing sensual
passion. How this, and ruthless and barbaric violence and
anti-democratic conduct on the Taliban's part, will go
down with the people is an open question.
At any rate, it is far from clear that control of Kabul,
important as that is, will permit the Taliban to vanquish
its opponents, some of whom, e.g. Mr Masood and Gen
Dostum, remain militarily formidable. The Taliban regi-
me's stability cannot be taken for granted. The US has
probably been foolish in rushing to recognise it - due to
its obsession with containing Shia-Islamic Iran rather
than its supposed strategic proximity to Pakistan.
What about the implications for the militancy in Kashmir?
Some groups there have exulted in the victory of this
fanatical force in the hope that their own prospects will
brighten. But it is hard to see a direct link between
the two. Indeed, the Jamaat-i-Islami connection of the
Valley's pro-Pakistan militants is at odds with the JUI
brand of Islam. It also appears unlikely that there will
be a significantly added influx of Afghan mercenaries
into the valley. This would be more likely in case of a
Taliban defeat or setback, not victory. At any rate,
while the Taliban takeover of two-thirds of Afghanistan
and Kabul is a strongly takeover of two-thirds of Afgha-
nistan and Kabul is a strongly negative development that
sets back the prospect for conciliation and peace in that
long-suffering country, it is not clear if and how New
Delhi can do much to reverse it. It should soberly study
and make a serious assessment of the still-unfolding
situation in Afghanistan.
Back
Top
|
