HVK Archives: Vital decision for Kashmir
Vital decision for Kashmir - The Indian Express
Kuldip Nayar
()
14 October 1996
Title : Vital decision for Kashmir
Author : Kuldip Nayar
Publication : The Indian Express
Date : October 14, 1996
Ideally, elections in Jammu and Kashmir should have been
held after a political settlement. But the Government's
predicament was how to find representatives who had the
backing to negotiate. It could have held talks with the
Hurriyat leaders. They represent a movement which,
despite the assistance from across the border, has its
own political goal. Many in the Kashmir valley have been
influenced by it and New Delhi's acts of omission and
commission have provided it with some tailor-made situa-
tions. Still, the Hurriyat is not all of Kashmir.
The other option was to have a dialogue with Farooq
Abdullah's National Conference, which was more or less
intact even after seven years of insurgency that showed
no mercy to its followers. But the party's image was
pro-Delhi. Its representative capacity was also doubted.
The third force, the militants, were divided; some were
with the Hurriyat and some, the surrendered lot, with the
Government. Therefore, who had the credentials to talk
was a big question before the Government. The election
was considered the best way out.
Probably in a situation where even New Delhi was frozen
in its attitude, elections could generate heat. Home
Minister Indrajit Gupta deserves the credit for starting
a process. And, as he said before the polls, the Assem-
bly would decide the quantum of autonomy. There is wide
criticism that the voting has not been independent. To
some extent, this is true. Srinagar was pretty bad and
Doda was only slightly better. But overall the polling
was fair.
With fear stalking the State because of the militants'
last-ditch effort, the average of 45 per cent of polling
is quite high. The Hurriyat's claim that people would
not "cooperate" was exposed because militants had to use
force to keep voters indoor. New Delhi .arrested the top
Hurriyat leaders unnecessarily. It was a ham-handed
action. Those who voted were determined to do so because
they were sick of militancy and wanted the old days of
tourism and peace to return. In any case, the militancy
is not even a fraction of what it was three years ago.
The Hurriyat could have assured 'fair' polling by agree-
ing to the supervision of elections by Indians of its
choice. It rejected the offer and wanted elections under
the aegis of the UN. The interference from the other
side was maximum. So much so, Washington had to ask its
ambassador, Thomas Simons Jr., in Islamabad to tell
Pakistan to "cease material support for the Kashmir
insurgency".
Now the process of transferring power begins. The Hur-
riyat should respect the result of elections. New Delhi
is obliged to talk to the elected members on autonomy.
The Government would, however, be acting churlishly if it
were to keep out the Hurriyat from the talks.
The elections were held to find out representatives of
people. These were not for determining the quantum of
autonomy. That discussion has to begin and the various
elements, even those who kept themselves out of the
elections, should be invited to the talks. And once
there is even a modicum of common ground, Pakistan and
its part of Kashmir should be associated to settle the
problem once and for all.
Should Kashmir on the Indian side decide to go back to
the pre-1953 position, there should be no problem. While
rectifying the accession to India for good, the State's
constituent assembly in 1952 had underlined that only
three subjects, foreign affairs, defence and communica-
tions, would be transferred to New Delhi. No constitu-
tional amendment at New Delhi is necessary to return to
the 1953 position.
A legislation requiring a simple majority can be passed
by Parliament to withdraw all the laws extended to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir since 1952. Once India's
sovereignty over the State is accepted, the Bharatiya
Janata Party may not object to the retention of Article
370 that gives the State a special status. When such a
status will end is dependent not on the rest of India but
on those living in the State because they opted to join
the Union, not the other way round.
The Hurriyat leaders are at the crossroads. They can
continue to stay in the wilderness but in due course they
will get isolated like the Akalis in Punjab. They boy-
cotted the election and allowed Beant Singh to form the
government. For some time, people in Punjab stood aside
but only to realise that a political set-up was any day
better than bureaucratic control.
New Delhi's immediate problem is what to do with the
surrendered militants who number around 5,000. They have
had the blessings of the Government because they were
creating division in the ranks of militants. Essential-
ly, they are a force of looters and killers. They oper-
ated without any control. Farooq Abdullah condemned
their role during the elections. Once an economic pack-
age is prepared for the State, there should be a provi-
sion to absorb these militants into the security forces
posted elsewhere in the country.
The Hurriyat may feel let down by America but, lately
there has been realisation in the State Department that
the Hurriyat cannot dictate terms to Washington. Eve
other Western capitals had pinned their hopes on elec-
tions. There is said to be a reaction of satisfaction in
America, Britain and elsewhere in the West. Now it is
for New Delhi to act quickly to facilitate the return of
autonomy that the State enjoyed under its first prime
minister (now chief minister) Sheikh Abdullah in 1952.
India has probably got another chance. If it messes it
up, it would lose a good opportunity.
If posterity ever apportions blame for conditions in
Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi will have far more to ex-
plain than Islamabad. From the beginning, we have made
hash of things in the State. We jailed Sheikh Abdullah,
who was instrumental in the integration of Jammu and
Kashmir with the Indian Union. We never allowed the
people of the State to choose their rulers as the rest of
the country did and saw to it that New Delhi's choice was
Srinagar's choice.
The present phase in the Kashmir valley is a carbon copy
of the last one which Islamabad started as 'Operation
Gibraltar' 31 years ago, in August 1965. The difference
between then and now is that the Kashmiris did not re-
spond at that time. They, in fact,. thwarted Pakistani
moves by handing over the first batch of infiltrators to
Indian security forces. This time, the Kashmiris re-
sponded and fought with the training and weapons which
they were offered by Pakistan even then. Why have the
same people changed is the key to the situation.
The simple answer is that the people i4 Kashmir at that
time were with us. This time they were not. So much so
that they wanted an independent State of their own. Why
they became so alienated is the question to which we have
to seek an answer before attempting any solution.
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