HVK Archives: Flowering Janus
Flowering Janus - The Telegraph
Rupa Sengupta
()
10 February 1997
Title : Flowering Janus
Author : Rupa Sengupta
Publication : The Telegraph
Date : February 10, 1997
The Congress's inability to sell "stability" - be it in Punjab,
Kashmir or Uttar Pradesh - is perhaps linked with what Jurgen
Habermas called "the crisis of legitimation". In Punjab's case,
that the party can console itself by referring to the inherent
instability of the Akali-saffron alliance does not erase the
crisis. It is too much to expect the Congress in its present
incarnation to concede the Punjab situation is not merely a matter
of its political fate in a specific election. That, rather, it
raises many questions about the conflict between secular
nationalism and forces which consider some concession to religious
values as the moral imperative of political life.
Contrary to the insistence of the proponents of either viewpoint,
there are no easy conclusions to the debate. For one thing, the
post-Jawaharlal Nehru Congress's vitiation of political
institutions should not detract from the notional merits of secular
nationalism. The latter's main recommendation lies in the
unselfconscious ease with which it is premised on and guarantees
individual freedom, volition and enquiry Arising from this is the
possibility of freely chosen collective action. It is this that
best safeguards cultural pluralism.
For another, Nehru's equation of religious nationalism with
communalism denies validity to indigenous - as opposed to imposed -
traditions that form part of the collective psyche of communities
of people. Caricaturing M.S. Golwalkar as an intellectual kin of
Adolf Hitler or all Akalis as potential J.S. Bhindranwales (as
Sitaram Kesri did at a recent rally by calling them "communal")
implies a propagandist privileging of ideologies born of - in the
case of most formerly colonized nations - historical twists rather
than organic evolution.
History is of crucial significance, but Janus faced. Some would
argue the sanest course of progress would be to accept historical
situations - hence political institutions as they exist. But others
- such as the Akalis or the sangh parivar - could claim persuading
communities of people to forget historical/mythological legacies is
only possible through institutional surgery. The history that
follows such lobotomy could justifiably be viewed as the artificial
monopoly of self styled fashioners of national destiny
Both raise a further, and possibly intractable, question. Is
nationhood experienced after the manmade - and therefore
perennially open to the charge of being arbitrary - legitimization
of physical boundaries and institutions? Or is it a shared
tradition? In which case, it would be as valid to circumstantially
created diasporas or officially branded outcasts as to those
defined by territorial demarcations or assumed acceptability If the
first category of nationhood is prioritized by the science of
politics, the latter is potentialized by the necessity of
historical change.
Exploiting simplistic interpretations of political events is one
danger of taking too hasty a stand. On the one hand is the basic
argument of the religious nationalists. Politics without ethics -
as defined by traditional precepts - is the politics of self
aggrandizing pursuers of temporal power. This is seen as vindicated
by the Congress's erosion of its own secular ideology and its
corruption ridden decline.
On the other, the secular nationalists assert the main agenda of
what they call religious "fundamentalism" is cultural
homogenization in order to institutionalize the hegemony of a
dominant faith thereby the dominant community. They contend
evidence ranges from the writings of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
leaders - Golwalkar's We or Our Nationhood Defined a text most
often cited - to the Bharatiya Janata Party's part in the Babri
Masjid demolition.
In the first case, the Congress's contribution to pre and
post-independence India as a unifying force cannot be dismissed as
a power chase by stooges of the West. Nor should the logic of its
ideology - which predominated in as fair a political contest as
between Nehru and the Vallabhbhai Patel patronized Hindu Mahasabha
- be diluted by subsequent cynical practice. At the party's Nasik
session in 1950, Nehru could stake his position on the issue of the
party's presidency in a way no political limpet would: "If you want
me as prime minister, you have to follow my lead ... If you do not
want me to remain, you tell me and I shall go."
In the second case, however, Nehru himself could never see - as
Patel did - the gains of accommodating and thus moderating the
Hindu nationalists whose patriotism - valuable to a nascent nation
- was beyond question. To focus on the perceived similarity of the
RSS's discipline with Nazi regimentation was part of a deliberate
policy of cordoning off a political site in which Hindu
nationalists would always be suspect.
In the process, he did not foresee the Hindu nationalist
inspirational model would prove more enduring than he thought. His
own ascendancy had to do with charismatic leadership of newly won
freedom. This burden of inherited charisma continues to dog the
Congress, 'as evident from the party's emotional link with
-dynastic politics. But the Hindu nationalists' cultural - and
political aims were not rooted in the covenant of time or immediate
power. Their political fronts would always mutate - as the Jana
Sangh did by merging with the Janata Party, and then reorganizing
as the BJP - according to changing needs. Their legitimacy or
otherwise would depend on how long the post-1947 Nehruvian
consensus could work.
Another factor has never been conceded at the Congress's own risk:
that religious nationalists of all hues agree on one fundamental.
L.K. Advani, speaking on globalization, has said that "the Indian
must be the core and the Western the additive; the modern
supplements the traditional". Both Sikhs and Muslims would concur.
It is the Congress's response to this concurrence that has often
led to disaster. In 1978, it took form in the Sanjay Gandhi
sponsored rise of Bhindranwale in order to sideline the Akali Dal
in Punjab. Is it a coincidence the Akali Dal was then the ruling
party in a coalition with the Jana Sangh?
The ideological contest has taken place in indefensible arenas.
The desecration of shrines has been one of the most self
destructive courses the religious nationalists could take
(Bhindranwale's occupation of the Golden Temple is not applicable
here. Militancy - though he did not personally support Khalistan -
puts him in a different category from Sikh or Hindu nationalists).
Desecration has also had a "secular" agency: electoral malpractice,
debasement of Parliament, judiciary and government, courtship of
communal elements, corruption - all have added to that "crisis of
legitimation", of credibility on the part of those who have defined
the categories of Indian polity
But can - and should - the Indian polity be defined in any other
way? Can the secular model be allowed to fail? The accent on the
individual - and hence on diverse communities preserving their
distinctiveness - the model provides cannot be substituted by
communitarian values as prescribed by g single religion. That would
amount to the veiled theocracy of the Iranian type, and necessitate
a similar revolution.
If the BJP alternative is to not necessarily presage the threat of
Hindu cultural domination, this has to be made clear And made clear
by its abjuring irresponsible manipulation of the Hindu faith.
"Pseudosecularism" can only be replaced by genuine secularism.
Which would mean pursuing constructive agendas. Such as the need
for a uniform civil code to dilute the vote bank rationale behind
minority appeasement. Such as the refusal to separate moral conduct
- as held up by all religions - from politics.
The Congress and other non-BJP forces have also to admit the lapses
of their so called secular practice. This would mean accepting the
positive interrogation of parties that cannot be branded "communal"
and hence "illegitimate" indefinitely For surely secularism also
means not holding someone's faith against him, merely because he
takes pride in being Hindu.
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