HVK Archives: Pokhran II and After
Pokhran II and After - The Times of India
K Subrahmanyam
()
May 14, 1998
Title: Pokhran II and After
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: May 14, 1998
India has conducted its nuclear tests and has become a nuclear
weapon state. It is at this stage futile to discuss why these
tests were carried out at this time and what were the underlying
motivations of the ruling party. It is also clear that while the
tests were carried out under the orders of the BJP government,
the Congress party and UF governments actively participated in
the programmes to produce the weapon prototypes which were tested
on Monday. Hence the favourable response to the tests from both
these parties. There is, therefore, an overall national consensus
for these tests. The idea of India staying short of weaponisation
was an illusion and after these tests there is no looking back.
India is now wholly and squarely in the nuclear game.
Since the decision to test had to be kept a secret and the
previous govermnents did not even take most of the members of
their own cabinets into confidence on the direction and
dimensions of the nuclear programme, not much thought has been
given to what to do after India enters the nuclear game. The
world has mercifully emerged out of that era of madness in which
very sophisticated university dons devised strategies to fight
nuclear wars, talked of multistep escalation ladders, limited
nuclear war, graduated response and counterforce etc. We now know
today in the words of President Ronald Reagan and general
secretary Mikhail Gorbachov that a nuclear war cannot be won and
must not be fought.
Joint Declaration
Nuclear weapons have only one legitimate purpose - to deter
intimidation by another nuclear weapon power and to retaliate if
a nation has been struck with a nuclear weapon. India's sole
justification for acquiring nuclear weapons is to deter Pakistan
and China if ever they resort to nuclear blackmail. There is no
other purpose for the Indian weapon. Therefore, the first step
the government must take is to proclaim loud and clear its
commitment to the doctrine of no-first-use without any
reservation whatsoever. The second step is to offer to China and
Pakistan draft joint declarations for mutual no- first-use
commitment. There is one between Russia and China and that could
serve as a model.
Long ago in October 1988 when 1 met the Chinese foreign minister,
Mr Qian Qichen in Beijing as a member of the Pugwash delegation,
I raised the issue with him. His reply was how could there be a
mutual no-first-use declaration between China and India when the
latter did not declare itself a nuclear weapon state. Now after
these tests the Chinese cannot dodge the proposal and it will put
China to test. India can follow that proposal with the suggestion
of an India-China-Russia agreement for no-first-use. China has
been suggesting such a no-first-use agreement to the other four
nuclear weapon powers. The US, UK and France have so far been
opposing the idea. There is, however, increasing support for such
an agreement among the non-official strategic community in the
US. Therefore, any Indian initiative in this respect may lead to
significant advance towards delegitimisation of nuclear weapons.
It is to be recalled that the Geneva protocol of 1925 signed 68
years before the chemical weapons treaty was a no-first-use
agreement.
Geneva Protocol
However, Pakistan may resist the idea. Our foreign secretary gave
Pakistan a non-paper in January 1994 proposing a mutual agreement
on non-use of nuclear capabilities. The term nuclear capabilities
was used because both India and Pakistan were at that stage
reluctant to admit that they had nuclear weapons. India cannot
have such compunctions now after these tests. Pakistan may still
have until they conduct a test of their own though Ms Benazir
Bhutto in her NBC TV interview of December 1, 1992, Mr Nawaz
Sharif in his Nila Bhatt speech of August 24,1994, General Aslam
Beg in his article in Nation in December 1993 and Dr A Q Khan on
any number of occasions have asserted that Pakistan has nuclear
weapons. Pakistani strategists also use the standard argument
used by the NATO to oppose a no-first-use agreement. .
The US and its NATO allies used to argue that they needed the
option to use nuclear weapons first in order to deter the
aggression by larger Soviet conventional forces. Now the
Pakistanis apply that argument to highlight that a no-first-use
agreement would be against their security interests since India's
conventional forces are larger. While this line of reasoning
sounds plausible, there is a widespread perception that
interstate wars using large scale regular armies are no longer
viable instruments of policy. Apart from this, the possession of
nuclear weapons by Pakistan would provide that country
existentialist deterrence even if it joins a no-first-use
agreement. Perhaps it may be easier to bring China into a no-
first-use agreement than Pakistan. However, India could gain more
diplomatic mileage if it initiates the move vis-a-vis Pakistan.
Till the end of the Cold War, India's diplomatic clout on
disarmament was generated because of its leadership in the non-
aligned movement. That movement itself lost much of its relevance
when the Cold War terminated. The US gained overwhelming
dominance over most of the members of the non-aligned movement
who had lost their manoeuvrability with the demise of the Soviet
Union. The US and its allies were able to dragoon the non-aligned
to legitimise nuclear weapons through the indefinite and
unconditional extension of the non-proliferation treaty.
Thereafter, all disarmament efforts were reduced to resolutions
in the UN General Assembly. The support to Indian resolutions on
disarmament in the UN has been steadily declining. The attitude
of industrial nations and the non-aligned was one of questioning
what India had to offer on disarmament. It had no nuclear weapons
to offer to disarm. It was no economic or military power. The
only nations taken seriously on disarmament negotiations are the
five nuclear weapon powers. They ran a parallel conference during
the consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban draft treaty and
all the decisions were made there reducing the Conference on
Disarmament to a mockery.
Greater Credibility
A nuclear India is likely to command greater credibility on
disarmament issues. If India can start a campaign on no-first-
use now with approaches to China, Russia and Pakistan, then by
the time the UN General Assembly meets in September, India will
be in a better position to take a lead on nuclear disarmament
matters. An Indian strategy for a disarmament campaign has to be
formulated and pursued vigorously. Many countries have a high-
powered special envoy for disarmament of the rank of a secretary
or a minister of state. Selling India's stand on the nuclear
issue will require considerable effort. Therefore, the Prime
Minister should consider the appointment of such a special envoy
immediately in order to facilitate a disarmament campaign.
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