HVK Archives: The euphoria and after
The euphoria and after - The Hindu
Inder Malhotra
()
May 13, 1998
Title: The euphoria and after
Author: Inder Malhotra
Publication: The Hindu
Date: May 13, 1998
Returning home on Sunday, May 10. after a fortnight's absence
overseas. was an experience rather like getting back to the
showing of a bad Bollywood film after the interval. The scenario
had not moved at all. The scene was as dismal - full of
uncertainty and apprehension - as one had left it. The stock
characters were repeating, mechanically an menacingly, their old
demands for the instant dismissal of the DMK Ministry in Tamil
Nadu and of that led by Mrs. Rabri Devi in Bihar. A minor new
element in the singularly unchanging situation, representing a
curious reversal of roles. was Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde's public
advice to the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari Vajpayee, to stop
being a "softie" but to "assert" himself and be tough. The only
joke I heard in the sombre ambience was to the effect that the
Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes, had " turned into a bull
that carries a China shop with him."
Within 24 hours, however, the capital's mood changed
dramatically, indeed incredibly. At 5-30 p.m. on Monday, Mr.
Vajpayee addressed his famous press conference. It also turned
out to be the briefest, most sensational and historic. Why All
India Radio - or Akashvani, to give it its official name - failed
to include the Prime Minister's announcement of a triple nuclear
test at Pokhran in its 6 p.m. news-bulletin remains a mystery.
But by that time, the exciting news had spread, through word of
mouth, like the proverbial prairie fire. Popular reaction was one
of exhilaration and euphoria.
There were, to be sure, critics as well as Doubting Thomases.
Those, for instance, who believe passionately that nuclear
weaponry would "bankrupt" the country but refuse to explain how
other nuclear weapon nations, including China which went nuclear
during the catastrophic Cultural Revolution and Pakistan whose
economy is far more parlous than that of this country, have
managed to escape going to the liquidation courts. The usual but
phony cries of a " nuclear arms race" in South Asia are also
being raised. A moment's reflection would reveal that South Asia
is not the arena where the mad competition between the United
States and the former Soviet Union in stockpiling nuclear weapons
can be replicated. To have a credible and reasonably recessed
nuclear deterrent, India does not need more than 60 or 80
warheads and an equal number of suitable missiles. Pakistan does
not have either the fissile material or other resources for more
than 20 or 30 nuclear warheads which should be sufficient to give
it the necessary sense of security. So where does the much-
dreaded arms race come in?
In this context, the comments of Ms. Benazir Bhutto, former Prime
Minister of Pakistan, from the BBC's London studios acquire
significance. She began by deploring the Indian three-in-one
test and. predicted that Pakistan will have to 'follow suit' and
conduct a nuclear test of its own, after which it should sign the
NPT regardless of whether India did so or not. However, she
concluded by declaring that in some ways it would be better for
both India and Pakistan to 'come out of the closet'. For that
would ensure 'some equilibrium.'
By comparison, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan, still lingering as Pakistan's
Foreign Minister, pending his 'reassignment' to some other job,
was more strident. But even he was less cocky than before.
Immediately after the test-firing of the Pakistani missile Ghauri
he had sent it was now in a position to 'negotiate with India
>from a position of strength.' But all he could say on Monday
night was that Pakistan's defences would be made 'impregnable'
against whatever threat India could pose.
As in 1974, so now total secrecy about the nuclear tests was
successfully maintained. This makes it all the more suspicious
that in December 1995 when Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao had given his
'tentative approval' to a nuclear test, preparations at Pokhran
were instantly 'detected' by the U. S. and the proposed test
jettisoned under American pressure. Ms. Bhutto has now claimed
that it was she who stymied the Indian test then. According to
her, she had rdered all preparations for a nuclear explosion,
and informed 'all concerned that a Pakistani test would
immediately follow the Indian one.
Negative reactions from most countries of the world were only to
be expected. Even so, it is noteworthy. that the U. S., usually
the loudest champion of non-proliferation. has expressed itself
less intemperately than the smaller fry such as Australia and New
Zealand. The High Commissioners of these two countries are lucky
to have been recalled because they will escape Delhi's heat and
come back in cooler days. Since the Glenn Amendment is triggered
automatically as soon as a country tests, it follows that Delhi
will be deprived of the American economic aid. But this amounts
to the princely sum of $47 million a Year which this country can
forgo easily. If Japan follows suit, the loss of an annual yen
assistance worth a billion dollars will be substantial. But even
that is a small price to pay for safeguarding Indian security and
supreme interests. China's adverse reaction is a strange
departure from the standard Chinese line that every country has a
right to decide whether nuclear weapons are necessary for its
security.
In this context, it is instructive to recall what the Chinese
leader had to say when they first detonated a nuclear device.
Zhou Enlai had told Marshal Nie Rongchen: 'Until you make the big
bang, you will not be heard.' Nao Zedong, a more earthy
individual, declared that a 'loud fart was more effective than a
long lecture.' (Source: Han Suyin. Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai & the
making of Modem China. Jonathan Cape, 1994. p. 297),
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