HVK Archives: A Feared Scenario Around the Corner
A Feared Scenario Around the Corner - Washington Post
R. Jeffrey Smith
()
May 14, 1998
Title: A Feared Scenario Around the Corner
Author: R. Jeffrey Smith
Publication: Washington Post
Date: May 14, 1998
Preventing Nuclear Strike Capability Has Been a U.S. Goal for
Subcontinent
For much of the past decade, U.S. policy toward the Asian
subcontinent has been quietly consumed by one major ambition: to
keep archenemies India and Pakistan from obtaining nuclear-tipped
missiles capable of destroying each other's major population
centers with just a few minutes' warning time.
U.S. intelligence analysts have repeatedly warned that relations
between the countries are so poor and so often swayed by
domestic politics that the mutual attainment of this capability
could make the unthinkable -- a nuclear exchange between bitter
regional rivals -- a reality.
But now, with India's tests this week of five nuclear bombs, U.S.
officials say this nightmare scenario could be around the corner.
India is suspected of having tested a warhead capable of fitting
atop its new medium-range Agni missiles, each capable of
striking major Pakistani cities. Pakistan, for its part, had
flight-tested one of its own nuclear-capable Ghauri missiles
five weeks earlier, which could strike virtually any Indian
city.
So far, neither side has deployed its most advanced missiles with
nuclear warheads, but U.S. analysts have speculated that both
countries could probably do so in a year or two. If so, it would
mean that for the first time in the 50 years since India and
Pakistan were partitioned by religious differences, they would
each possess a hair-trigger ability to wreak nuclear destruction
on the other.
The nuclear tests by India, and some worrisome steps taken
earlier by Pakistan, have accelerated the subcontinent's arms
race and sown new uncertainty about its outcome, according to
U.S. officials and independent experts. For years, "they have
been inching along toward a nuclear and missile capability,"
acting undersecretary of state John D. Holum said in an
interview yesterday. "Now India has just taken a big leap along
that path."
Several other officials said that India's nuclear blasts mean
that Washington's long-standing efforts to contain proliferation
in the region have been mostly for naught. Diplomatic and
economic pressure applied not only in India and Pakistan but
also against several key supplier nations often has been
circumvented or ignored.
Operating stealthily and with its checkbook at the ready,
Pakistan has circumvented Washington's campaign by importing key
nuclear technology from China and complete, medium-range
ballistic missiles from both China and North Korea. India, for
its part, has used Canadian-made reactors to produce plutonium
for its nuclear bombs and made its own missiles with know-how
acquired from the United States and Russia.
"There is a lot of momentum in the strategic programs, including
the ballistic missile programs," deputy assistant secretary of
state Robert J. Einhorn told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee yesterday. "We've put a very high priority in trying
to promote restraint."
But other officials said the latest tests reflect the fact that
the two countries are nearing their goal in lockstep, with each
ratcheting up its military programs in response to the
acquisition of key pieces of technology by the other. In
explaining their nuclear blasts, for example, Indian officials
have complained in part that Pakistan's test of the Ghauri
missile was a provocative military display and required an
Indian riposte.
Pakistan's military named the missile, which has an estimated
range of around 860 miles, after a famous Muslim warrior who
slew a Hindu emperor named Prithvi. But the missile was in fact
purchased by Pakistan from North Korea in a secret 1997 deal that
caused the Clinton administration to invoke economic sanctions
against government entities in both countries on May 4.
The missile was purchased by Khan Research Laboratories, which
has long played a key role in the development of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons, from a North Korean firm called the Changwang
Sinyong Corporation.
Cash-strapped engineers in North Korea had developed the missile
under the name No Dong and sold what U.S. officials described as
a "handful" of the weapons to Pakistan for millions of dollars
even before the No Dong was fielded by the North Korean
military.
Although Washington has repeatedly asked North Korea to constrain
its missile sales to such volatile regions, the country has said
it will do so only if Washington pays an amount equivalent to
its profits from such sales. "They will sell virtually anything
for cash," said a senior U.S. official.
U.S. officials had also approached Pakistan to complain about
suspicious contacts with North Korea, but the Pakistani officials
denied anything untoward. The transfer subsequently escaped U.S.
detection until after it was completed, several officials said.
The Ghauri is not the first nuclear-capable missile acquired by
Pakistan, but it is clearly the best. U.S. intelligence officials
say that Pakistan had acquired several dozen nuclear-capable
missiles from China, in a deal concluded by Beijing shortly
after Washington's 1992 sale of F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan.
These missiles, known as the M-11, have a range of roughly 180
miles, which makes them incapable of striking major Indian
cities. So the Ghauri gives Pakistan's military an assured means
for the first time of striking New Delhi from various locations
inside Pakistan.
Eight months before Pakistan tested the Ghauri, India had
provoked Pakistani outrage by moving some of its short-range
Prithvi missiles close to the Pakistani border. Derived from a
Russian air defense missile known as the SA-2, the Prithvi is
not capable of carrying a nuclear weapon. But it has been used
by India as the second stage of a missile that could carry such
arms -- the Agni, which has an estimated range of 1,250 miles
and was last flight-tested in 1994.
The first stage of the Agni is a copy of the U.S.-made Scout
space rocket, which Washington sold to India many years ago.
"They were able to get a lot of useful stuff from foreigners
before the doors came crashing down" in the late 1980s, when the
United States and other nations first began to worry seriously
about missile proliferation, one official said.
If one of the nuclear tests was indeed a new warhead meant to be
deployed with the Agni, India has abundant nuclear material on
hand for use in such warheads. It has operated several Canadian-
designed nuclear reactors to produce plutonium for its bomb
program for many years, and has so much material stockpiled that
this week its officials endorsed a global treaty to end new
production of fissile material.
Such a pact has long been pushed by Washington, but it has been
resisted by Pakistan -- which has far less fissile material on
hand -- on grounds that it would effectively allow India to
retain a permanent advantage. In contrast to India, which relies
primarily on plutonium to fuel its bombs, Pakistan has used
highly enriched uranium. But in January, Pakistan acknowledged
that it had begun operating a nuclear reactor, built with
Chinese assistance, that U.S. officials say is ideally suited
for producing plutonium for weapons.
Several officials said that when deputy national security adviser
Samuel R. "Sandy" Berger visited Pakistan, he obtained a
Pakistani pledge that it would not enrich uranium to the level
considered ideal for nuclear arms. But U.S. intelligence
officials have said they believe Pakistan has not kept its
pledge.
If the two countries eventually field nuclear-equipped, medium-
range ballistic missiles, they will be subject to some of the
same tensions experienced by the United States and the Soviet
Union during the Cold War, U.S. officials said.
"With the superpowers, at least there was a territorial buffer
zone. With these two, there not only is no buffer zone, but you
have a territorial dispute over Kashmir that could provide the
sparks for a war," said one official.
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