HVK Archives: Testing time for the world
Testing time for the world - The Asian Age
Ramesh Thakur
()
May 21, 1998
Title: Testing time for the world
Author: Ramesh Thakur
Publication: The Asian Age
Date: May 21, 1998
The nuclear tests carried out by India are regrettable,
disappointing and wrong - but they are also understandable. They
demonstrated an underestimated level of nuclear sophistication,
an unexpected strength of political will and an unsuspected
ability to evade advance detection.
India's nuclear pursuit is based on a flawed grasp of
contemporary international realities and mistaken calculations of
security needs. By carrying out the, tests, India has put itself
on the wrong side of history. Why?
Domestically, the Vajpayee government has nothing to lose and
much to gain by tapping nationalist sentiment. The ragtag
coalition of 20 parties has been lurching from one crisis to
another Its collapse seemed imminent, threatening yet another
election. The tests have enhanced the BJP's stature and the Prime
Minister's authority. Instant polls showed 91 per cent approval,
even though 80 per cent also said they believed that Pakistan
would follow suit with its own tests.
The Indian government has seized high ground, making it difficult
for any political party to criticise it for fear of being branded
unpatriotic. The Bharatiya Janata Party will argue that only it
has the courage of nuclear convictions that previous governments
lacked. This should ensure some stability for the government, as
no other party would risk another election in which the BJP would
be returned with a majority.
Regionally, India has faced strategic encirclement through
nuclear missile collusion between Pakistan and China. -After the
indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
1995 and the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. in
1996, New Delhi faced the choice of "use it or lose it" on the
long-held nuclear option. By not testing, India could not match
China's conventional or nuclear capabilities. But India's
threshold nuclear status enabled Pakistan to neutralise India's
conventional military superiority. Pakistan's test last month of
the Ghauri destroyed India's natural strategic depth and produced
much crowing in Pakistan about having achieved parity with India.
India, which tested three types of nuclear weapons (fission, low-
yield and fusion), has sent three clear signals to Pakistan and
China. Pakistan's nuclear capability is still behind India's. New
Delhi can yet, if it chooses, match China on the nuclear world
stage. And the collusion between Beijing and Islamabad will not
go unanswered.
The signals of international defiance are even more interesting.
The Canberra Commission on the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons in
1996 argued that it defied credulity to believe that a self-
appointed group of five countries could forever maintain a
monopoly on one type of weaponry. That conclusion has been
vindicated.
India's old posture of nuclear ambiguity was seen as a sham.
India was paying the price through embargoes on high-technology
transfers. The world tried to corner India through a
constitutional trick by which the test ban treaty was rescued
>from the Disarmament Conference in Geneva and approved by the UN
General Assembly in New York. The resulting hardening of India's
nuclear stance was predictable. Now the treaty will be dead on
arrival in the US Senate.
New Delhi seems to have concluded that marginal costs of
additional sanctions are outweighed by gains in national security
and pride. India has long nursed a sense of grievance about
international "nuclear apartheid."
India had exhibited restraint: no test since 1974, no declared
nuclear weapon status, no sharing of nuclear technology with
others and no overt deployment of missiles. India has abstained
>from exporting arms. Despite this, it was criticised for
rejecting the nuclear treaties - even while the world turned a
blind eye to clandestine acquisition of nuclear capability by
Pakistan with Chinese assistance.
The world cannot allow India to defy the developing anti-nuclear
norm with impunity. But what to do? Under US law, Washington
must apply sanctions on credits and credit guarantees, on loans
>from US banks and on military assistance. It also must oppose
loans from the IMF and the World Bank. Japan, India's biggest
donor, is bound to reconsider its foreign aid, and other
countries will follow to varying degrees.
Sanctions on India face three sets of difficulties: the
historical record, moral equivalence and practical calculations.
They have a bad reputation as a policy instrument for effecting
change. The five nuclear powers have no moral authority to
impose them. They maintain stockpiles in defiance of a World
Court opinion on nations' legal obligation to nuclear
disarmament. Also, India's tests breach no international treaty,
convention or law. The Big Five preach non-proliferation but
practice deterrence. Their bluff has been called.
Justifying the US opening to China in 1971, Henry Kissinger
remarked that a nation of 800 million people armed with nuclear
weapons could not be ignored. That logic of engagement applies
even more forcefully to India today. Outsiders' self-interest
lies in assisting India's economic growth.
The dilemma is this: A moderate response will be self-defeating.
India's nuclear hawks will feel vindicated, saying that India is
now being treated with respect because it has nuclear weapons,
which should therefore be openly deployed in numbers. A harsh
response will be self-fulfilling. The hawks will argue that a
friendless India which is the target of hostile international
attention needs an arsenal of nuclear weapons to defend its
interests.
Official statements from New Delhi present intriguing
possibilities of resolving the dilemma. If outside pressure
prevents Pakistan from nuclear testing, and if sanctions are not
imposed, India may be prepared to join the nuclear club from
within, to sign the test ban treaty, to observe the provisions of
the non-proliferation treaty, to accept permanent membership on
the UN Security Council and to take part in arms control talks at
the centre table. But don't hold your breath.
(The writer is the vice rector of the United Nations University
in Tokyo)
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