HVK Archives: Politics of Shakti
Politics of Shakti - The Times of India
K Subrahmanyam
()
May 26, 1998
Title: Politics of Shakti
Author: K Subrahmanyam
Publication: The Times of India
Date: May 26, 1998
It was Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, as foreign minister in the Janata
government in April 1979, who announced in the Lok Sabha that the
Pakistani nuclear programme was not a peaceful one. That
announcement was made a few days before the US invoked the
Symington Amendment against Pakistan on finding that it was
embarked upon uranium enrichment. When Indira Gandhi returned as
Prime Minister, the US-Pakistani collaborative venture on
Afghanistan had started. A few months later the US revoked
sanctions on Pakistan and began a full-scale military aid
programme. Now we know, as disclosed by General Arif, that by
1982, Islamabad had obtained an assurance from the US that there
Would be no interference in Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme.
Indira Gandhi sent Mr Raja Ramanna, leader of the Pokhran I team,
who was then scientific adviser to the defence minister, back to
the Bhaba Atomic Research Centre. Mr Ramanna recommended Mr V S
Arunachalam as his successor and invited Mr A P J Kalam to move
>from the department of space to the missile laboratory in the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Indira
Gandhi sanctioned testing of a nuclear weapon, but the
preparations were discovered and the US applied pressure forcing
India to back off.
Rajiv's Orientation
When Rajiv Gandhi became Prime Minister he formed a planning
group which included Mr Ramanna, then chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission, and this writer, at that time Director,
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The nuclear issue was
discussed in successive meetings. At that stage Rajiv's
orientation was anti-nuclear. He urged that India should come up
with an alternative NPT. While I argued that there was no
alternative to going nuclear, the economist in the group said
that a nuclear weapons programme would be a set back to our
economic development. In the last meeting of the group in
November 1985, Rajiv wanted the cost estimate for a nuclear
deterrent. A small task force under Gen K Sundarji, which
included atomic energy and missile experts (who are today in the
limelight), produced the report showing that India could have a
balanced minimum deterrent for Rs 7,000 crore (at 1985 rupee
value) in about 10 years. That report, of which the only copy
was delivered to Rajiv personally by Gen Sundarji, vanished into
thin air. The planning group was never asked to meet again.
In 1985, Rajiv accepted the proposal for a pact with Pakistan on
mutual non-attack on nuclear installations and offered it to Gen
Zia in December that year, and the latter accepted it. A proposal
for mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapon capabilities was
mooted. Rajiv favoured it but one of his cabinet colleagues shot
it down on the ground that Rajiv had talked so much about the
Pakistani nuclear threat that such a move would be regarded as a
sign of weakness and would demoralise our armed forces.
Adequate Evidence
By 1986, Rajiv had distanced himself from Mr Ramanna and Mr Arun
Singh, then minister of state for defence research and
development. He would not meet Mr Ramanna, and did not consult
him on the appointment of a new AEC chairman. Meanwhile Dr A Q
Khan, the Pakistani nuclear weapon designer, disclosed that his
country had assembled the bomb in January 1987, and to provide an
appropriate backdrop for this announcement a crisis was created
by Pakistan using the Operation Brasstacks as an excuse.
Rajiv's search for an alternative to the NPT led to the
formulation of the Rajiv Gandhi plan of 1988 which was presented
to the third UN special session on disarmament. He should have
been shattered by the total lack of response to his eminently
sensible plan. By that time there was adequate evidence -
including the very nominal sentences handed to the Pakistanis
caught redhanded on nuclear material procurement in the US - that
the Reagan administration was turning a blind eye to nuclear
weapons acquisition by Pakistan. Indian intelligence agencies had
enough proof of Pak-Chinese collaboration and there were reports
of a Pak nuclear device being exploded in Lop Nor in May 1985.
Finally, Rajiv fulfilled his duty as Prime Minister, and in spite
of his anti-nuclear orientation, he gave the go-ahead for the
Indian weaponisation project. In May 1990, Mr Ramanna, as
minister of state for defence, warned Pakistan against nuclear
sabre-rattling. He declared in the Rajya Sabha that India would
never use its nuclear capability first but if Pakistan did so New
Delhi would rise to the occasion. This indicates that the first
Indian weapons might have been ready by that time. In
retrospect, the strong deterrent statements made by Mr Chandra
Shekhar as Prime Minister, and subsequently by Mr Sharad Pawar as
defence minister tend to support this hypothesis.
Rajiv met Indian journalists in Kerala House in the last week of
April 1991. Replying to a question, he said that he was re-
evaluating the nuclear issue, and that he had written to the
President on the subject. Obviously, he knew the status of the
Indian programme.
Mr P V Narasimha Rao prevailed upon Mr Vajpayee as leader of the
opposition not to introduce any resolution in Parliament on the
nuclear issue by assuring him that, things were on track. Mr I K
Gujral's references to deterrence after he took over as Prime
Minister were also revealing signals. The 1995 attempt at
testing, called off under US pressure, proved to be a dry run for
Shakti. Therefore, the nuclear weapons programme is a national
programme to which the Congress, the Janata of Mr V P Singh and
Mr Chandra Shekhar and the United Front under Mr Deve Gowda and
Mr Gujral were fully committed. While the credit for taking the
decision to conduct the test goes to Mr Vajpayee and his party,
it could not have been done with such sophistication in 1998 but
for the support to the programme by leaders of all the national
parties since 1987. Rajiv's role typifies the Indian dilemma: of
opposition to nuclear weapons and commitment to their
elimination, without at the same time compromising national
security for an idealistic vision not immediately realisable in
today's world. Historians may applaud his courageous decision.
Telling Comment
Indian prime ministers had to implement this decision in utmost
secrecy, because in this country there are hardly any secrets.
Mr V P Singh, Mr Chandra Shekhar and, for most of his tenure, Mr
Narasimha Rao were their own defence ministers in order to guard
against leakage of this secret. While the maintenance of secrecy
is commendable, over the years successive governments failed to
prepare the political parties and the public to the problems of
nuclear security and the case for India going nuclear. Hence the
utter confusion within the parties, and the denunciation of the
programme initiated by Rajiv Gandhi by his own party leaders.
This is a telling comment how poorly educated our political class
is particularly on national security and foreign policy issues.
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