HVK Archives: Grit with conciliation
Grit with conciliation - The Indian Express
J.N. Dixit
()
May 28, 1998
Title: Grit with conciliation
Author: J.N. Dixit
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: May 28, 1998
Cogitations on whether India should have conducted the recent
nuclear tests are irrelevant to the changed realities of regional
politics and international strategic equations. The points to be
considered are: the implications of India acquiring nuclear-
weapon status, the nuances of international reactions, how to
cope with negative international reactions, what India has
achieved and where it should proceed.
First the implications. India is a defect nuclear weapons power
regardless of the legal quibbling about the terms of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear-weapon powers are unlikely
to give it formal recognition as one and let it participate in
non-proliferation processes on an equal footing with them. They
will take note of our nuclear-weapons capacity and examine ways
of adjusting to it. Reservations and sanctions will mark the
initial phase. But if India shows unity and grit and takes
logical follow-up action, these powers will gradually adjust.
India has disturbed the existing strategic equations and macro-
level political plans of the superpowers. We have posed an
operational challenge to unilateral restrictions on technology
transfer to developing countries. We have profoundly changed the
Asian security environment, overtly confirming our capacities in
relation to the other major Asian entities, Russia, China and
Japan and, to some extent, Pakistan.
More importantly, we have disrupted the nuclear powers' long-term
agenda of remaining dominant in the international order,
conceived at the end of the Second World War and remained an over-
arching aim even after the Cold War.
International reaction to India's abandoning ambiguity for
categorical and demonstrate affirmation of its strategic
capacities has been negative, as expected. But it is the nuances
that India should note. The US and Japanese governments have been
most concrete in their criticism and have imposed sanctions.
Despite President Clinton's posture of pain, the fact is that his
administration is extremely irritated with the Indian government
and will impose sanctions to the maximum extent feasible. The
language of Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth's
testimony to Congress on India's tests clearly indicates the deep
resentment of US authorities.
This resentment will, however, be marginally tempered by the
views of House of Representatives Speaker Newt Gingrich,
influential political figures like Kissinger and Brzezinski, and
experts like Haas. American public opinion is divided. We must
work to utilise the rational elements in the US establishment and
public opinion to keep relations on track and not become
jingoistic or confrontationist. Japan shares the concerns of the
industrial countries. But it is also prompted by the apprehension
higher levels of militarisation in an Asian country generates
about Japan's own right-wing politicians and military
establishment who want to change its commitment to pacifism and
non-proliferation. Japan is the only country to have suffered a
nuclear attack. We must react with understanding.
Britain, Germany and France - especially France - did not support
extensive sanctions. Russia has argued against sanctions. India
can take preliminary satisfaction that, though critical, Western
Europe and Russia want to continue cooperation. Our policies
should be responsive.
Neither the UN Security Council nor the Non-aligned Foreign
Ministers' Conference at Cartagena have condemned India despite
efforts by some countries. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
statement of May 19 is significant: "You cannot have an exclusive
club whose members have nuclear weapons and are refusing to
disband it and tell others now not to have it. The nuclear powers
need to rethink and set an example for other nations."
Though there is no endorsement of India's action, it has
certainly changed the status quo terms of reference on
disarmament and arms control. There is a slowly emerging view on
looking at these issues in terms of India's logic of many years.
We should encourage this process.
Amongst our immediate neighbours, Sri Lanka has supported the
tests. Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Maldives have expressed no
definite opinion. Pakistan has objected strongly and decided to
come out of the nuclear closet. China is equally critical,
partly due to India's argument that its nuclear weaponisation was
primarily a response to the Chinese threat. At a deeper level, it
is natural for China to view with reservation a qualitative
change in Asia's strategic balance. Its unquestioned dominance
stands slightly challenged, but only slightly.
We must keep the dialogue with Pakistan going without unnecessary
belligerence and assure it of no-first use. With China it is
absolutely necessary to bring relations back on track. Escalating
the current confrontation which, frankly, has been begun by us,
will be detrimental to our mutual interest as well as regional
stability.
I have noticed in my interactions with Asian, African and South
American diplomats, whatever their governments formal stance, an
undercurrent of satisfaction that a developing country has
overcome discriminatory pressures and asserted its self-.
reliance and technological achievements.
We should not deal with the tests as an end in themselves but
proceed to make the capacity we have attained deplorable both in
terms of weaponisation and delivery systems. There is no need to
be paranoid or defensive. We must immediately initiate bilateral
discussions with nuclear and other major world powers to apprise
them of the rationale of what we are doing to assure them that we
shall, as before, remain a restrained and responsible country.
I wish we had not been so specific in mentioning China as the
reason for our nuclear weaponisation, in George Fernandes's
statements and in the first communications sent by Atalji to his
counterparts. It would have been sufficient to emphasise the
deteriorating regional security environment. We have landed in
an unnecessarily confrontationist stand with China. This is not
appeasement or defensiveness but advocacy of what is reasonable.
Our economic and technological policies should be predicated on
our facing sanctions and other pressures for perhaps two to five
years. If we sustain the momentum of the security postures
initiated at Pokharan this month and demonstrate grit in the face
of sanctions, it is reasonable to expect that the world will come
to terms with us.
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