HVK Archives: A nuclear strategy for India
A nuclear strategy for India - The Economic Times
K subrahmanyam
()
May 28, 1998
Title: A nuclear strategy for India
Author: K subrahmanyam
Publication: The Economic Times
Date: May 28, 1998
India has declared itself a nuclear weapon state after conducting
a series of five nuclear weapon tests. The country has to decide
now the strategy it proposes to adopt. The US generated vast
quantities of strategic literature along with a vast arsenal of
weapons exceeding 30,000 warheads. The Soviet Union had only
very limited published literature though its arsenal tried to
match the American one, on the principle of equality and equal
security. The Chinese, though their nuclear efforts were
triggered by the American threats to them in 1953 and 1958,
developed their arsenal initially mostly with the Soviet Union as
their adversary with tacit security cover of US after 1971.
Therefore, India is not in a position to model itself on any of
the existing nuclear weapon powers. It has to think through its
own strategic doctrine.
However, we have 53-year history of the nuclear era to learn
>from. The nuclear strategy in US and Soviet Union evolved in the
first four decades on the implicit assumption that the larger the
stockpile a country had, it exercised greater deterrence.
Moreover, both super powers appear to have believed that a
nuclear war involving exchanges of hundreds and even thousands of
both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons was fightable and
winnable. As far back as 1962, after a NATO exercise involving
tactical nuclear weapons the scientific adviser to the British
defence minister Sir Solly Zuckerman challenged this assumption
but his views and those of others who agreed with him did not
have much influence on the US and Soviet governments. The
arsenals grew larger and larger. In 1985, President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev brought a sense of realism into the
nuclear strategic debate with their joint declaration that a
nuclear war could not be won and, therefore, should not be
initiated. Now many influential American strategist believe that
even an arsenal of 200 weapons would constitute adequate
deterrence, and the US and Russia should move towards the goal of
reducing their stockpiles to that number.
During the period of sixties to eighties when a nuclear war using
thousands of nuclear weapons was considered feasible it became
necessary to have second strike forces of adequate sizes which
will survive an all out first strike attack. Now the widely
accepted view is that such attacks are infeasible because of
their environmental consequences and inability to exercise
effective command and control, and even one bomb on one major
city will constitute unacceptable damage. Taking these two
factors into account, and the fact that no country can calculate
on the certainty of being able to eliminate all weapons of the
adversary and being free of the threat of retaliation, deterrence
can be exercised with very modest arsenals. The survivability of
the retaliatory force can be ensured by making it mobile on land
or under water.
Once the idea of war fighting is given up as infeasible then the
command and control over a modest retaliatory arsenal will not be
as costly as those meant for war fighting. The mutual deterrence
generated by possession of nuclear weapons is now-a-days called
existentialist deterrence. It is hard to imagine today disputes
in which nations will have such high stakes as to risk the use of
a nuclear weapon which will invite certain retaliation.
In the present era prolonged high intensity international wars
using organised conventional forces between industrial states,
and even among relatively advanced developing states (such as
India, China and Pakistan), are becoming less and less likely.
Eight years of war between Iran and Iraq proved that it could not
lead to meaningful military results. While nations must still
insure themselves against irrational acts like those of Saddam
Hussein that insurance should be commensurate with the risks
involved. A nation in possession of nuclear weapons and adequate
conventional military forces does not need to resort to nuclear
weapons in very low probability conventional attacks. At present,
the relatively high probable occurrence is nuclear blackmail more
than actual use of the weapon. Therefore, nuclear weapons are
needed by India mostly to deter nuclear blackmail. This can be
achieved effectively with no first use posture and existentialist
deterrence arising out of India's possession of nuclear weapons.
A no first use posture will be in conformity with India's stand
for the last five decades that nuclear weapons must be eliminated
and the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons are crimes
against humanity.
Apart from that any war fighting or first use doctrine would be
more expensive in terms of command and control than the no first
use posture. The doctrine of no first use will restrict the use
of the weapon to retaliation only after the adversary uses the
weapon first. Therefore, the elaborate command and control
involved in launch on warning and launch under attack strategies
will not be necessary. The retaliatory force can be kept well
spread to make its elimination difficult and the warheads and the
launchers kept separated to ensure safety and avoid any
unauthorised use. One can have more dummy delivery systems by way
of deception. Today the US and Russia are moving into de-
targeting and de-alerting status which would be the posture under
no first use. The threat of an adversary resorting to extremely
improbable decapitation attack - strike on the capital to
eliminate the leadership of the country - can be taken care of by
providing for political and military order of succession under
legislation and working out standard operational procedures for
retaliation. In 1990, at a seminar in Kharagvasla, General
Sundarji explained the no first use posture, its simplicity and
the relatively lower costs to a group of US officials, including
those in command of nuclear weapons. They could not pick holes in
his logic and he has been a strong advocate of no first use. He
has elaborated on it in his book Blind Men of Hindusthan.
No first use is often attributed to the Chinese since they came
out with such a declaration on the day of their first test on
October 16, 1964. In fact the no first use doctrine was
implemented in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in which the
signatories undertook not to use chemical weapons but at the same
time reserved the right of retaliation. Some Indian diplomats
therefore prefer to talk of the doctrine of non-use of nuclear
weapons while reserving the right of retaliation. It amounts to
the same thing as no first use. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 de-
legitimised the chemical weapons and led the way to the Chemical
Weapons Convention of 1993. Similarly, the no first use doctrine
too would in due course pave the way to de-legitimisation of
nuclear weapons.
India should now propose no first use mutual agreements to all
nuclear weapons powers. If any power turns down our offer that
would lend additional justification for our possession of nuclear
weapons. If they accept the offer then it would mean recognition
of our nuclear weapon status. Either way India will have nothing
to lose. While getting recognition as a nuclear weapon power
through an amendment of the Nonproliferation Treaty is not going
to be easy, it will be easier to achieve that goal through mutual
no first use treaties. The Chinese have refused to de-target
their weapons on the US on the ground that the US is unwilling to
sign a mutual no first use treaty with them.
No first use doctrine can be proclaimed unilaterally without
negotiating it with other countries. Mutual or collective
agreements with other nuclear weapon powers are of relevance to
promote delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and to move the world
towards disarmament. Therefore, India should not lose any time in
proclaiming the no first use doctrine.
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