HVK Archives: Comrades with a Chinese accent
Comrades with a Chinese accent - The Indian Express
G.M. Telang
()
May 28, 1998
Title: Comrades with a Chinese accent
Author: G.M. Telang
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: May 28, 1998
After keeping the nuclear option open for over two decades, India
has at long last had the courage to free itself from the shackles
of this self-defeating stance. Within two days of the conduct of
five crucial nuclear tests at Pokharan, India has been in a
position to declare itself a nuclear weapons power. This is a
resounding assertion of India's freedom of action at an important
turning point in the era of nuclear politics. Nothing else could
serve national interests better at this juncture.
According to a group of Indian Marxist ideologues, however, all
this is a worthless display of 'pseudo-nationalism'. They have
indeed been consistently firm opponents of that nationalism which
the overwhelming majority of the country's politically active
middle class and in fact the electorate as a whole have nurtured.
This was so throughout the Indian National Congress-led struggle
for independence as well as in the succeeding five decades since
the achievement of this goal. For these oft-mislabelled radicals,
the popular notion of nationalism has always been a bourgeois
disease. Their faith, instead, in the so-called proletarian
internationalism remains unshaken. Their most notable
contribution to the promotion of this overriding principle was,
of course, their infamous united front with the British rulers
when Gandhiji launched the Quit India movement in 1942. Likewise
this was behind the Marxists' support to Beijing during China's
border war with India in 1962.
The same mindset has inspired not merely these apparently
unattached Marxists but even the CPI and the CPI(M) to condemn
the Indian nuclear tests. It goes against the grain for them to
accept that these tests represent a vital breakthrough in the
quest for credible security against blackmail in the new
environment created, by China's acquisition of a sophisticated
nuclear arsenal. Even if there were no Sino-Pakistan axis in
existence and no Kashmir problem, this development would be of
grave concern to India's security planners. Both these dimensions
only served to heighten the need for New Delhi to put in place a
new strategy without further loss of time.
The long-time ideological opponents of Indian nationalism are
also trying to paint a frightening scenario as a result of
India's decision to base its security on nuclear deterrence. This
view of nuclear deterrence is indeed a new ploy on their part.
They had greeted with a deafening silence each of the 45 declared
nuclear tests carried out by China since 1964. How come that
throughout this feverish pursuit by China of the means of nuclear
deterrence, the Indian communists never showed the slightest
anxiety about a possible outbreak of a nuclear war in Asia? The
answer lies in their conviction that China's policy stemmed from
genuine nationalism as distinguished from India's alleged pseudo-
nationalism.
Again, this convenient distinction is based on the great
principle of proletarian internationalism. What, in other words,
strengthens China's nationalism, should be accepted by all true
revolutionaries as the latest manifestation of this canon
enshrined in the Marxist-Leninist lexicon. When Pol Pot, a
staunch Chinese ally against Vietnam, put at least a million
Cambodians to the sword in the mid-seventies, then, too, the
Indian communists showed supreme unconcern. That was yet another
instance of solidarity, even if undeclared, with China as a duty
enjoined by proletarian internationalism.
It must be said in fairness here that the Chinese ideologues,
unlike their Soviet counterparts earlier, do not seem to have
sought to manipulate their admirers in India. Such rectitude
could have been dictated by Chinese pessimism about the future of
the communist movement in India. For one thing, the Chinese are
aware of the deep divisions even among those who swear by Maoism
in this country.
More relevantly, the Chinese communist theoreticians cannot have
failed to notice that the CPI(M) and the CPI have not yet managed
to gain even ten percent of the seats in the central parliament
in the twelve general elections held so far. This has only
underlined the party's essentially regional rather than national
influence. The Chinese leadership, therefore, cannot afford to
ignore the fact that the vitality of Indian nationalism remains
unimpaired.
Back
Top
|
