archive: Pak men fled once going got tough
Pak men fled once going got tough
Vikram Jit Singh
The Indian Express
July 11, 1999
Title: Pak men fled once going got tough
Author: Vikram Jit Singh
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: July 11, 1999
DRASS/BATALIK, JULY 10: A major reason for the Pakistani rout in Drass
and Batalik has been the failure of its officers to lead from the
front, leaving charge with the junior commissioned officers (havildars
and subedars) as they stayed in the comfort of fibre-glass huts.
In the battle for Point 4700-Tommy-Saddle on the Drass Line of
Control, the 18 Garhwal Rifles caught the enemy napping. ``Point 4700
has a steep cliff fall leading to a glacier where the enemy had
pitched tents and two fibre-glass huts for the officers led by Major
Azim Ahmad of the 6 Northern Light Infantry. With a few stoves, the
temperature in the fibre-glass huts rises to near-room temperature,''
says a Major who took part in the assaults.
During the day, the Pakistanis, using the `Jumar' mountaineering
system, would slither down the cliff to their administrative base at
the foot of Point 4700 comprising tents and the two fibre-glass huts.
``We noticed that they used to leave only one or two sentries on the
top and returnto their positions in the evening. We advanced our
normal attack timings to late afternoon and caught the intruders
napping,'' said a havildar.
Although eight Pakistani officers are believed to have died in Drass,
most of them are believed to have been artillery officers guiding fire
onto Indian positions. When the Indian Army launched a major offensive
in the Drass sector, the Pakistani officers, including Maj Ahmad, fled
across the Line of Control which is just a kilometre away from Point
4700.
A radio intercept later from the besieged soldiers and JCOs clearly
pointed to the sense of betrayal felt by the subordinate ranks. ``All
the sahibs have fled, leaving us to brave the Hindustani attack. What
can we do now,'' was the SOS sent from the Point 4700 sector to the
master controller in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
But JCO-led operations are not new; in fact, they seem to be a
tradition in the Pakistani Army. ``During the 1971 operations, the
officers were sometimes found four to five km behind theirtroops,
leaving charge with the JCOs,'' said a 1971 war veteran.
While Indian officers do acknowledge the ``brilliant'' Pakistani plan
of intrusion, they point to the isolation of the intruders once the
Army started to cordon off the positions. ``For example, they had no
clear command which could have helped them avoid the Indian Army's
operations to outflank the intruders. The officers were not there in
the front. And there was no way controllers in Pakistan could have
guided the intruders and helped offset the our Army's moves,''
explained an officer involved in planning operations in Batalik.
One of the main reasons for the Pakistani rout in Batalik was the
outflanking of the intruders after the capture of the Khalubar ridge
which exposed the main supply camp in the Munthodalo region. ``The
Pakistanis did not realise the significance of holding onto Khalubar
ridge at all costs. Once this ridge fell by the first week of July,
the intruders just caved in because the supplylines were getting
choked,'' said the officer.
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