archive: India in a multi-polar world
India in a multi-polar world
Sandhya Jain
The Pioneer
July 20, 1999
Title: India in a multi-polar world
Author: Sandhya Jain
Publication: The Pioneer
Date: July 20, 1999
We are suddenly in a new, multi-polar world. And India is one of its
major pillars. Many of us may find this hard to believe. But those who
are beginning to realise that it is indeed so, are also bemused at the
enormity of it all. How did such an immense change take place so
imperceptibly?
This smooth, yet dramatic transition from a unipolar to a multi-polar
world is one of the most singular achievements of India's two month
long engagement with the Pakistani Army and mujahideen in Kargil.
Surprisingly, it is also the least acknowledged. Or perhaps it is not
so surprising, given the niggardly attitude of the media, academics,
politicians, et al, towards giving credit to Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee for the political leadership he has demonstrated in
matters like exercising the nuclear option, test-firing missiles,
facing brute aggression with calm strength, and changing the contours
of our foreign policy in a manner that brings such tangible benefits.
Cynics will demand evidence of India's emergence as a power deserving
respect and consideration. Yet discerning observers can see this in
the refusal of the United States, China, and others, to treat India
and Pakistan at par in the conflict. This is the first time India has
received such a courtesy since Jawaharlal Nehru took the Kashmir issue
to the United Nations, though we have always protested at being
equated with a country one-seventh our size. The shift has been
executed with finesse, which is probably why it has gone unnoticed.
But those who have noticed Pakistan's unique isolation in the
international community on the Kargil issue, must also take note of
the quality and quantity of support received by India.
On the one hand, the Indian Government's measured response of pushing
back the invaders but confining operations to the Line of Control won
widespread approval. At the same time, and this is truly significant,
none of the major world powers issued the usual statements asking both
sides to cease hostilities- a position that would hold both sides
equally responsible for breach of peace. This time, the international
community took an unprecedented position-there was an aggressor
(Pakistan), a victim (India), and the victim was acting within its
rights by giving the aggressor a fitting reply. The victim would be
allowed to do this job in peace, and its decision to do so on its own
territory so as to limit the area of hostilities, was greatly
appreciated. On the other hand, efforts were made to persuade the
aggressor to back off.
This is the real significance of American President Bill Clinton's
one-sided intervention with Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif on the
fourth of July. President Clinton did go through the motion of
inviting Mr Vajpayee for talks, but he readily accepted the Prime
Minister's refusal to do so in the midst of a grave conflict. By all
accounts, however, he put the screws on an old client-state, Pakistan,
and back home, after some bluff and bluster, Mr Nawaz Sharif ordered
both troops and troopers to withdraw.
Those of us who cannot break out of the old mindsets see the
Clinton-Sharif joint statement as evidence of third party mediation in
Kashmir, and say it violates India's stated position of settling the
dispute bilaterally. Others caution that it could pave the way for
eventual third party mediation, which India could find difficult to
resist after having canvassed the support of the international
community on the violation of the LoC. This line of thinking is
inadequate to explain the situation in which we find ourselves today.
The deference shown by the international community, particularly the
United States, to India's desire that none should interfere in its
engagement with Pakistan in Kargil, is a powerful indicator of
international acceptance of India's new status. Contrast this with the
arrival of the Seventh Fleet in the wake of the 1971 war, and you will
realise that what I'm talking about is no small achievement. The
question is, how did it come about?
It certainly didn't happen overnight, though it has only now become
apparent. The collapse of the Soviet Union from its own internal
contradictions ended the structure of two-superpower hegemony the
world had witnessed in the aftermath of the Second World War. This
gave rise to fears of American dominance in a unipolar world, and the
American proclivity to play international gendarme certainly added to
the misgivings. But anyone with a sense of history would realise that
there is no such thing as a unipolar world; what has happened is a
redistribution of power among nations. This is to say that a new world
order has emerged, only we have not given it due recognition.
That new order is now becoming more clearly visible. The Soviet Union
is no more, but Russia is a force to reckon with, as is China. In
fact, the Chinese have neither subscribed to nor worried overmuch
about the so-called unipolar world; where China's internal and
external interests are concerned, they know how to have their way.
Britain, France, Germany and Japan continue to rank among the leading
nations, and now, with Pakistan virtually considered a "rogue state",
India has emerged as the country of status in this region.
To emphasise the point, I may point out that for the first time in its
conflicts with Pakistan, India has not had to rely solely upon Russian
support. I value Russia's friendship, but there is no denying that
having a solitary friend-patron in the international arena diminished
our status and gave us the look of a 'semi-protectorate'. That is why
the world mocked at our non-alignment, while we were pushed into
taking absurd positions on issues like the invasion of Hungary.
Mr Vajpayee, on the other hand, charted out a bold new course when he
tactfully supported-the US decision to bomb Taliban bases in
Afghanistan last August by linking it with India's problems with
cross-border terrorism. This writer had then pointed out that he had
"reversed the anti-American tilt" bequeathed by Nehru and paved the
way for "an epochal realignment of forces on the international plane,
which could see an evolving alliance between the world's largest and
most powerful democracies" (The Pioneer, August 29, 1998). I am
gratified that my perception that the Prime Minister had corrected a
critical faultline in our foreign policy has been vindicated. By any
reckoning, the decision to invest in US friendship was a wise one.
Even Japan, which seemed at odds with international perceptions on
Kargil, has since clarified its stance.
It will be argued that a combination of factors worked to prompt the
Pakistani withdrawal. China was so cold that Mr Nawaz Sharif had to
cut short his visit. General Anthony Zinni conveyed a threat to bomb
Taliban bases in Pakistan, and France withdrew a promise to deliver a
submarine and Mirage III fighter jets. The US House foreign relations
committee passed an amendment urging President Clinton to oppose the
proposed US $ 100 million World Bank loan to Pakistan. The point,
however, is that India was in the right even in the past.
It is Mr Vajpayee and his team, notably Mr Jaswant Singh and Mr
Brajesh Mishra, who have made the world see the conflict through
India's eyes. In a fundamental sense, he has opened the door for
settling the Kashmir dispute to our satisfaction at some future date.
Back
Top
|
