Hindu Vivek Kendra
A RESOURCE CENTER FOR THE PROMOTION OF HINDUTVA
   
 
 
«« Back
archive: On the edge of the precipice

On the edge of the precipice

M.P. Bhandara
DAWN, Karachi
July 21, 1999


    Title: On the edge of the precipice
    Author: M.P. Bhandara
    Publication: DAWN, Karachi
    Date: July 21, 1999
    
    HAVING sleep-walked into a near disaster at Kargil, we halt at the
    edge of the precipice. We might have won a battle but we lost the
    war.A soon-to-be-lame-duck president of the US provides the face
    saving crumb of "personal interest" (whatever that might mean) to the
    resolution of the Kashmir dispute. If Pakistan arrived on the now
    famous Quaid's nod, Kashmir hangs on Clinton's crumb.
    
    The tailpiece of the Kargil fiasco is difficult to match in the annals
    diplomatic humiliation. Certainly the worst setback for us since the
    fall of united Pakistan in December 1971. How did it arise? What was
    the game plan? Was it sanctioned by the Defence Committee of the
    Cabinet? Should an enquiry into the debacle be made by Parliament?
    These are some of the questions that are agitating the minds of
    concerned citizens.
    
    We made every conceivable mistake. Initially, we maintained that Tiger
    Hills was on our side of the LoC. Who were we trying to bluff? Later,
    we are told that Kargil was in retaliation as India had violated the
    line of Control on three previous occasions and had seized our
    territory. This is news to most ordinary Pakistanis. We knew about
    Indian adventurism in Siachen but not this. When did the intrusions
    take place and how much territory was occupied? Why have we kept quiet
    on this?
    
    What was the military or political aim of Kargil? If the aim was to
    cut the Indian line of communications to Siachen or Leh, did anyone in
    his right mind not consider that this amounted to a declaration of war
    with India? That the international community would condemn it in no
    uncertain terms just as it condemned Advani's threat to take over our
    part of Kashmir in the heady flush of the Indian nuclear explosion!
    The world is wedded to the concept of the 'status quo'; it cannot be
    upturned by force. Impatient Saddam Hussein should have learnt this
    from the Chinese. China has never exercised force in pursuance of its
    Taiwan claim.
    
    It is generally accepted that Kargil was planned last year and its
    execution began in February just about the time of the Lahore
    declaration. This opens us to the charge that Sharif's negotiations
    with Vajpayee were not undertaken in good faith.
    
    There are other surprises, too. India by not crossing the Line of
    Control (LoC) has secured a notable diplomatic victory. The world is
    all praise for Indian "restraint", Indian "maturity" and so on. India,
    which lost its glamour and attraction for the West after the cold war
    and in particular after Babri Masjid, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism
    and the nuclear bomb of last May, now re-emerges as a responsible and
    respected power.
    
    We are told incessantly that the Kargil freedom fighters are genuine
    Kashmiri freedom fighters. However, is it reasonable to believe that
    freedom fighters can fight at 15,000 feet above sea level without
    Pakistan rations, clothing, logistics, ammunition and intelligence
    support? Again, who are we fooling? It is possible for PTV to beguile
    its captive audience at home but the world does not consist of
    retards. We have always been victims of our own make-believe world.
    For example, our current school history books report as "history" that
    Bangladesh was created against the will of its people by Indian armed
    intervention! Say this to a Bangladeshi and watch his reaction.
    
    A current example of the make-believe syndrome is the manner in which
    Clinton's "personal interest" pledge is being played up in the press
    as if an onus to find a solution is placed on Clinton. This "pledge"
    is no more than a face-sever for Sharif. Clinton had no choice other
    than to demand unilateral Pakistan withdrawal from Kargil following
    resolutions in the US Congress.
    
    The average 'Pakistani sees Clinton as he would see one of his own
    rulers - whimsical, dictatorial and beyond accountability. The
    obtaining fact is that an American president's personal pledge cannot
    overrule Congress which approves foreign policy and influences it on a
    day-to-day basis. Before our expectations rise very high, Clinton's
    pledge should be played down. The US is not a mediator or conciliator
    in the Kashmir dispute.
    
    Since we do not have the courage to face our recent historical past,
    our present is caught in a web of myths and our future is warped by
    this burden. But, alas, there is no escape from the ice and fire of
    truth. A new Pakistan will only emerge after we have the courage to
    face our past honestly. We need a truth commission as in South Africa.
    
    On October 24, 1947, the Pakistan army headquarters informed its
    Indian counterpart that some 5,000 tribesmen had captured Muzaffarabad
    and Domel and were approaching Srinagar. A vacillating Maharaja was
    frightened into inviting India to send troops at 11 p.m. on the same
    day and signalled accession to India.
    
    We have all but forgotten that the Maharaja, backed by the dominant
    political parties of the time, desired independence. In retrospect we
    may question if it was wise to do what we did and leave the Maharaja
    with no other option by sending marauding tribesmen who managed to 
    thoroughly alienate the Kashmiris by loot and plunder. An independent
    Kashmir would have been (and might be in the future) as close and
    friendly to Pakistan as Canada is to the US. Given the complexion of
    the population of Kashmir and its historical trade and cultural roots,
    it would be but natural. If by a magic wand all of Kashmir were to be
    part of Pakistan tomorrow, one fears we might have another Afghanistan
    to contend with.
    
    Our second misadventure was in September 1965. After we were
    successful in the Rann of Kutch earlier in that year, Ayub Khan (by
    nature a cautious person) was pressured by the hawks in his cabinet
    (led by Z.A. Bhutto) and the army to infiltrate the ceasefire line in
    Kashmir. The action was based on the incorrect premise that indigenous
    resistance could be ignited by a few saboteurs. Ayub resisted the idea
    as he clearly foresaw India crossing the international frontier in
    retaliation at a point of its choosing.
    
    The Bhutto faction, which included some prominent generals, put out
    the canard that Ayub's cowardice stemmed from his desire to protect
    his newly acquired wealth. It was boasted at the time that one
    Pakistani soldier was equal to four Indian soldiers and so on.
    
    What happened is history. The 1965 war ended in Tashkent which led
    directly to December 1971 and the fall of united Pakistan. One
    colossal blunder followed another; in the azure light of retrospect we
    can see that united Pakistan was eminently savable.
    
    When Justice Hamoodur Rahman in his official enquiry recorded the
    truth of 1971, Bhutto as prime minister personally ordered that each
    and every copy of the report be burnt, and burnt to ashes it was. Not
    one copy was saved. And to-date no attempt has been made to
    reconstruct the causes that led to our dismemberment. The same fate is
    likely to befall the Kargil episode.
    
    Are we not as a nation allergic to knowing the truth? Truth today
    should begin with a parliamentary enquiry into Kargil rather than the
    chauvinistic notion of starting new Kargils in Kashmir. The one
    feature that recurs right from 1947 to this year's Kargil misadventure
    is that a tiny cabal of men take the crucial decisions which have the
    potential of leading to war. The self-perception of this tiny cabal is
    that they are the only patriots left in the country.
    
    The sane suggestion of a National Security Council (NSC) consisting of
    the leading organs of the state and the leader of the opposition to
    examine the issues of war and peace was rejected by the prime
    minister. This led to the resignation of that fine soldier General
    Jehangir Karamat last November.
    
    Let us for a moment suppose that we had an NSC, what would have
    happened?
    
    1) The foreign minister would have been obliged to record the
    considered views of the Foreign Office (FO) as an institution of the
    state. The basic Indian diplomatic thrust was to regain the prestige
    and influence it lost in world affairs after the end of the cold war,
    followed by the razing of the Babri Masjid and the Indian nuclear
    explosions of May 1998. Never has India's stock in world opinion
    ratings been lower than in this decade.
    
    To show itself as a responsible regional nuclear power India would try
    to contain Kargil and not cross the LoC, at least till the last drop
    of diplomatic advantage was squeezed out. India's best option was to
    expose Pakistan as an aggressor and a fundamentalist state.
    
    The FO knows well the views of the US Congress on Kashmir / Afghan
    Mujahideen issue. A flagrant Mujahideen intrusion across the LoC could
    put us back on the terrorist list.
    
    2) The finance minister would no doubt have informed the NSC of the
    expected consequences of a cut-off by the World Bank and the IMF and
    the G-8 nations.
    
    3) The JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) would have presented a realistic
    military assessment of a local Kashmir battle which is arguably
    winnable and a war with India which may have totally unpredictable
    consequences.
    
    4) Perhaps, an analytical mind on the NSC - and the advantage of
    having such a constitutional or sub-constitutional committee is that a
    broad spectrum of independent opinion is generated - might have
    stressed that the objectives of an armed action should be assessed in
    the context of its consequences - economic, international and
    regional.
    
    The downside consideration is a more important one than the upside.
    The downside price paid by Pakistan at Kargil would have been rated as
    simply too high in the context of any possible upside scenario:
    
    a) By having Pakistan agree to the inviolability of the LoC, we have
    played right into India's hand of obtaining world sanction of giving
    LoC the sacrosanctity of an international border.
    
    b) China has been forced to tilt in the direction of being a South
    Asian mediator. Remember, China has always been our ally before. China
    agreed to support Pakistan if pressed to do so at the Security Council
    and the United Nations, but Nawaz Sharif was clearly advised of
    China's reservations on the Kargil operation.
    
    Wiser counsel could also have prevailed upon our hawks to realize that
    in the totally unpredictable scenario of a nuclear war, the very
    existence of Pakistan is more in peril than is India's. Confrontation
    with India over the past 50 years has apparently failed. Do we have
    the strength to recognize other options?
    
    Let us ask who are the real victors today of World War II: Germany or
    England, Japan or Russia? The poet can take a larger view on the
    questions of War and Peace. My dear Telemachus, The Trojan War is over
    now; I don't recall who won it. (Brodsky)
    



Back                          Top

«« Back
 
 
 
  Search Articles
 
  Special Annoucements