archive: On the edge of the precipice
On the edge of the precipice
M.P. Bhandara
DAWN, Karachi
July 21, 1999
Title: On the edge of the precipice
Author: M.P. Bhandara
Publication: DAWN, Karachi
Date: July 21, 1999
HAVING sleep-walked into a near disaster at Kargil, we halt at the
edge of the precipice. We might have won a battle but we lost the
war.A soon-to-be-lame-duck president of the US provides the face
saving crumb of "personal interest" (whatever that might mean) to the
resolution of the Kashmir dispute. If Pakistan arrived on the now
famous Quaid's nod, Kashmir hangs on Clinton's crumb.
The tailpiece of the Kargil fiasco is difficult to match in the annals
diplomatic humiliation. Certainly the worst setback for us since the
fall of united Pakistan in December 1971. How did it arise? What was
the game plan? Was it sanctioned by the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet? Should an enquiry into the debacle be made by Parliament?
These are some of the questions that are agitating the minds of
concerned citizens.
We made every conceivable mistake. Initially, we maintained that Tiger
Hills was on our side of the LoC. Who were we trying to bluff? Later,
we are told that Kargil was in retaliation as India had violated the
line of Control on three previous occasions and had seized our
territory. This is news to most ordinary Pakistanis. We knew about
Indian adventurism in Siachen but not this. When did the intrusions
take place and how much territory was occupied? Why have we kept quiet
on this?
What was the military or political aim of Kargil? If the aim was to
cut the Indian line of communications to Siachen or Leh, did anyone in
his right mind not consider that this amounted to a declaration of war
with India? That the international community would condemn it in no
uncertain terms just as it condemned Advani's threat to take over our
part of Kashmir in the heady flush of the Indian nuclear explosion!
The world is wedded to the concept of the 'status quo'; it cannot be
upturned by force. Impatient Saddam Hussein should have learnt this
from the Chinese. China has never exercised force in pursuance of its
Taiwan claim.
It is generally accepted that Kargil was planned last year and its
execution began in February just about the time of the Lahore
declaration. This opens us to the charge that Sharif's negotiations
with Vajpayee were not undertaken in good faith.
There are other surprises, too. India by not crossing the Line of
Control (LoC) has secured a notable diplomatic victory. The world is
all praise for Indian "restraint", Indian "maturity" and so on. India,
which lost its glamour and attraction for the West after the cold war
and in particular after Babri Masjid, the rise of Hindu fundamentalism
and the nuclear bomb of last May, now re-emerges as a responsible and
respected power.
We are told incessantly that the Kargil freedom fighters are genuine
Kashmiri freedom fighters. However, is it reasonable to believe that
freedom fighters can fight at 15,000 feet above sea level without
Pakistan rations, clothing, logistics, ammunition and intelligence
support? Again, who are we fooling? It is possible for PTV to beguile
its captive audience at home but the world does not consist of
retards. We have always been victims of our own make-believe world.
For example, our current school history books report as "history" that
Bangladesh was created against the will of its people by Indian armed
intervention! Say this to a Bangladeshi and watch his reaction.
A current example of the make-believe syndrome is the manner in which
Clinton's "personal interest" pledge is being played up in the press
as if an onus to find a solution is placed on Clinton. This "pledge"
is no more than a face-sever for Sharif. Clinton had no choice other
than to demand unilateral Pakistan withdrawal from Kargil following
resolutions in the US Congress.
The average 'Pakistani sees Clinton as he would see one of his own
rulers - whimsical, dictatorial and beyond accountability. The
obtaining fact is that an American president's personal pledge cannot
overrule Congress which approves foreign policy and influences it on a
day-to-day basis. Before our expectations rise very high, Clinton's
pledge should be played down. The US is not a mediator or conciliator
in the Kashmir dispute.
Since we do not have the courage to face our recent historical past,
our present is caught in a web of myths and our future is warped by
this burden. But, alas, there is no escape from the ice and fire of
truth. A new Pakistan will only emerge after we have the courage to
face our past honestly. We need a truth commission as in South Africa.
On October 24, 1947, the Pakistan army headquarters informed its
Indian counterpart that some 5,000 tribesmen had captured Muzaffarabad
and Domel and were approaching Srinagar. A vacillating Maharaja was
frightened into inviting India to send troops at 11 p.m. on the same
day and signalled accession to India.
We have all but forgotten that the Maharaja, backed by the dominant
political parties of the time, desired independence. In retrospect we
may question if it was wise to do what we did and leave the Maharaja
with no other option by sending marauding tribesmen who managed to
thoroughly alienate the Kashmiris by loot and plunder. An independent
Kashmir would have been (and might be in the future) as close and
friendly to Pakistan as Canada is to the US. Given the complexion of
the population of Kashmir and its historical trade and cultural roots,
it would be but natural. If by a magic wand all of Kashmir were to be
part of Pakistan tomorrow, one fears we might have another Afghanistan
to contend with.
Our second misadventure was in September 1965. After we were
successful in the Rann of Kutch earlier in that year, Ayub Khan (by
nature a cautious person) was pressured by the hawks in his cabinet
(led by Z.A. Bhutto) and the army to infiltrate the ceasefire line in
Kashmir. The action was based on the incorrect premise that indigenous
resistance could be ignited by a few saboteurs. Ayub resisted the idea
as he clearly foresaw India crossing the international frontier in
retaliation at a point of its choosing.
The Bhutto faction, which included some prominent generals, put out
the canard that Ayub's cowardice stemmed from his desire to protect
his newly acquired wealth. It was boasted at the time that one
Pakistani soldier was equal to four Indian soldiers and so on.
What happened is history. The 1965 war ended in Tashkent which led
directly to December 1971 and the fall of united Pakistan. One
colossal blunder followed another; in the azure light of retrospect we
can see that united Pakistan was eminently savable.
When Justice Hamoodur Rahman in his official enquiry recorded the
truth of 1971, Bhutto as prime minister personally ordered that each
and every copy of the report be burnt, and burnt to ashes it was. Not
one copy was saved. And to-date no attempt has been made to
reconstruct the causes that led to our dismemberment. The same fate is
likely to befall the Kargil episode.
Are we not as a nation allergic to knowing the truth? Truth today
should begin with a parliamentary enquiry into Kargil rather than the
chauvinistic notion of starting new Kargils in Kashmir. The one
feature that recurs right from 1947 to this year's Kargil misadventure
is that a tiny cabal of men take the crucial decisions which have the
potential of leading to war. The self-perception of this tiny cabal is
that they are the only patriots left in the country.
The sane suggestion of a National Security Council (NSC) consisting of
the leading organs of the state and the leader of the opposition to
examine the issues of war and peace was rejected by the prime
minister. This led to the resignation of that fine soldier General
Jehangir Karamat last November.
Let us for a moment suppose that we had an NSC, what would have
happened?
1) The foreign minister would have been obliged to record the
considered views of the Foreign Office (FO) as an institution of the
state. The basic Indian diplomatic thrust was to regain the prestige
and influence it lost in world affairs after the end of the cold war,
followed by the razing of the Babri Masjid and the Indian nuclear
explosions of May 1998. Never has India's stock in world opinion
ratings been lower than in this decade.
To show itself as a responsible regional nuclear power India would try
to contain Kargil and not cross the LoC, at least till the last drop
of diplomatic advantage was squeezed out. India's best option was to
expose Pakistan as an aggressor and a fundamentalist state.
The FO knows well the views of the US Congress on Kashmir / Afghan
Mujahideen issue. A flagrant Mujahideen intrusion across the LoC could
put us back on the terrorist list.
2) The finance minister would no doubt have informed the NSC of the
expected consequences of a cut-off by the World Bank and the IMF and
the G-8 nations.
3) The JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) would have presented a realistic
military assessment of a local Kashmir battle which is arguably
winnable and a war with India which may have totally unpredictable
consequences.
4) Perhaps, an analytical mind on the NSC - and the advantage of
having such a constitutional or sub-constitutional committee is that a
broad spectrum of independent opinion is generated - might have
stressed that the objectives of an armed action should be assessed in
the context of its consequences - economic, international and
regional.
The downside consideration is a more important one than the upside.
The downside price paid by Pakistan at Kargil would have been rated as
simply too high in the context of any possible upside scenario:
a) By having Pakistan agree to the inviolability of the LoC, we have
played right into India's hand of obtaining world sanction of giving
LoC the sacrosanctity of an international border.
b) China has been forced to tilt in the direction of being a South
Asian mediator. Remember, China has always been our ally before. China
agreed to support Pakistan if pressed to do so at the Security Council
and the United Nations, but Nawaz Sharif was clearly advised of
China's reservations on the Kargil operation.
Wiser counsel could also have prevailed upon our hawks to realize that
in the totally unpredictable scenario of a nuclear war, the very
existence of Pakistan is more in peril than is India's. Confrontation
with India over the past 50 years has apparently failed. Do we have
the strength to recognize other options?
Let us ask who are the real victors today of World War II: Germany or
England, Japan or Russia? The poet can take a larger view on the
questions of War and Peace. My dear Telemachus, The Trojan War is over
now; I don't recall who won it. (Brodsky)
Back
Top
|
