archive: The Pak. Design
The Pak. Design
Brig. Arun Bajpai (Retd.)
The Hindu
June 15, 1999
Title: The Pak. Design
Author: Brig. Arun Bajpai (Retd.)
Publication: The Hindu
Date: June 15, 1999
In was only in May last that the Pakistani intrusion across the Line
of Control (LoC) on ridges ranging in height from 15000 ft. to 17000
ft. in the Batalik-Kargil-Dras sector in Jammu and Kashmir, dominating
the Srinagar-Leh Highway, the lifeline for troops located on the
Siachen glacier and Ladakh, came to light. Pakistan has used heavily
armed Afghan mercenaries, given them suitable ranks alongwith regular
Pakistani Army soldiers, led by Pakistani Army officers. They were
instructed to cut the Srinagar-Leh Highway and stay put on these
heights, thereby altering the configuration of the LoC In this sector
and choking the supply lines of Indian troops righting at Siachen.
Their presence would also have facilitated large-scale induction of
infiltrators into the Kashmir Valley through the Zojila Pass.
The Indian Army's counter-offensive, despite extreme difficulty of
terrain and climate, was swift. By May 20, more than two division
(30000 troops) strong force was assembled and launched to evict these
intruders. Para commandos were used to cut off their escape routes.
>From May 26, the Indian Air Force also joined in.
The Government and the entire Opposition stood as one in their resolve
to throw the intruders out. All this has upset the Pakistani
applecart. Now they know they have only two options left - either cut
down the cost and withdraw or face total annihilation. In both
events, they suffer tremendous loss of face, affecting the morale of
the insurgents to continue insurgency in Kashmir.
Today, the question agitating the minds of thinkers and military
planners in this country and abroad is, why Pakistan has resorted to
this mischief now, when relations between the two countries were
certainly improving after the bus diplomacy and the Lahore
Declaration early this year. To Pakistan's astonishment, India even
agreed to discuss Kashmir, an issue it had been refusing to broach for
the past 50 years. The answer lies in the Pakistani psyche of
deep-rooted mistrust of India and the belief that all these talks are
only a sideshow pandering to the wishes of the United States and the
West.
The catalyst of this mischief vas the G-8 countries resolution,
adopted in the wake of the nuclear tests conducted by both India and
Pakistan in May 1998, declaring that Kashmir is a Cashpoint for a
possible nuclear holocaust in South Asia. Pakistan immediately
latched on to it, and refused to solve the Kashmir issue bilaterally
under the Shimla Agreement. It left no stone unturned to
internationalise the issue, pleading for a third party mediation,
preferably by the U.S. A case in point is Mr. Nawaz Sharif abruptly
calling off his summit meeting with Mr. Vajpayee during the SAARC
conference in Colombo in July 1998.
Pakistan, however, took note of the talks on the CTBT going on at this
time between the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, and the
U.S. Under Secretary, Mr. Strobe Talbott. They were making' good
progress in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual understanding. At
the same time, for Pakistan, reeling under the U.S. economic
sanctions, the prospects of bankruptcy were looming large and it
needed the U.S. and the IMF to bad it out. Pakistan immediately
changed tack and from August 1998 started singing paeans on the Shimla
Agreement and showed interest in bilateral talks.
Feigning innocence
Before the Kargil operation could be launched, it needed a minimum of
five to six months for stocking supplies and ammunition at those
heights in addition to providing shelter to the intruders in extreme
cold and snow. All this had to be done in a clandestine manner. The
gameplan was to put across a smiling face to the unsuspecting Indians
to lull them into complacency. Meanwhile, the preparations on Kargil
went apace. By April-May, once the induction of intruders was
completed, the surprise operations were to be launched. Then feign
innocence to the Western world by saying that it is a local uprising
within India. To safeguard against the possibility of Indian armed
forces, twice the size of the Pakistani Army, pouncing on Pakistan in
an all-out war in retaliation to this mischief in Kargil, Pakistan
tested its Ghauri missile in March 1998 and inducted it into service.
The nuclear devices were tested in May 1998, making the security
shield complete. As against this, India has only the Prithvi missile
with 250 km range inducted in service so far. The Agni I with 2,000
km range is only a technology demonstrator and Agni II with 2,500 km
range has just been tested. Pakistan knows that, by next year, this
gap in the Indian missile capability will not exist.
India took Pakistan by surprise with the bus diplomacy of Mr. Vajpayee
in February, leading to the Lahore Declaration. It is quite possible
that Mr. Nawaz Sharif might have told the Pakistani Army in February
to abandon the Kargil plan but the Army went ahead on its OPM.
Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the misjudgement in the timing
of the launch of this operation by Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Western world are mired neck deep in the Kosovo
crisis least wanting another Cashpoint in the form of Kashmir. In
India, there is a caretaker Government and elections are due. Nobody
will believe that India can seek war with Pakistan at this stage, even
if the Pakistani propaganda tries its best to make people believe it.
Pakistan is already standing isolated in the world arena as an
irresponsible nuclear power and a mischief monger playing with
brinkmanship. There is also a possibility that Pakistan went for this
misadventure to get India involved in a border war, thereby easing the
pressure on Pakistan to sign the CTBT. India has already been let off
the hook by the U.S. due to the impending elections.
India has shown tremendous restraint despite all provocations by
Pakistan, including the downing of its fighter aircraft by missiles
fired from across the LoC, by limiting the scope of its military
operations and keeping it localised. Nevertheless, India cannot
always be reacting to Pak.-created situations and do the
fire-fighting. It should seize the initiative both diplomatically and
militarily to isolate Pakistan and drive it against the wall.
India should get across its message that it is prepared for all
consequences, including a nuclear war, but it will not part with even
an inch of its soil. On the diplomatic front, India should not allow
itself to be compelled to discuss Kashmir in isolation as demanded by
Pakistan. It should either discuss Kashmir and all the other related
issues or none at all. Talks will only he held bilaterally. There
will be no scope for third party mediation or U.N. intervention.
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