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archive: Was there an intelligence failure?

Was there an intelligence failure?

B. Raman
Frontline
July 30, 1999


    Title: Was there an intelligence failure? 
    Author: B. Raman
    Publication: Frontline
    Date: July 30, 1999 
    
    Only a detailed retrospective study, after the ejection of all the
    Pakistani invaders in the Drass-Kargil-Batalik sectors of Jammu and
    Kashmir, could bring out the complete picture of what went wrong with
    India's national security management in this area before May 6, 1999
    and how Pakistan's proxy invasion remained undetected until that day. 
    
    However, even at this stage one could make certain observations of
    relevance. The first is that Pakistan's proxy invasion took place in a
    sector which received low priority from the managers of national
    security for many years. 
    
    India has a system of holding a periodic review of border security
    management in different sectors along the Indo-Pakistan and
    Sino-Indian borders in order to identify gaps in trans-border security
    and take corrective action. It was as a result of such reviews that
    projects were undertaken to fence India's borders and the Line of
    Control (LoC) with Pakistan in Jammu, Punjab and upper Rajasthan, to
    intensify desert surveillance in Rajasthan and Bhuj and to step up
    coastal surveillance off Gujarat. 
    
    Unfortunately, such reviews were essentially preoccupied with
    trans-border security in the Sindh, Pakistani Punjab and
    Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). Equal attention was not paid to
    trans-border security in the Northern Areas of the Pakistan sector,
    consisting of Gilgit and Baltistan. 
    
    This was the result of an assumption that Pakistani infiltration from
    the Northern Areas into the Drass-Kargil-Batalik areas was the least
    likely in view of (a) the difficult terrain and the high ridges; (b)
    difficulty of access to these ridges from the Pakistani side; and (c)
    the unsympathetic attitude of the local population on the Indian side,
    mainly Shias and Buddhists to Pakistan. Hence, the infiltrators would
    not get local support. 
    
    The recent events have, however, proved this assumption wrong.
    Consequently, focus on trans-border surveillance in the Ladakh area
    was concentrated across the Sino-Indian border and little attention
    was paid to trans-LoC developments in the Northern Areas. 
    
    The second observation is that there were major gaps in India's
    knowledge of the Northern Areas. Indian intelligence was better
    informed on POK but had difficulty in collecting human intelligence
    from the Northern Areas because: 
    
    (a) There is very little trans-border traffic across the LoC in this
    sector in the form of relatives exchanging visits or traders and
    smugglers clandestinely crossing the LoC with their goods; 
    
    (b) Officials posted in the Indian High Commission in Islamabad or
    visitors from India are not allowed to visit this area; 
    
    (c) The Government of India too follows a very restrictive policy by
    not allowing the people of these areas to visit their relatives and
    friends in the Kargil tehsil. As such, no one approaches the Indian
    High Commission to obtain visas; 
    
    (d) The Northern Areas has very limited facilities for higher
    education. As a result, migration from there to earn a living abroad
    is not common. The Mirpuri diaspora in the United Kingdom and the
    United States, which is a useful reservoir of intelligence recruits
    for monitoring developments in POK, has practically no migrants from
    the Northern Areas. 
    
    These difficulties leave little scope for collection of human
    intelligence and hence, one has to depend on technical intelligence.
    Unfortunately, till recently, not only successive governments but the
    intelligence community itself gave low priority to these areas even
    for strengthening the technical intelligence capability. 
    
    Development of human sources in Chinese society is very difficult. It
    is comparatively easier in Pakistan, except in the Northern Areas and
    in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). As a result, in the
    allocation of resources to strengthen the technical intelligence
    capability, technical surveillance of China was always given top
    priority, followed by Sindh, Punjab and POK areas of Pakistan. The
    Northern Areas hardly received any attention. 
    
    Since no infiltration or invasion from the Northern Areas was
    apprehended, no detailed thinking went into gathering information
    about the areas either by the intelligence community or the Joint
    Intelligence Committee (JIC) or the inter-departmental committees
    concerned. Alternative ideas, such as taking advantage of the presence
    of a large Ismaili community in the Northern Areas which is well
    looked after by the Aga Khan Foundation, the only non-governmental
    organisation allowed by Pakistan to work in this area, have not been
    explored. 
    
    Gilgit and Baltistan have a large population of Punjabi and Pakhtoon
    settlers, many of them ex-servicemen, who were brought in by the
    Zia-ul-Haq regime in order to reduce the Kashmiri Shias to a minority.
    Until 1992, the Najibullah Government in Kabul, with good contacts
    among the Pakhtoon settlers of the Northern Areas and POK, was a good
    source of information regarding the goings-on in these areas. But
    after the overthrow of Najibullah in April 1992, this source dried up.
    India's present intelligence focus in Afghanistan is non-Pakhtoon
    centric. 
    
    The third observation is not specifically related to Indo-Pakistan
    relations and Kargil, but is of great relevance to toning up the work
    of the intelligence community in order to prevent similar surprises in
    the future. This is about the good performance of the intelligence
    community on strategic intelligence and its unsatisfactory record in
    the matter of tactical or preventive intelligence. 
    
    Strategic intelligence alerts the Government to changes in policy and
    strategy among other administrative decisions, but tactical
    intelligence gives details of action actually taken in the
    implementation of changes of policy, strategy and so on. Strategic
    intelligence makes one wiser but does not help in preventing
    disasters. Some examples in illustration would be in order: 
    
    * The intelligence community alerted the Government in 1988 that Rajiv
    Gandhi was on the hit-list of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
    (LTTE) and hence there was a threat to his life. But it could not
    collect tactical intelligence regarding the action actually taken by
    the LTTE to carry out its plan. 
    
    * The intelligence community reported in the second half of 1992 that
    the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had directed its surrogates in
    India to emulate the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and concentrate on
    economic targets and that the first attack might be on economic
    targets in Mumbai, but could not get details regarding the how, where
    and when of the attack. As a result, the Mumbai blasts of March 1993
    caught them napping. 
    
    * The intelligence community had been telling the government since
    1994 that Tamil Nadu was becoming a major centre of the activities of
    the ISI and Islamic fundamentalist parties, but was clueless about the
    preparations for the Coimbatore blasts of February 1998. 
    
    * Intelligence knew the background of Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the new
    Pakistani Chief of the Army Staff, and his reputation as a rogue
    elephant and his links with Islamic extremist organisations, but could
    not forecast his Kargil adventure. 
    
    Indian intelligence's poor record in tactical intelligence is owing to
    its poor progress in penetration operations. Unless one penetrates the
    ranks of an adversary, whether it is another country, a terrorist
    organisation or a religious extremist group, one cannot get details of
    the adversary's plans of action. Apart from the Pakistani Army
    regulars, the present invaders in the Kargil sector consist of the
    cadres of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Laskar-e-Taiba, the Al Badr,
    the Al Qaeda and the Hizbul Mujahideen. 
    
    Of these, the Laskar has its presence as far down South as Hyderabad
    and has been taking local recruits for training in secret camps in
    Kashmir or in Pakistan or Afghanistan. Had any Indian intelligence
    agency penetrated this organisation by taking advantage of its
    recruitment pattern, we would have been better informed of its plans
    in Kashmir. 
    
    Why this difficulty in penetration? Is it because of defective
    recruitment of intelligence officers, inadequate training and poor
    modus operandi, or are there other reasons? These questions have not
    received the attention they deserve. The Indian intelligence community
    is supposed to have had the longest period of interaction with the
    LTTE, but despite this it has not been able to penetrate it. 
    
    The fourth observation relates to the capability in technical
    intelligence, generally considered the most authentic form of
    intelligence. There are certain forms of technical intelligence
    capability that help in the collection of strategic intelligence, and
    certain others that help in tactical intelligence. The recently
    released recordings of the telephone conversations of Musharraf from
    Beijing are a good example of strategic intelligence collection
    through technical means. These recordings gave clinching evidence
    about the Pakistan Army's involvement in Kargil. All international
    telephone calls pass through satellites and it is relatively easy to
    monitor them if one has the equipment. No penetration of the
    adversary's set-up is required in order to monitor wireless
    communications or telephonic communications through satellites. 
    
    Land-line telephone communications, such as a telephonic conversation
    between a General in Rawalpindi and his subordinates in Skardu, are a
    more important source of tactical intelligence, But it is much more
    difficult to intercept land-line communications inside a country than
    to intercept international telephone calls made through satellites.
    For interception of internal telephone calls one may require physical
    access to the line to be monitored. Unless one is able to penetrate
    the telecommunications or military set-up of the adversary, one may
    not be able to get useful tactical intelligence through technical
    means. 
    
    The fifth observation relates to the lack of adequate attention paid
    in the intelligence community to the need to diversify its sources of
    procurement of technical equipment and to indigenise capabilities.
    Diversification and indigenisation have made satisfactory progress in
    respect of equipment for electronic monitoring, but not in respect of
    aerial reconnaissance, for which dependence on Western sources is
    disturbingly high, particularly since the Sino-Indian war of 1962. 
    
    Such equipment and expertise may come with an informal condition or at
    least an understanding that what is procured could be used only for
    the surveillance of China and not Pakistan, which is not desirable. 
    
    Over the years, the defence forces have either indigenised their
    equipment or benefited from the friendly relations with the former
    Soviet Union and the present Russian Federation for reducing their
    dependence on Western equipment and expertise. But similar efforts
    have not been made by the intelligence community. As a result of their
    close interactions with their Western counterparts in the past, they
    let themselves be infected by the basic Western suspicions of
    Communist countries and this has stood in the way of their
    diversification. 
    
    The sixth observation relates to relative threats to the nation's
    security from China and Pakistan. China's nuclear and missile
    capability, its military linkages with countries such as Myanmar, and
    its historic irredentist impulses make it a high priority area for
    intelligence focus, but it is not a threat to India's national
    security in the same sense as Pakistan is. After China gave up in 1979
    its policy of supporting the insurgencies of foreign Communist
    parties, destabilisation and balkanisation of India has not been a
    motivating factor in its policies towards India. 
    
    In the case of Pakistan, not only religious extremist organisations
    such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Laskar-e-Taiba, but even the
    state, its armed forces and intelligence agencies are motivated in
    their actions by a compulsive urge to promote destabilisation and
    balkanisation of India. This urge poses the greatest threat to India's
    national security and will continue to be a matter of major concern
    for many years, whatever be the cosmetic improvement in bilateral
    relations. By overlooking this urge in moments of unwarranted euphoria
    or misplaced generosity, India will be doing a great disservice to
    national security, as has already been done in Kargil. 
    
    The seventh observation is that feelings and noble sentiments have no
    place in intelligence policy formulation; it has to be based on a
    clinical and unemotional analysis of the nation's interests and
    threats to national security. For nearly 50 years, the intelligence
    policy on Pakistan was based on the assessment that the greatest
    threat to national security arises from Pakistan's Punjabi mindset and
    laid stress on the need for close interactions with the non-Punjabi
    sections of the Pakistani population for intelligence collection and
    for inducing restraint in the behaviour of the Pakistani Army in
    Kashmir. 
    
    In its uncritical enthusiasm for Nawaz Sharif after he returned to
    power in February 1997, India diluted this policy in order to befriend
    the Pakistani Punjabis in general and Sharif in particular; it has
    paid the price for it in Kargil. 
    
    The most important components of the national security management
    apparatus are the assessment and follow-up machineries. Even the best
    of intelligence collection agencies cannot protect national security
    if the assessment and follow-up action are not up to the mark. 
    
    This was the main lesson brought out by the Lord Franks Committee of
    the U.K., which inquired into allegations of intelligence failure with
    regard to the Argentine occupation of the Falklands. It exonerated the
    British intelligence community and the Navy and held the Joint
    Intelligence Committee exclusively responsible for the disaster. 
    
    One need not be surprised if a post-mortem into the Kargil invasion
    brings out a similar conclusion. 
    
    Whatever be the ultimate finding, one cannot deny that attention to
    the micro aspects of the functioning of the Indian intelligence needs
    immediate attention. 
    
    (B. Raman is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat,
    Government of India.)
    



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