archive: Of forgotten fighters (Interview with Lt.-Gen A.S. Kalkat.)
Of forgotten fighters (Interview with Lt.-Gen A.S. Kalkat.)
Posted by Ashok Chowgule (ashokvc@giasbm01.vsnl.net.in)
Frontline
July 30, 1999
Title: Of forgotten fighters (Interview with Lt.-Gen A.S. Kalkat.)
Author:
Publication: Frontline
Date: July 30, 1999
As the fighting in the Kargil sector reached a decisive phase,
military analysts were drawing comparisons between this latest round
and the battles fought by the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri
Lanka in the period between 1987 and 1990. In that operation, 70,000
young men and women, including soldiers, sailors, airmen and civilian
service personnel, fought in adverse conditions and hostile
circumstances for over two and a half years. But today, the nation
seems to have forget ten them. According to Lieutenant-General
(retired) A.S. Kalkat, who commanded the IPKF, they "fought with
honour and returned with dignity."
The valiant soldiers fighting in Kargil are given due recognition. In
a widespread and spontaneous response, the state, private enterprise
and individual citizens have contributed liberally to welfare funds
for the families of the dead and the wounded. However, a sort of
collective amnesia seems to have set in about the around 1,200 Indian
soldiers who were killed in the jungles of Sri Lanka.
Here, Lt.-Gen. Kalkat draws parallels between the IPKF experience and
the current one in the Kargil sector. Speaking to John Cherian in New
Delhi, Lt.-Gen. Kalkat said that it was still not too late for the
nation to recognise the sacrifices made by the IPKF soldiers.
Excerpts:
Q: Are there any comparisons to be drawn between the fighting in the
Kargil sector and the IPKF experience?
A: Yes and no. The IPKF operations as well as the operations in the
Kargil sector are infantry-predominant operations. What this means is
that in normal battles, the Air Force, and if there is a coastline,
the Navy, play important roles. The other components of the Army,
particularly tanks and heavy artillery, play a predominant role in
supporting the infantry. This results in much fewer casualties among
infantry soldiers.
However, in jungle terrain and in mountain warfare, the support of
tanks is almost absent. The ability of the Air Force to provide close
air support gets severely restricted and artillery support is not as
effective as in the plains. This is the common condition which we
soldiers faced in Sri Lanka and indeed face today in the Kargil
sector. This implies a much greater reliance by the infantry soldier
on his personal weapons and involves engaging the enemy eyeball to
eyeball in close combat, often fighting hand to hand ultimately to
destroy him. This kind of fighting in essence is the ultimate test of
human endurance, perseverance and courage.
The next common factor is that the engagements are not of large
formations, such as brigades and divisions. Most battles are fought at
the company and platoon levels, and because of this the performance of
the young officer, who is the company or platoon commander, becomes a
battle-winning factor. As I can see, the performance of the young
officer, which was outstanding in Sri Lanka as was evident from the
high proportion of officer casualties, is following a similar pattern
in the Kargil sector.
In both cases, our soldiers faced a battle-hardened adversary. In
Kargil, in addition to the regular Pakistan Army, there is the Afghan
Mujahideen; in Sri Lanka, there was the LTTE. Both the Afghan
Mujahideen and the LTTE have been rated among the most dangerous
militant-terrorist organisations in the world.
Another common factor is that the militants in both the cases have
been armed with the most sophisticated weaponry, often superior to
that used by the Indian infantry. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE had AK-47s.
We never had them. The LTTE also had better hand-held communication
equipment.
Q: Was the political environment different when the IPKF moved into
Sri Lanka?
A: When the IPKF first went in, there was great public euphoria for
two months. But the moment the fighting broke out in right earnest and
the body bags started coming home, the euphoria came down. Over a
period there were dissenting voices on the government's decision, and
indeed against the IPKF. One major political party placed its
opposition to the involvement of the IPKF in its election manifesto.
This seriously impaired the morale of the Indian soldiers fighting in
the jungles of Sri Lanka.
I am happy to say that today the entire nation is behind the Indian
soldier in one voice. This certainly makes the task of the commanders
easier in sustaining morale and commitment among their troops.
Q: Can this support be sustained for an extended period of time?
A: My main concern is that in case this confrontation lingers on for
long, media interest will start waning after some time. The time
should never come that the people of this country lose interest. That
is a dangerous scenario which will create the syndrome of 'a forgotten
army' - a feeling which had started to creep into the IPKF towards the
later stages.
Q: Was there a similar patriotic fervour when the IPKF was in action?
A: None whatsoever, except in Tamil Nadu, where there was great
awareness of the ongoing conflict in the north and east Sri Lanka. We
got symbolic gifts and donations but nothing substantive.
Q: Have the martyrs of that war been forgotten?
A: It is still not too late. There should be a memorial to commemorate
the memory of the soldiers who left the shores of India to fulfil the
country's solemn commitment to a friendly neighbour and for which they
gave their lives and never returned to their motherland. I would be
failing in my duty to the families of the valiant dead of the IPKF,
which I had the privilege to command, if I were not to speak on their
behalf. In a country where memorials and monuments are put up for all
and sundry, no government has seen it fit to lay even one stone or one
brick to commemorate the brave men of the Indian armed forces who laid
down their lives. There is no place for public recognition for their
sacrifices; there is no place where the families of the dead martyrs
can even place a wreath in memory of their loved ones.
Even though Vietnam was this century's most controversial and
unpopular involvement, the American nation did not forget its dead:
the Vietnam Memorial in Washington is the tribute of a grateful people
to the patriotism and sacrifice of its soldiers. A nation that does
not honour its dead heroes dishonours itself.
Since the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in March 1990,
successive governments have wished that it had never happened. Indeed,
some hoped that by disregarding it, it would be erased from the memory
of the nation. Be that as it may, some facts are incontrovertible and
can neither be wished away nor thrown into the dustbin of history.
First, it actually happened; second, 1,200 Indian soldiers sacrificed
their lives and more than 3,000 were wounded; third, a former Prime
Minister of our country was assassinated; fourth, the bloodbath in Sri
Lanka continues with even greater ferocity, and finally, neither the
government of Sri Lanka nor the LTTE nor all the political negotiators
since have come up with a better alternative to the Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord.
Q: Do you visualise a quick conclusion to the conflict in Kargil?
A: We do not know the details of the initiatives, talks and contacts
taking place at the covert level. Therefore, if one were to take the
statements in the press at face value, then it would appear that the
conflict would end soon. However, I am sceptical of commitments given
by Pakistan, particularly in respect to any issue in Kashmir.
Basically, Pakistan should stick to its words and ensure that the
militants are not allowed to operate. Pakistan should not be allowed
to wage a proxy war. In such a situation, we have no option but to
fight till the last infiltrator is driven out or killed.
Q: What are the options available for India?
A: At this stage we have two options. One is to carry on as we are
doing now - which is a long-drawn-out and time-consuming affair ...
Alternatively, cross the Line of Control (LoC) or the border at a time
and place of our choosing ultimately to destroy the invaders.
Obviously, around the area of the current operations, bypassing the
positions established by the infiltrators - lower to the LoC - may not
be possible since all existing gaps would have been plugged by the
regular Pakistan Army. Therefore we may have to seek the ingress
routes across the LoC away from the area. There are other alternatives
such as solely using air power to strike at their artillery which is
supporting the infiltrators from positions in Pakistan- Occupied
Kashmir (POK). Since Pakistan claims that it is not supporting the
Mujahideen, then it cannot complain that we have hit their guns. Of
course such an action raises the conflict to another level.
Nevertheless, if there seems a danger of this conflict lingering on,
it leaves India with no choice except to seek one of these options
than getting involved in a bleeding war.
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