archive: Psychotic State-II
Psychotic State-II
AD Moddie
The Statesman
July 20, 1999
Title: Psychotic State-II
Author: AD Moddie
Publication: The Statesman
Date: July 20, 1999
THE chiefs of the defence services have been complaining of being
starved of resources for India's vital defence needs in the last 15
years - the enemy is within, there can be no alibis of "foreign
hands". Every political party, every government, Centre and states,
every Parliament, the whole unproductive government resource-guzzling
apparatus, including bankrupt PSU's, SEB's and public utilities, have
created this resource crisis.
This led to financial bankruptcy in 1991, with no lessons learnt by
any political party, least of all the "progressive" Left, who would
steadfastly stand in the way of financial reforms and protect a few
million pampered PSU employees, to the neglect of the 350 million
people below the poverty line, and India's primary security needs.
Remember, the chameleon Communists in India sided with the British in
1942, and the Communist Tudeh party sided with Khomeini's Islamic
"revolution", which killed millions of Iranians, and increased
unemployment from the Shah's one million to 10 million; apart from
Indian Communists claiming Chairman Mao as their Chairman!
IDEOLOGY
Historically, the Left's primary security concern is that of its
political survival. Stripped of a bankrupt ideology, they can now only
parrot secularism. Their economic pampering of PSU employees has been
to the detriment of the poorer masses, India's security, and
development.
So, where do we go after India's own past record and Pakistan's latest
Kargil threat? What new politics, economies, and better security
preparedness?
First and foremost, our Intelligence should be so upgraded, so
technologically smart, so lynx-eyed, that we are never taken by
surprise again. That will only be possible if, a) Intelligence on
India's defence is given top priority with the best men and
technology, with no political favourites; b) the public impression
that India's Intelligence services have been largely misused for
intra-political purposes needs to be dispelled; c) the closest
coordination of Intelligence with the highest civil and military
authorities; and d) Indian Intelligence should have a strong
international reach. If surprise is the first law of threat and
aggression, sharp and prompt Intelligence is the first answer.
Second, there must be a national consensus for a) the defence service
chiefs to be full-time members of the National Security Council; b)
the council should meet every quarter and be a full-time, high quality
on-going mechanism, with no politicisation; c) the defence ministry
should be reformed to give the defence chiefs commensurate powers to
meet their responsibilities in respect of security needs in manpower,
technology, and military strategy within the government's perceptions
of national threats and national political objectives. It must be
clearly enunciated that the supremacy of the civil power is confined
to the political executive, and does not extend to the civil service
in the defence ministry. This vagueness has weakened our defence
capability by defence ministry babus.
Third, the defence committee of Parliament should acquire a
professional capability in defence matters, contribute to constructive
debates on defence, and ensure that Parliament gives sufficient time
to defence budgets and policies.
Fourth, a very realistic view in and outside government about the
nature of Pakistan as the real adversary is imperative. There is
insufficient appreciation in and outside government that the
Government of Pakistan is not a coherent or independent identity with
which to negotiate. More than most countries, it has diffuse
political, religious and economic power structures. We are dealing
with at least four semi-independent loosely related power organisms
with no democratic tradition of civil society and no joint
responsibility: the armed services, perhaps the most coherent
component; the ISI with a terrorist network involving narcotics and
arms trade; Afghan (possibly Bin Laden-inspired) and local
mercenaries, independently financed from narcotics, Saudi Arabia, and
foreign Pakistani sources ; and lastly, the world's most sustained and
effective motivators, the clerics spreading the archaic message of
"jehad" to thousands of gullible martyrs.
MOTIVATION
What an unstable pot-pourri of power with one common irrational
motivation, and no clear effective responsible and negotiating focus.
In this process of assessing the adversary, the daily Indian press has
confidently pointed to India's far larger GDP, and Pakistan's meagre
foreign reserves of only one billion dollars, as compared with India's
33 billion. Yet Sreedhar in The Week (20 June 1999) has pointed to, a)
half of Pakistan's GNP of Rs (P) 2750 billion being generated by the
parallel economy in smuggling, which can be mobilised for Kargil-type
operations at just Pak (P) 100 million, and b) the
Pakistan-Afghanistan narcotics trade is estimated to generate $15
billion, about half of India's foreign reserves (UN estimates).
Much of donations from abroad and some of the narcotics money goes
directly to Pakistan's army and ISI. Pakistan's war chest is diffuse
and unaccountable to the people of Pakistan, or its government and
Parliament. It reflects its incoherent diffusion of power. So, even
financially, the adversary threat should not be underestimated.
Striking at the narcotics trade and the international financial
institutions is as important as striking with Bofors guns.
Fifth, Indian politicians since Mrs Gandhi have provided the alibi of
"the foreign hand". Yet they themselves are responsible: a) for the
subversion of Intelligence and the government services for partisan
political political purposes; b) for the bankruptcy of 1991, and
subsequent resource shortages for defence, for social development in
education and health and to relieve poverty, for financial profligacy,
for uncontrolled fiscal deficits, for borrowings and expenditures
beyond means, for failures in the post-1991 reform process and their
inability to pass essential reform Bills; c) for the impressions they
give abroad and to Pakistan, in particular, of a corrupt and
debilitated state, becoming more so with each passing year. This is a
clear reflection of Derrida's Lie of the State and the State of the
Lie.
REFORM
So, the overall reform of the political and state system after Kargil
is the true test of the real patriotism of all Indian political
parties. Their credibility is at its lowest point, inviting external
aggression as a sign of weakness. India's security and development
cannot be assured without a strong economic base to generate far more
surplus resources, not fiscal deficits, financial profligacy and
corruption, the persistent plundering of politicians and their
criminal nexus. The ideological and economic lesson of the USSR is
lost on Indian politicians. Parliament and state legislatures will
need meaningful debates towards these ends, not mindless street brawls
in the well of the House.
After Kargil, what sort of example will Indian politicians and the
bureaucrats they have made their henchmen set our defence personnel to
strengthen, not weaken, India? At the next critical elections, the
electorate, media and NGOs must demand quick and effective economic
reforms, cleaner politics, and good government. There may be more and
worse Kargils to come. Listen to Nawaz Sharif even after Cologne. We
are dealing with a state whose psyche is torn between the 10th and
20th centuries; which is basically medieval, feudal and ferocious;
which cannot find peace within itself; and which does not have the
negotiating focus or mind-set of a modern state.
The only instrument of such a society and such a state in resolving
conflicts is by force. Its own constituents are its victims, from East
Pakistan to Sindh and Baluchistan - the inhuman use of force by
Muslims against Muslims again and again. There is no substitute for
realism in any doctrine of good neighbourliness with a medieval,
schizophrenic state.
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