archive: Roads that lead from Kargil
Roads that lead from Kargil
N. Krishnan
Asian Age
22 July 1999.
Title: Roads that lead from Kargil
Author: N. Krishnan
Publication: Asian Age
Date: 22 July 1999.
The future of the Lahore process became a big question mark as soon as
the Kargil perfidy of Pakistan came to light. The government rightly
declared that there would be no dialogue with Pakistan until the
intruders had been thrown out; the Opposition parties also readily
agreed. The government put the highest priority on the military action
to clear the areas and again the Opposition has been in agreement. For
the rest, however, there is not only no agreement but burgeoning
controversy fuelled by partisan politics of the worst kind. The ruling
party is preparing to "celebrate" the "victory"; the opposition
parties are crying hoarse that the Kashmir issue has been
internationalised. The media is awash with contradictory comments
expressing, on the one hand, satisfaction that Pakistan is being
forced by the US to withdraw and, on the other, apprehension that the
Americans are going to become meddlesome mediators. Now that the end
of the conflict is mercifully in sight it is even being asked whether
it was at all necessary to go running after G-8 and U/s support when
our armed forces were already finishing off the job on their own!
The time has come to think seriously about the post-Kargil scenario.
India is committed to a resumption of the Lahore process of dialogue.
Even if there may be a legitimate sentiment in the country that one
need not rush into talks with a neighbour who has just demonstrated
such bad faith and acted so callously, the inevitability of getting
back to the dialogue will be conceded. Let it also be recognized that
there will be intensified pressure from Pakistan to start the
dialogue, invoking the Clinton-Sharif statement which calls for it.
However, in realistic terms, any resumption of dialogue will not be
feasible until after September when a new government has taken over
after the elections. Mounting the military and diplomatic operation to
counter the Kargil intrusion was one thing but picking up the rudely
snapped thread of dialogue with Pakistan is quite another matter. No
caretaker government can do it.
This does not mean that we should not give serious thought to the
dialogue process and prepare ourselves for it. The temptation to think
in extreme terms should be resisted. We cannot wish away Pakistan nor
wipe it out. Nor can we expect that after this ignominious defeat,
militarily as well as diplomatically, Pakistan will overnight become
repentant and quiescent. On the contrary, the army as well as the
mujahideens will be baying for Nawaz Sharif's blood (assuming that he
manages to hold on to power). At the same time. Resuming the dialogue
in search of a settlement of our differences, including especially
Kashmir, need not be seen by India as a surrender or a sign of
weakness but rather as a far-seeing initiative taken in our own future
interests.
The next two months will necessarily be devoted to electioneering and
all the boasting blustering and rubbishing that goes with it. Would
it, however, be too much to hope that all the parties might
voluntarily accept restraint and not cross a mutually agreed threshold
in respect of Kargil, starting with the BJP itself, which should stop
seeking to derive political mileage out of it? If such a positive
beginning could be made, one could go further, and suggest that
think-tanks of the government as well as the major parties should get
together to talk in confidence to try and work out a strategy for the
talks.
Such a proposition might appear to be entirely fanciful. However, the
bitter Kargil experience following so soon after the euphorious
Lahore bus journey may provide the incentive for all parties to
submerge difference and come together to share ideas about what could
be realistically done to build peace with Pakistan, which means,
primarily, resolving the vexing issue of Kashmir; and leading from
that, what kind of guarantees would be needed to assure us of
Pakistani adherence to any agreement we may reach. In the absence of
such constructive preparatory thinking, resumption of the dialogue
would be no more that a sterile exercise. Passions would be aroused on
both sides. Pakistan would be seeking fresh misadventures. Meanwhile,
the enormous cost of holding Kargil would be added to the already
exorbitant expenditure on Siachen leading to even more draining of our
resources. India-Pakistan relations would go into a nose-dive and
tensions between the two will be heightened. It is imperative that the
resumed dialogue must start on new premises and seek to break fresh
ground.
The Kargil experience could provide the necessary motivation. Pakistan
would, it is to be hoped, have learnt the lesson and refrain from
similar transgressions and infiltration's into our territory. It is
equally to be hoped that the international community would also be
more vigilant in monitoring Pakistan's behaviour. India, for its part,
should recognise that it cannot procrastinate any further facing up
squarely to the problem of Kashmir.
If scrupulous for the LoC raising its status almost to that of an
international frontier and cessation of all further infiltration as
well as export of terrorism by Pakistan could be secured, it would be
tantamount to implicit acceptance of Kashmir's position as an integral
part of India. At the same time, the frustrations as well as
expectations of Kashmiris of various groups must receive India's
understanding and bold and imaginative action taken to win them over
with grant of greater autonomy.
Pakistan is no longer the strategic factor it was in US South Asia
policy. In fact, it may well become a liability. Its democracy is
fragile; it is no leader of modern and moderate forces of Islam but
is instead showing strong fundamentalist tendencies. It is fomenting
extremism and militancy and exporting terrorism. Pakistan may well be
a conduit for the spread of the Taliban which might only be too ready
to secure a foothold in Kashmir. In such a situation, the interests of
regional stability would surely be better served with Kashmir as an
integral part of India rather than as a part of Pakistan or a
Talibanised entity. The US and the world should be sensitised to these
realities.
The present conjuncture may provide the best opportunity for India to
negotiate a viable solution for Kashmir. Indian thinking must free
itself of the straitjacket of the past. In the bilateral dialogue with
Pakistan we must take full account of these new and emerging
configurations and exploit them to our advantage. US good offices,
when needed to provide stimulus, could be availed of by us.
The challenge of the post-Kargil period would be how to develop such
thinking and to build a consensus. A national government may be beyond
our reach, but surely a national policy on Kashmir is. Can Kargil be a
turning point?
(KRISHNAN is a former permanent representative to the United Nations.)
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