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archive: Roads that lead from Kargil

Roads that lead from Kargil

N. Krishnan
Asian Age
22 July 1999.


    Title: Roads that lead from Kargil
    Author: N. Krishnan
    Publication: Asian Age
    Date: 22 July 1999.
    
    The future of the Lahore process became a big question mark as soon as
    the Kargil perfidy of Pakistan came to light. The government rightly
    declared that there would be no dialogue with Pakistan until the
    intruders had been thrown out; the Opposition parties also readily
    agreed. The government put the highest priority on the military action
    to clear the areas and again the Opposition has been in agreement. For
    the rest, however, there is not only no agreement but burgeoning
    controversy fuelled by partisan politics of the worst kind. The ruling
    party is preparing to "celebrate" the "victory"; the opposition
    parties are crying hoarse that the Kashmir issue has been
    internationalised. The media is awash with contradictory comments
    expressing, on the one hand, satisfaction that Pakistan is being
    forced by the US to withdraw and, on the other, apprehension that the
    Americans are going to become meddlesome mediators. Now that the end
    of the conflict is mercifully in sight it is even being asked whether
    it was at all necessary to go running after G-8 and U/s support when
    our armed forces were already finishing off the job on their own! 
    
    The time has come to think seriously about the post-Kargil scenario.
    India is committed to a resumption of the Lahore process of dialogue.
    Even if there may be a legitimate sentiment in the country that one
    need not rush  into talks with a neighbour who has just demonstrated
    such bad faith and acted so callously, the inevitability of getting
    back to the dialogue will be conceded. Let it also be recognized that
    there will be  intensified pressure from Pakistan to start the
    dialogue, invoking the Clinton-Sharif statement which calls for it.
    However, in realistic terms, any resumption of dialogue will not be
    feasible until after September when a new government has taken over
    after the elections. Mounting the military and diplomatic operation to
    counter the Kargil intrusion was one thing but picking up the rudely
    snapped thread of dialogue with Pakistan is quite another matter. No
    caretaker government can do it.
    
    This does not mean that we should not give serious thought to the
    dialogue process and prepare ourselves for it. The temptation to think
    in extreme terms should be resisted. We cannot wish away Pakistan nor
    wipe it out. Nor can  we expect that after this ignominious defeat,
    militarily as well as diplomatically, Pakistan will overnight become
    repentant and quiescent. On the contrary, the army as well as the
    mujahideens will be baying for Nawaz Sharif's blood (assuming that he
    manages to hold on to power). At the same time. Resuming the dialogue
    in search of a settlement of our differences, including especially
    Kashmir, need not be seen by India as a surrender or a sign of
    weakness but rather as a far-seeing initiative taken in our own future
    interests.
    
    The next two months will necessarily be devoted to electioneering and
    all the boasting blustering and rubbishing that goes with it. Would
    it, however,  be too much to hope that all the parties might
    voluntarily accept restraint and not cross a mutually agreed threshold
    in respect of Kargil, starting with the BJP itself, which should stop
    seeking to derive political mileage out of it? If such a positive
    beginning could be made, one could go further, and suggest that
    think-tanks of the government as well as the major parties should get
    together to talk in confidence to try and work out a strategy for the
    talks.
    
    Such a proposition might appear to be entirely fanciful. However, the
    bitter Kargil experience following so soon after  the euphorious
    Lahore bus journey may provide the incentive for all parties to
    submerge difference and come together to share ideas about what could
    be realistically done to build peace with Pakistan, which means,
    primarily, resolving the vexing issue of Kashmir; and leading from
    that, what kind of guarantees would be needed to assure us of
    Pakistani adherence to any agreement we may reach. In the absence of
    such constructive preparatory thinking, resumption of the dialogue
    would be no more that a sterile exercise. Passions would be aroused on
    both sides. Pakistan would be seeking fresh misadventures. Meanwhile,
    the enormous cost of holding Kargil would be added to the already
    exorbitant expenditure on Siachen leading to even more draining of our
    resources. India-Pakistan relations would  go into a nose-dive and
    tensions between the two will be heightened. It is imperative that the
    resumed dialogue must start on new premises and seek to break fresh
    ground.
    
    The Kargil experience could provide the necessary motivation. Pakistan
    would, it is to be hoped, have learnt the lesson and refrain from
    similar transgressions and infiltration's into our territory. It is
    equally to be hoped that the international community would also be
    more vigilant in monitoring Pakistan's behaviour. India, for its part,
    should recognise that it cannot procrastinate any further facing up
    squarely to the problem of  Kashmir.
    
    If scrupulous for the LoC raising its status almost to that of an
    international frontier and cessation of all further infiltration as
    well as export of terrorism by Pakistan could be secured, it would be
    tantamount to implicit acceptance of Kashmir's position as an integral
    part of India. At the same time, the frustrations as well as
    expectations of Kashmiris of various groups must receive India's
    understanding and bold and imaginative action taken to win them over
    with grant of greater autonomy.
    
    Pakistan is no longer the strategic factor it was in US  South Asia
    policy. In fact, it may well become a liability. Its democracy is
    fragile; it is no leader of modern and moderate forces of  Islam  but
    is instead showing strong fundamentalist tendencies. It is fomenting
    extremism and militancy and exporting terrorism. Pakistan may well  be
    a conduit for the spread of the Taliban which might only be too ready
    to secure a foothold in Kashmir. In such a situation, the interests of
    regional stability would surely be better served with Kashmir  as an
    integral part of India rather than as a part of Pakistan or a
    Talibanised entity. The US and the world should be sensitised to these
    realities.
    
    The present conjuncture may provide the best opportunity for India to
    negotiate a viable solution for Kashmir. Indian thinking must free
    itself of the straitjacket of the past. In the bilateral dialogue with
    Pakistan we must take full account  of these new and emerging
    configurations and exploit them to our advantage. US good offices,
    when needed to provide stimulus, could be availed of by us.
    
    The challenge of the post-Kargil period would be how to develop such
    thinking and to build a consensus. A national government may be beyond
    our reach, but surely a national policy on Kashmir is. Can Kargil be a
    turning point?
    
    (KRISHNAN is a former permanent representative to the United Nations.)
    



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