archive: The jehadi: Pak's new big player
The jehadi: Pak's new big player
Bharat Bhushan
The Hindustan Times
July 19, 1999
Title: The jehadi: Pak's new big player
Author: Bharat Bhushan
Publication: The Hindustan Times
Date: July 19, 1999
New political personality is emerging in Pakistani politics which is
outside the electoral process but is influencing society through its
restlessness, turbulence and a belligerence arising out of a perceived
sense of injustice. The jehadi, a by-product of both Pakistan's
Afghan policy and the failure of the State to deliver either
economically or socially, now threatens to push Pakistani politics
rightwards.
The threat of religious extremism is more pronounced in some areas
than in others and is qualitatively different in different parts of
Pakistan. The term "Talibanisation" may be a good approximation to
describe the developments of the Islamic fundamentalist forces in
parts of the North-West Frontier Province, the Northern Areas and
Balochistan which have seen Afghan influence. However, in Pakistan
Punjab it is best described as the growth of Islamic sectarianism
between the Shias and Sunnis.
Overarching these developments and feeding into them directly are two
other important factors. One is what some Pakistanis, pointing to the
growing influence of religious schools run from mosques, call the
"madrasa-isation" of society. Another is the overall shift that has
taken place in Pakistani democratic politics - from the Pakistan
People's Party which was relatively more secular and describes itself
as modernist, to the Pakistan Muslim Leagi4e which has appropriated
the idiom and, to an extent, the agenda of the religious
fundamentalists.
Referring to the consequences of Pakistan's Afghan policy, a Pakistani
political observer said, "The politics of expediency leads to the law
of unforeseen consequences. Our inability to recognise the domestic
consequences of certain kind of international behaviour is a prime
example of this. If the first phase of the Afghan policy, when we
were hand-in-glove with the Americans, led to the drug and gun culture
in Pakistan, the second, the post-Taliban phase, has fuelled extremist
religious forces and unprecedented sectarian violence here."
Saba Khattak of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute said, "It
is not as if the Taliban influence is a future threat. It is already
happening.
Under the influence of the local mullahs, the Governor of NWFP has
already imposed the Sharia by signing the Shariah Nizam-I-Adl
Regulation 1999 in the Malakand Division. This means that two sets of
laws will apply in Pakistan. And this has been accepted by the
government.
Was not Nawaz Sharif himself trying to bring in the Sharia Bill
through the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment? So, these trends are
already there."
Except for those involved with the Afghan policy, opinion makers here
seem to accept that the Afghan djinn has come out of the bottle.
They, however, do not believe that to be the determining factor in the
growth of religious extremism, claiming that the fallout of
Afghanistan merely provided the context.
Frustrations of several kinds, they argue, have eroded some of the
fundamental structures of society and fuelled the belief that the
state sector can neither deliver economically nor in terms of human
development.
Under these circumstances, a millenarian message which promises
miracles and argues for a return to the faith and to martial law has
an appeal, they suggest.
"The developments in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution have both
impacted the Pakistani psyche in ways that most outsiders don't
understand," said one. Asfundiyar Wali, leader of the secular Awami
National Party, plays down the growing importance of the madrasas
saying that "they are only an improved version of the mosque" and that
if these had been politically effective, then there would be a cause
to worry.
However, others point out that Pakistan's expenditure on education
proportional to the Gross Domestic Product is less than that of even
Bhutan's at 1.6 per cent. The existing schools are unevenly spread
and meet only half the need - 98 million out of 135 million Pakistanis
are illiterate and 16 million children have no school to go to. It is
this gap that the madrasa tries to fill.
The State of Human Rights Report of Pakistan 1998, quoting official
reports on the madrasas says, "1,200 of these institutions were run by
religio-political parties.
Some 150 are reported to be nurseries for terrorism, with at least six
in Punjab declared sensitive and needing surveillance, with action
recommended against 200 of the teachers."
Instead of taking them head on, the government has in fact had to
retract a requirement for the madrasas to teach basic mathematics and
science for fear of a religious backlash!
As one commentator put it, "By producing children with an archaic
value system, these religious seminaries create a support base for the
Talibanisation of Pakistan, although it may be a very strong term to
use as of now."
In Pakistan Punjab, the religious fundamentalist group are largely
sectarian "It is not Talibanisation but religious sectarianism between
the Shias and the Sunnis. The Lashkar-I-Jhangvi, the armed wing of
the Sunni grouping, Sipah-e-Saheba, is carrying out a vendetta against
those belonging to the Sipah-I-Mohammed, the militant wing of the Shia
organisation, the Tehrik-I-Jafaria. The only redeeming thing is that
they don't have much support. If they gain mass support, then they
will create a vertical divide in society.
The worst affected will be the Pakistan Army. The State will not
allow that to happen," claimed Kahild Mahmud of the Institute of
Regional Studies.
It is only the Lashkar-I-Tayyeba which, although based in Punjab, is
above ethnic and religious sectarianism.
Its influence has grown in the last two years and its annual
congregations are bigger than the annual congresses that political
parties may be able to organise. It is the Lashkar-I-Tayyeba which
may represent a real potential organised threat to the Pakistani
political class.
While Pakistan's political parties are unable to attract even 50
people for a demonstration, the jehadis are getting more than ten
times that number even in Islamabad.
The westernised, modernistic elite of Pakistan understands the threat
from these forces which operate outside the political framework and
yet have emerged as important centres of power.
A number of people, however, believe that the situation is still
manageable as potential effective countervailing forces are present in
Pakistani society. But they fear that this may not be so ten years
down the line.
They believe that if the economy bounces back, the democratic
institutions of the state are strengthened and the people begin to
think that they can deliver social and economic justice, then
religious extremism can be checked.
More importantly, they believe that the Nawaz Sharif government
instead of checking the forces of religious extremism has been
creating a helpful atmosphere for their growth.
"Nawaz Sharif thinks that he is being clever in adopting their
agenda. He should know that this is the slippery slope of
compromise. They will gain by this, not him."
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