archive: India must handle Pakistan's blackmail with firmness
India must handle Pakistan's blackmail with firmness
M. V. Kamath
The Free Press Journal
July 22, 1999
Title: India must handle Pakistan's blackmail with firmness
Author: M. V. Kamath
Publication: The Free Press Journal
Date: July 22, 1999
Currently there is intense speculation in Delhi as else where as to
why the United States and, by implication, the G-8 has been overly
sympathetic to the Indian cause over Kargil. And why for that matter,
China which has had the closest relationship with Pakistan for over
three decades has been almost scrupulously neutral over the same
issue. How can one explain this newfound concern for India's
sovereignty and respect for the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir?
For close to fifty years the United States has been extremely critical
of India and one of its senior officials, Ms. Robin Raphael had even
gone to the extent of questioning the validity of Jammu & Kashmir's
accession to India. Overnight, as it were, much to the delight of
Delhi, Washington is singing a different tune. Some people see a
'paradigm shift' of United States policy toward the sub-continent in
India's favour. In India's favour? After all these years of Delhi's
frustration? Are we dreaming or asleep? Is it possible that the
United States will ever see the Kashmir issue from India's point of
view? At this stage it is necessary to point out some facts of life.
The U.S. State Department has not formally rejected the Rabin Raphael
thesis. What it has done - and what the G-8 have done -is merely to
say that the Line of Control in Kashmir is a fact of life, that it
cannot be ignored under any excuse and that Pakistan had better honour
it. No penalty has so far been threatened and probably none will be.
So where does the 'paradigm shift' come in the picture? Besides, how
is one to interpret President Clinton's offer to Pakistan Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif that he will take a "personal interest" in
accelerating the Indo-Pak dialogue? If it is not a face-saver, surely
it can be interpreted as a fig leaf to cover Pakistan's sins? And
still the fact remains that for the first time in. five decades - and
that is a long, long time - Washington has unambiguously backed India
in the latter's series of confrontations with Pakistan over Kashmir
since independence There are many who see in this a change of attitude
towards Delhi that is real and substantial. And many possible or
plausible reasons are offered for this change. One is that the United
States has no permanent friends but only permanent interests and
presently these interests happen to favour India. Time was when the
United States needed Pakistan to "contain" the Soviet Union and its
likely spread towards Afghanistan and onwards the Indian Ocean.
Pakistan, therefore, needed to be favoured even if it was under
military dictatorship.
Then again the United States needed Pakistan to establish contacts
with Beijing - witness Henry Kissinger's secret trip from Rawalpindi
to Beijing. Still later the United States wanted Pakistan's help to
establish links with the Taliban and therefore it suited Washington to
be sympathetic to-wards Islamabad. But now, it is claimed, Pakistan,
having served its usefulness to the United States, can be conveniently
ignored and India favoured. But why India? One school of thought
assumes that the United States is attracted towards India because of
the huge market it offers, especially considering that U.S. investment
in China has reached a saturation point and, in any event, the United
States has an adverse balance of trade with Beijing. But are
Americans fools to change their foreign policy overnight in the hope
that the emerging market in India will offer U.S. investors unlimited
scope? The emerging market has yet to materialise and Pepsi or
McDonald aren't exactly happy with the returns on their invested
capital. Indeed the slow pace of India's economic reforms must have
acted as a damper to the American investor's hopes of making it big,
though it also needs to be pointed out that the Chinese trade surplus
is almost five times larger than the two-way trade between India and
the United States. Investment in India, for all its trials and
tribulations will remain attractive. But if trade is not the reason
for America's about-turn what else is? Some experts point out to
Washington's concern over the growing fundamentalism noticeable in
Pakistan. Osama bin Laden may at one time have been the darling of
the Pentagon but he is now seen as an enemy who has to be shackled.
One report says that as part of the United States' help to get
Pakistan out of the mess it is now engaged in, Clinton has demanded an
assurance from Nawaz Sharif that bin Laden be 'delivered' to American
authorities soonest. Whether Nawaz Sharif can meet that demand is
another matter. But it is obvious that the United States is worried
over the growing nexus between the fundamentalists and the Pakistan
Army. If it is allowed to grow, it could turn out to be a menace not
only to Pakistan's immediate neighbour but the U.S. interests
everywhere. The United States also has to think not just of Jammu &
Kashmir but the countries to the north, especially Kazakhistan,
Kyrghistan, Tadjikistan, Usbekistan and Turbkmenistan. These are
predominantly Muslim countries some of which are known to possess
nuclear arms left over by the former Soviet Union. It would be a bad
day for the United States should they fall to the charms of Islamic
fundamentalism.
China, too, has good reason td be cautious of Pakistan despite the
fact that Beijing has supplied Pakistan not only missiles but
technical know how to build them. The truth of the matter is that
China cannot afford Islamic fundamentalism to spread to its far
western province of Sinkiang Uiger, a giant state of 633,802 square
miles, larger in area than Britain, France, Germany and Spain put
together. It is home to Lop Nor, where the Chinese usually conduct
their nuclear tests. It is also China's richest region in strategic
minerals. To add to China's concerns, its population is 75 per cent
Muslim. To let this sink into any fundamentalist morass would be
inviting trouble.
Both the United States and China, then, have reason to be disturbed in
developments in Pakistan. Today Pakistan could say that it has
nothing to do with the mujahideens who had crossed the LoC to get
entrenched in Indian territory. Tomorrow the same mujahideens could
be unleashed in the Central Asian Republics and in Sinkiang Uiger.
Where would that leave the United States and China?
The unspoken fear in Delhi is that, despite what American officials
today say about not wishing to be mediators in the Jammu & Kashmir
dispute they may well ask for some future quid pro from India for
standing by it today. Nawaz Sharif had gone to Washington and later
to London with the specific objective of 'internationalising' the
so-called Kashmir dispute. Indeed Islamabad already is claiming
'victory' on the grounds that that objective has been attained. This
may not be how India sees it, but can it be seriously argued that
America's new stand may not turn out to be the beginning of the very
internationalisation which is so repugnant to Delhi.
Internationalisation, by definition, means that official cognisance
has been taken note of by the U. N. Security Council and a resolution
passed on a given issue. The crossing of Pakistani forces of the LoC
into Indian territory has not been the subject of a Security Council
sitting. Unlike Jawaharlal Nehru,- Atal Bihari Vajpayee has not
rushed to the U.N. for getting redress. Nor has the Indian Prime
Minister appealed to Washington, London, Paris or Berlin, much less to
Beijing to interfere in India's dispute with Pakistan. Delhi wants
this to be strictly a bilateral matter - and there the matter ends.
The Pakistani leaders may hum and haw, they may wish to link Kargil
with Siachin - interestingly, and significantly the U.S. is not
agreeable to this - but India has stood firm and made it plain to all
concerned that the first condition for any talks is the total
withdrawal of Pakistani forces from Indian territory. If the invaders
and infiltrators do not go of their own accord, they will be forced
to. Certainly in Delhi there are no two opinions in this regard.
Pakistan may, in the words of one national newspaper, hedge the
obvious, highlight the dubious and evade the moral imperative - all
with a straight face - but it will not take it very far. It should
know, if it does not already know, that the game is up.
There has been much talk about the Tashkent and Simla Agreement both
of which were arrived at under specific conditions. The time has now
come for India to go beyond these Agreements, valuable as they were at
one time. India - and the rest of the world - knows exactly where the
LoC lies. Pakistan pretends that it is not aware of it as yet. In
that case India is free to suggest that the line extends far beyond
where it is now. For Pakistan's information, it has been illegally
occupying a third of the original Jammu & Kashmir. It has to clear
out of all the territory it is presently occupying. The question of
Siachin, therefore, just does not apply. To, make India's desertion
of Siachin as a precondition to holding talks as Pakistan demands is
neither here nor there.
Once Kargil and adjacent areas are cleared of Pakistani infiltrators
the real work of negotiating begins. To suggest that the present LoC
must be converted into an international border is for India to accept
defeat even before talks have started. Parliament has already passed
a resolution that insists that all of Kashmir belongs to India. All
future negotiations with Pakistan must start with this premise.
Nothing else would do. Pakistan has provided India with a golden
opportunity to enforce its will. It should not be given up. It is
inconceivable that Pakistan should be shown any concessions. That
time is past. This time India must impose its will, and not be cowed
by the fact that Pakistan has nuclear bombs. The only language
blackmailers understand is firmness. And that is the language that
Delhi must learn to speak.
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