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archive: 'Kargil campaign is good tonic for the country and army'

'Kargil campaign is good tonic for the country and army'

Posted by Ashok Chowgule (ashokvc@giasbm01.vsnl.net.in)
Rediff on Net
July 27, 1999


    Title: 'Kargil campaign is good tonic for the country and army'
    (Interview with General Ved Prakash Malik
    Author: 
    Publication: Rediff on Net
    Date: July 27, 1999 
    
    When Major General (retired) Ashok K Mehta interviewed General Ved
    Prakash Malik, the army chief of staff was of the firm belief that the
    war was not over yet. He warned that we are "dealing with an enemy who
    is unpredictable, unreliable and tell lies."   At what stage were you
    most worried during the war? 
    
    Well, in the beginning, just when it all started, there was anxiety as
    the picture was not very clear. Later, it was during the battle for
    Tololing heights and Point 5140 in Drass that I kept my fingers
    crossed. That was the success that I was looking for. 
    
    When did you realise that the army was over the hump? 
    
    It was after the capture of the Tiger Hill, Point 4875 and Point 5303
    in Drass. And Point 5203 in Batalik. 
    
    What would you have done had the enemy cut off the Leh road and/or
    occupied the Zojila Pass? 
    
    If he had just cut the road, I would have attacked him from the east
    and west. I brought in 6 Mountain Division partly through Upshi-Manali
    and the rest through Zojila. Had Zojila been lost, it would have
    forced the conflict beyond the LoC -- a much wider conflict. 
    
    To what do you attribute the success of the operations? 
    
    The strength of our jawans, the strength of military leadership --
    from commanding officers down to junior officers, particularly young
    officers who have led the boys from up front. Other than this is the
    abundance of regimental spirit. Take the recovery of Major Saravanan's
    body from Jubar by 1 Bihar. The jawans kept vigil for 25 days and
    refused to withdraw till the body was recovered. 
    
    Artillery has been a significant ingredient of success. Also, the
    air-strikes on logistic bases such as Mantho Dhalo and precision
    strikes on Tiger Hill. Air was not as effective against enemy posts,
    but the IAF kept innovating and were ever willing. 
    
    Who fought the battles? 
    
    The divisional commanders and below. They were involved in the
    planning and conduct of operations with the corps and army commander
    overseeing. 
    
    Anything else on the war? 
    
    I have seen commanders down in the dumps one day rise in spirit after
    a nudge -- a stick-and-carrot works. It is important for senior
    commanders to visit the battle zone without interfering in its
    conduct. I made six trips to the front and I don't think I made myself
    objectionable. In fact, I could help by arranging the immediate needs
    for battle -- air photos, binoculars, guns --bypassing normal
    channels. 
    
    Did you get a free hand to fight the war? 
    
    Yes, except for the restriction on crossing the LoC. I will not, at
    this stage, say anything more on this as the war is not over. The
    decision not to cross it initially was correct. The three service
    chiefs would meet the Cabinet every day and were kept informed of the
    non-military aspects of the war. 
    
    Did you have any problems at all? 
    
    Not really. I won't discuss the larger problems right now. But there
    was no interference from any quarter in the conduct of the campaign. 
    
    But crossing the LoC..? 
    
    The operations are not over, so I won't say anything more on this. But
    there were many positive aspects of civil-military relations. There
    was close co-ordination and harmony with the ministry of external
    affairs. I'd been kept informed and consulted where necessary,
    including by the national security adviser. 
    
    All the three service chiefs have been part of the consultation
    process but I'm the one most intimately involved in the war. The navy
    has played its role and made its own contribution to the war effort.
    I'm afraid I cannot tell you how. 
    
    Why did the army wait 50 years to declare 1999 the Year of the Jawan? 
    
    You should ask me why I declared it now, not why it did not happen in
    the past. I cannot answer for the past. The army and the nation needed
    to focus on the jawan, his strengths, and make up his shortcomings in
    welfare, career management, training and most of all, his izzat. 
    
    There is a comprehensive plan for addressing these problems in every
    army command. The aim is to improve the quality of life and other
    facilities for the jawan. The state of transit camps has been
    improved, he can now travel by air to the North-East and J&K and other
    facilities are in the pipeline. But this is not a job for the army
    alone. The country, the people and the government of the day have to
    get together for this. 
    
    Are you relieved the war is over? 
    
    As I told you, for me it is not over. I do not trust Pakistan. He may
    not leave! 
    
    But I am more confident now after Kargil about the Indian armed forces
    juggernaut. It is moving and is effective. One feels sorry for the
    human losses we have suffered. But the Kargil campaign is a good tonic
    for the country and the army. The credit for this must go to the
    jawan. 
    
    We owe it to the jawans for reminding the nation to be prepared and
    conscious of its security needs.
    



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