archive: 'Through the travail and fire of Kargil our nation has been
'Through the travail and fire of Kargil our nation has been
Posted by Ashok Chowgule (ashokvc@giasbm01.vsnl.net.in)
The Rediff Special
July 29, 1999.
Title: 'Through the travail and fire of Kargil our nation has been
renewed' (Interview with Jaswant Singh)
Author:
Publication: The Rediff Special
Date: July 29, 1999.
It is now time to look ahead; to look beyond Kargil. But even in
charting our course for the future we have to assess what Kargil 1999
was all about. What were the challenges -- military and diplomatic?
What new facets of our total national commitment and endeavour
emerged? What lessons for the years that lie ahead? 'Operation Vijay'
-- as the prime minister said some days back -- has resulted in
'Vijay' for India. As we re-examine the military and diplomatic
challenges that then confronted us, and which were successfully
managed, we need to have a preliminary analysis, draw some first
conclusions and above all, looking beyond Kargil, draw a route chart
for the tomorrows to come.
First, the military dimension. Kargil was a military aggression by
Pakistan, with Pak army regulars, across a stretch of the LoC, in four
pockets. From the Mushkoh Valley in the west to Tartuk in the
Yaldor-Batalik sector in the east. Initially, with the aggressor -- as
with all aggressors -- lay the element of surprise. This was soon
countered locally. Initially, the terrain, too, conferred some
advantage to the aggressor. They had intruded along ridgelines to
occupy some key heights and features that dominated a vital road link,
between Drass and Kargil. The depth of the ridgelines north of the LoC
and their gradients, along with nullah approaches, enabled the
Pakistan army to provide crucial logistical and administrative support
to their troops.
The Indian army's response to the military challenge was measured yet
swift; it was focused, thus effective. The first task was to contain
the intrusion. For this an accurate assessment was necessary about the
degree and extent of it. This involved, amongst other activities the
drawing of fire. Simultaneously, a redeployment of troops took place.
Through a successful containment of the aggressor's intrusion was
ensured the inevitable defeat of this misadventure by Pakistan. The
element of surprise was countered by the Indian army through the speed
and lethality of its response. On May 26, the Air Force swung into
action in support of the ground operations.
Our military objective had been clearly spelt out to the intruders --
retreat or the Indian army shall evict you. In any event once the
intruder's aim of interfering with the Drass-Kargil Highway had been
thwarted, the whole rationale of this aggression had got defeated. A
mere holding of heights was militarily a counter productive venture.
They were bound to be evicted -- in detail -- one by one; for their
occupation served scant military purpose. For India, occupation of
territory, south of the LoC, was simply not acceptable both physically
and as a violation of a principle. Tactical surprise having been lost
early by the aggressor, the military principles of superior force,
concentration and firepower were bound to tell. And they did,
decisively. This phase of eviction did not, indeed could not be a
phase of battles of manoeuvre. The nature of the terrain, the
adversary's dispositions plus most importantly our self-imposed
restraints about the LoC, precluded those options. The battles for the
heights thus became classic infantry actions in high altitude,
combining mountaineering and fighting, against fixed enemy positions
at a higher elevation. They were actions that demanded grit, stamina
and dauntless courage. Our troops displayed all these qualities in
full measure.
Let us be clear about one other vital aspect. This aggression in
Kargil sector was by the Pak regular army, it had the logistic and
administrative support of not the Pakistani Army alone but of their
total state machinery. Secondly, this misadventure was not aimed at
infiltrating into the Srinagar Valley, it was to occupy territory in
Kargil and in holding that. This purpose, too, was defeated.
The Kargil aggression is not an extension of the problem of externally
aided and abetted cross border terrorism that we have combated up till
now. It is an overspill of the 'Afghanistan' disorder syndrome.' That
is also why it had to be defeated. In parallel to the military, we
also had major diplomatic challenges on our hands. A firm signal had
to be conveyed to Pakistan, as also a clear and unambiguous message to
the international community. Let us accept that in today's age no
conflict, least of all one between two nuclear weapons possessing
states can escape global media spotlight. This was an additional and a
new factor. Managing all these required a qualitatively new level of
coordination between the two wings of the South Block -- the
ministries of defence and external affairs. This, too was achieved to
demonstrable effect.
Of course, Kargil posed a challenge both to the substance of our
foreign policy as also to the conduct of our diplomacy. The prime
minister had at the very beginning directed the MEA that the true
challenge lay in turning back the aggressor, in defeating all his
designs, in reversing the aggression but with the maximum of
restraint. The MEA had, therefore, also placed before itself the
objective of protecting the international flank of the MoD; so that
our operations on the ground and in the air could go on unhindered.
This was also achieved in no insignificant measure. The first
requirement, thus, was establishing the fact of Pakistan's intrusion
and aggression. I would venture to claim that we succeeded in doing
so. The next requirement was to spell our objectives with clarity,
consistency and candour. This was done early, repeated whenever
necessary and can be summed up, sequentially, as the following
irreducible minimums. They were:
Pakistan's armed intrusion in Kargil will be evicted and its
aggression vacated. All Pakistan regular troops and extremist elements
under its command and control will have to withdraw. For this purpose,
our armed forces will take all necessary action on our side of the
Line of Control.
Once this intrusion has been cleared, Pakistan would need to reaffirm
the inviolability and sanctity of the Line of Control.
Dialogue, as part of the Lahore process, which after all, was
initiated by us could only then be resumed.
Our diplomatic machinery was geared fully to convey these objectives
to the international community, as being valid and worthy of support.
Continuous interaction was maintained, with all the major powers, and
the rest of the international community through our diplomatic
missions abroad, the diplomatic community in New Delhi and through
personal interaction. It is a measure of the justness of India's cause
that what I have cited above, as the irreducible minimums, found such
a large community of countries standing up in support. Principally,
let me repeat, it was because India's stand was recognised as just,
thus it was acted upon. It wish to also emphasise that the importance
of the inviolability and sanctity of the Line of Control, for
maintaining peace and tranquillity, was totally accepted by the
international community, and Pakistan was held as having violated this
Line. Its efforts at terming it as imprecise also failed. Even more,
the international community accepted India's view that Pakistan was
guilty also of transgressing the territory of trust. The international
community also concurred with our assertion that Kargil was a
manifestation of this medieval malevolence spilling over from
Afghanistan, that these were no freedom fighters, thus there was a
need to confront such impulses; in the interest not just of our region
but of the larger global community.
It is noteworthy that under the leadership of the prime minister the
ministries of external affairs and the ministry of defence worked as
one, the combined synergy of which demonstrated the true power and
effectiveness of the Indian State. This is, of course, how it should
be. But it is a matter of satisfaction nevertheless, that this was
achieved at a time of trial, a time which tests the mettle of any
government's machinery. In this is also a lesson for the future.
There was an added dimension to our total national endeavour. It was
the role of our media during the Kargil operations. It was marked by
exuberant enthusiasm bordering, at times, on the reckless. These young
men and women of the media, who were in Kargil brought the valour of
our troops, in the face of great odds, directly into the homes of our
citizens. They touched our hearts and eyes with the tales of the
bereaved and the families of the fallen. This was our first experience
of conflict in the television/information age. We learnt as we went
along. It would be no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the role of
the electronic and the print media, in fully informing and mobilising
public opinion, was an invaluable part of the total national effort to
meet the challenge of Kargil.
Why did Pakistan undertake such an ill-conceived misadventure?
Perhaps, they thought that they could translate the advantage of
tactical surprise into a strategic gain by bringing about a de facto
realignment of the LoC in the region, thus rendering the Srinagar-Leh
National Highway vulnerable. They were wrong. They miscalculated
India's resolve, they did not comprehend the sense of national outrage
at this blatant breach of trust, the sheer motivation of the Indian
soldiers and the leadership quality of the Indian Army officers who
led from the front.
Perhaps, Pakistan calculated on provoking India into an escalation.
They were wrong again because the decision of not crossing the LoC was
taken early and maintained scrupulously in the face of the high
casualties, and even when the decision to employ air power was taken.
The area of conflict was not expanded. Pakistan having disowned its
troops as 'freedom fighters' could hardly thereafter have opened up a
new front, to ease pressure in Kargil.
What of the future? Looking beyond Kargil provides us an opportunity
to renew our faith in ourselves, our society, our polity and our
nation. It compels us to look ahead in all fields of national
endeavour but particularly, in the spheres of national security and
foreign policy. One simple message emanating from Kargil is that
adequate resources have to be made available for national defence,
that the kind of relegation of defence needs that we witnessed in the
late eighties and nineties is unsound policy, that technological
upgradation cannot be postponed, that the nation must always think of
the welfare of those who are in the first rank of its defence.
Kargil has many pointers for our foreign policy and diplomacy too. As
in the present instance, we should always be ready to engage with the
world as full and responsible members of the international community,
but, of course, keeping our national priorities and interests as the
guiding principle; we ought to have no reluctance, leave alone fear,
in engaging with the world on any issue. Indeed, we serve the national
interest when we engage the world on the basis of equality and mutual
respect. Such engagement is the very substance of diplomacy. That is
not any internationalisation of an issue. Nor does it imply mediation
or any acceptance of intermediaries.
Issues have to be addressed bilaterally between concerned countries,
and in the case of India and Pakistan, that is what the Lahore process
is all about. We would like to renew that process and we would like
Pakistan to facilitate a resumption of the process, by reaffirming the
inviolability and sanctity of the Line of control. Clearly, a
sponsorship of terrorism across the Line of Control, or elsewhere, is
a violation of the Line of Control, as indeed of Simla Agreement and
Lahore Declaration. There is a need, for Pakistan, to abjure
sponsoring, aiding or abetting cross-border terrorism. These are not
any pre-conditions for dialogue. We are after all, the initiators of
this dialogue process and our commitment to it is firm and abiding.
But it is only right for our nation, at this juncture, to expect that
Pakistan will repair the damage that it has done to trust, that it
demonstrates this through concrete and tangible steps. Trust is not
built by engaging in dialogue in winter and committing aggression in
summer. Continuous calls for Jihad can also hardly be read as messages
for dialogue and peace. And it is in this vein that I suggest that
high pitched propaganda against India also does not inspire confidence
in Pakistan's interest in dialogue.
I would venture to suggest that Pakistan, too, has to come to terms
with its history, as indeed with its geography. It has to realise that
there simply is no military solution to what it presumes is its locus
standi in Jammu and Kashmir. It is, of course, for Pakistan to
determine its priorities but fomenting religious fundamentalism can
hardly be employed as a tool against want and poverty. India
recognises the permanence of the sovereign state of Pakistan and that
is final. While India remains ready for dialogue, the pace at which it
can move forward will depend entirely on when and how the state of
Pakistan, and what it has now become, permits it to do so.
Our foreign policy has not been fixated on Pakistan, but that has been
a significant preoccupation of it. We need to re-examine this in
detail. Globally, India has to move purposefully towards realising its
true dimensions as a major civilisational state, with its own
strategic autonomy and strategic space, born out of its economic and
political interaction with other countries particularly in the
Asia-Pacific community. The real wealth of a nation is its people.
History and paucity of appropriate resources prevented us from
participating in the economic transformations brought about since the
industrial Revolution. In 1820, Asia contributed 58 per cent of the
World GDP; today it is at 37 per cent; by 2020, expectations are that
it could regain the level of 200 years ago. India has a signal role to
play in the coming decades. With our democratic institutions, a large
skilled manpower base, geographic location, we must ensure that India
rides the crest of this wave.
Through the travail and fire of Kargil our nation has been renewed.
The mood though sombre, is confident. National will stands sharpened.
The sacrifice of our youth has not and will not be in vain. That is
the solemn message of Kargil to the nation and to the world. I
remember the poignant words of the memorial at Kohima, that stands
tall and proud on a hill, commemorating those who fell in another war.
When you go home
Tell them of us
And say
For your tomorrow
We gave our today.
This was the speech External Affairs Minister Jaswsant Singh delivered
at the India International Centre last week.
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