archive: Stupid is as stupid does
Stupid is as stupid does
Varsha Bhosle
Rediff on Net
June 28, 1999
Title: Stupid is as stupid does
Author: Varsha Bhosle
Publication: Rediff on Net
Date: June 28, 1999
In this Politically Correct Age, it's an absolute sin to attribute
traits to bunches of people. So naturally, I hold that blacks have
beat, Maadoos have money sense, Sikhs are sexy, and so on. Still, it's
all at a scientifically unproven level and I'm not about to start
defending my theories, no matter how fanatically I believe in them.
But I wonder about those systematic studies of the human psyche, which
are used by strategists to understand an ally or enemy. Are such
profiles at all reliable?
Secondly, would an assessor's bias affect the interpretation? What
made Henry Kissinger say to Mao-Tse Tung, "For Ghandi (sic),
non-violence wasn't a philosophical principle, but because he thought
the British were too moralistic and sentimental to use violence
against. They are nonsentimental people... given the character and
diversity of the English people, [nonresistance] was only a way to
conduct the struggle against the British." Moralistic, sentimental,
nonsentimental -- as national characteristics. Freudian mumbo-jumbo,
perhaps. But if not, whose assessment was correct, Gandhiji's or
Kissinger's?
Pakistan, whose intelligence agencies were set up by the CIA, engages
in a study of not only the terrain of its operations, but also the
psyche of an adversary in order to predict his reaction. A three-year
research was undertaken by a lieutenant-colonel of the Pakistan army
for the Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Studies in the Command and
Staff College, Quetta, to monitor India's external response pattern
and delve into the Indian mind. Apart from analysis of tactics,
organisation and doctrinal aspects, its main thrust was to understand
the "Indian personality."
The paper imputes two traits -- "patience" and "intellectualism" --
which are of interest. It's no secret that all Pakistan thinks that
one Muslim can beat ten Hindus, but its military establishment now has
a "scientific study" asserting that Indians are patient to a point of
absurdity, and that the Indian's intellectualism results in his
supposed reluctance to pick up arms, because of which he's forced into
a strategy of defence based on concepts...
I admit, I thought so, too; and I believed them to be negative
factors. Till Kargil, that is. But the more I ponder Pakistan's
military history, and its present overdrive, and our own retaliatory
actions, the more I feel we're A-Ok. Pakistan is everything we are not
-- indeed, they exemplify the antonyms for "patient" and
"intellectual." And frankly, if we're erring at all, I'd rather we err
in the direction of the "Indian" traits. Can't help it -- it's the
Hindu tilt towards buddhi-vaad.
It can't be denied by even Natwar that India has gained a
psychological superiority over Pakistan -- country-to-country, and
through the support of the international community. If war hysteria
had been our aim, all Mr Jaswant Singh had to do was release pictures
of the mangled bodies of the six jawans, and bingo! But India played
by the rules and is playing very cleverly -- consider the calibrated
military response to the intrusion, the revising against evolving
situations, the explicit refusal to cede territory, the resolve to
localise the conflict, the rejection of third party mediation, the
continuing endorsement of the Lahore peace process, and the release of
the Musharraf transcripts...
All of which has made Pakistan look like a vicious buffoon state. For
it so unbalanced them that that idiot, Brig Qureshi, admitted to The
LA Times that Pakistani troops are fighting Indian soldiers at the
LoC; their equally daft PM made a nuclear threat; and rocket-scientist
Parvez Musharraf declared there will be no "unilateral withdrawal"
from Kargil -- thereby contradicting all avowals of Pakistan's
non-involvement -- and accorded military honours to a slain Harkat
mujahideen... They simply do not know what to do when faced with
restraint and discretion -- characteristics alien to the jihad
mindset.
It's silly to discuss whether or not India should open other fronts or
cross the LoC -- that's for the service chiefs to determine. If you
recall, even Mrs G had to postpone the liberation of Bangladesh on
General Sam Manekshaw's advice. But should we go gung-ho, I've no
doubt that Pakistan will suffer yet another Operation Gibraltar. Even
then -- as in the 1947 Operation Gulmarg -- Pakistan had put together
a force of "freedom fighters" (PoK civilians and army regulars) to
infiltrate and provoke an uprising in Kashmir while the Pakistan Army
was ready to "defend" the border. No, Pakistan is not known for
originality. For that, they'd need a tad of intellectualism...
The story of Operation Gibraltar and its adjunct, Operation Grand Slam
-- hastily launched when it was realised that Gibraltar was an
unmitigated fiasco -- is a laugh riot from start to finish. Gibraltar
was the infiltration operation, while the latter was the manoeuvre to
capture Akhnur-Jammu. Till today, no one can say why President Ayub
blundered into the war even when his officers were against it,
although all evidence points to then Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto's monomania.
However, one feature becomes clear from reading memoirs of that time:
There's a fault in the Pakistani personality. The Paki is amazingly
stupid, undisciplined and, worst of all, he wilts under pressure. It's
precisely this -- coupled with the "flaws" in the Indian personality,
of course -- that led to Pakistan's 1965 humiliation. So, how do I, no
psychologist, make this sweeping statement? Hey, it's history! You be
the judge -- while keeping in mind the recent kukri combat of the Naga
Regiment:
In August 1965, after the infiltrators began attacking posts in
Srinagar, Poonch and Kargil areas, Indian troops dressed like the
mujahideen and moved about in small groups to locate them. When found,
they were surrounded and subjected to mortar fire. The infiltrators,
who had received only three months training and no battle inoculation,
panicked and fled.
In the Rajauri area, the infiltration routes were not kept open by
Pakistani command. We sealed the routes, and they surrendered.
Phase I of Grand Slam started 20 hours behind schedule. Phase II began
2 days late because General Musa decided to change the commanding
officer on the day it was scheduled to begin.
On September 6, when the troops under Yahya Khan were about 25 miles
from the strategically vital Akhnur, the patient, intellectualising
Indians attacked across the international border at Jassar and Lahore:
Yahya instantly went on the defensive. Meanwhile, Pak's 13 Lancers had
advanced to where they could see the undefended Akhnur bridge, but
since they didn't receive orders to capture it - they stayed put! 13
Lancers yet have the milestone at which they halted; it says, "Akhnur,
4 Kilometres."
At the Jassar bridge, two companies of 3 Punjab, in an enclave across
the Ravi, were attacked by two battalions of our 29 Independent
Brigade. 3 Punjab fled across the bridge. In the morning, its
commander induced two tanks and a section of the battalion to cross
the bridge. The tanks got bogged down, and their pictures were
published worldwide.
Pak's Military Operations Directorate indicated to the Special
Services Group the major bridges to destroy, military targets to
sabotage and lines of communications to disrupt. Col SG Mehdi, who had
commanded the SSG for two years, had exaggerated its capabilities --
and refused the task. Gen Musa could only scream, "You have cheated
me!"
The SSG had agreed to paradrop commandos on three main Indian
airbases. On D-day, officers were randomly picked up and given a
perfunctory briefing. The Adampur airbase team was given a bundle of
quarter-inch maps printed in 1923 after they had boarded the aircraft.
The Pathankot team was dropped on the Amritsar Road; its commander
couldn't assemble the troops and all of them eventually surrendered.
The Halwara team was dropped on the roof-tops of a large village. Its
commander, too, couldn't assemble his men, but along with two men,
made his way to the airbase. When they reached it, a PAF aircraft
bombed the base.
When we thrice attacked the two enemy companies deployed across the
Jassar bridge, Pak's 15 Division ordered the bridge to be demolished
in such a hurry that its companies across the Chenab had to abandon
all the heavy weapons -- for us to pick.
When the commanding officer of 6 Lancers was shot dead on the turret
of his tank, the second in command refused to assume control -- and so
did the rest of the squadron officers. 6 Lancers became paralysed.
When the commander of 24 Cavalry was killed, this regiment, too, went
loco.
Pak's 4 Armoured Brigade secured Mastgarh without opposition, and
then, instead of advancing eastwards, moved towards the Pakistan
border.
10 FF occupied undefended Bhure Karimpur. The tank squadron supporting
the battalion got bogged down and asked for further operations to be
called off for the day. The request was denied and the brigade was
ordered to complete the mission by night. To this end, the commander
asked for -- and received -- a squadron for flank protection. However,
the brigade made no effort to follow orders.
Soon after the advance to capture Chima began, the brigade commander
discovered that 4 Cavalry and 10 FF were on wrong routes. He corrected
them, but didn't inform the 12 Cavalry squadron deployed at
Lakhna-Kalangar about the movements. When 10 FF tried to pass through,
12 Cavalry opened fire. 10 FF panicked, abandoned their armoured
personnel carriers, rushed past the brigade HQ -- where the company
under command of 4 Cavalry also joined them! The second in command of
the battalion spent the next few days recovering the abandoned
carriers.
4 Cavalry, with 11 tanks, reached Mile 32, but got bogged down. The
commanding officer didn't send a runner to the brigade to inform that
the objective had been occupied, and the brigade commander didn't
bother to establish communications. The crew of the swamped tanks
collected after nightfall, and the officer decided that if the brigade
didn't link up, he'd surrender. After sunrise, an Indian jeep came
along and a very surprised Sikh lieutenant saw a dozen empty M 47
Patton tanks lined up. He fetched a 10-man patrol; a white flag was
waved; and about a squadron-strength of 4 Cavalry surrendered.
24 Cavalry attacked Khem Karan-Bhikkiwind with two companies of 5 FF
and a squadron of tanks. The attack began well, but when one company
commander was killed and the other wounded, both the companies ran
back -- firing at their own men! 24 Cavalry, left without infantry,
fled.
Brig (retd) ZA Khan, in his book The Way It Was, writes: "The 1965 war
with India was started by us to force a favourable settlement of the
Kashmir dispute. It ended with the loss of over 5,000 Azad Kashmiris
forcibly recruited and sent as infiltrators... Operation Grand Slam
was very near a success but failed due to commanders and staff
officers, from the regimental to the divisional level, not being alert
to the opportunity... The discipline and the determination of our
troops in adversity requires a deep study. Generally when officers got
killed, the troops abandoned their mission... [Musa and Nur Khan]
asked for a ceasefire which was arranged and came into effect on 23
September."
Our Army says, "Besides losing sizable tracts of Pakistan, Ayub and
Musa lost their credibility and jobs... Pakistan trying to snap up
what did not belong to her had been administered a sharp rap on the
knuckles. Pakistan's allies did their bit to pull her out of a sticky
situation. The Chinese carried out some moves to forward positions and
unleashed a propaganda campaign. The Americans provided some moral and
equipment support. That was all."
So what else is new? Stupid is as stupid does...
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